

# **Localization of Aid – A Case of Bangladesh Flood 2017**



A Dissertation for the Degree of Masters in Disaster Management

By

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## **Abstract**

Today, only a small fraction of funding is given directly to local actors. An estimate from UN OCHA FTS dataset indicates local and national responders received only 2% of the humanitarian funding globally. Local and national NGOs combined are the critical actors in shifting the centre of gravity for humanitarian action. In this view this study aims to know about the types of partnership, best practices and shortfalls in terms of coordination among local / national NGOs and INGOs within the framework of localization. Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries to natural disasters as floods and cyclones and has experienced a great proliferation of civil society organizations widely known as NGOs since its independence. Recently it has been also introduced to Start Fund, which is notable among the limited global and national pooled fund led by NGOs for small/medium disasters for its immense speed with a keen interest on localization. But as funding cannot be a sole measure of progress on localisation and that other aspects are also critical, including increasing the quality of funding, building partnerships that are more equitable and strengthening national capacities, the study has adopted a seven dimension framework based on existing literature. The study adopted a mixed data collection technique and information was gathered administering a semi-structured questionnaire among the Start Funded agencies (INGOs and N/LNGOs). This study provided an opportunity to better understand how the Start Fund members operate in this setting, and how current practices, which are, partially but not only, shaped by Start Fund policies and procedures, relate to "localisation". It was found that, though N/LNGOs account for the major portion of the programmatic cost, they are unable to access sufficient management or operational costs. This is because there is little awareness about who is funding the Start Fund and how the Start Fund functions. The local staff of INGOs also confirmed that during the response because of the short time frame both local staff of INGOs and partners are overstretched. This as a result impacts the quality of partnership by causing lack of information sharing, collaboration etc. It can be recommended that appropriate funds should be allocated for staff salaries in the budget so it does not lead to brain drain during Start Funded response. There is also a need to safeguard a window of funding for NNGOs, as they will not always be able to compete for funding on the same terms as INGOs, in formats, with a jargon and a mind-set that over decades have been honed by the latter. The inclusive approach to set up the new fund (i.e. Start Fund Bangladesh) will be crucial if it is to have national ownership, with percentage of its budget going to national actors by 2020, and major reduction in intermediation.

## Acronyms

CNN	Cable News Network
CRS	Catholic Relief Service
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEPP	Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
DNA	Double Nucleic Acid
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture organization
FTS	Financial Tracking System
GBP	Great Britain Pound
GHP	Global Humanitarian Platform
HCTT	Humanitarian Coordination Task Team
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent
ICVA	International Committee of Voluntary Agencies
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IRC	International Relief Committee
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
LNGO	Local Non-Government Organization
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDRRC	National Disaster Risk Reduction Council
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NNGO	National Non-Government Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PoP	Principles of Partnership
PSC	Project Selection Committee

RCRC	Red Cross and Red Crescent
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Education Fund
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
WFP	World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background

Although more humanitarian assistance is being delivered than ever before—hitting a record \$24.5 billion in 2014 (Development Initiatives, 2015)—the need for aid is growing even faster. Tens of millions of people receive vital humanitarian aid every year, but millions more suffer without adequate help and protection, and their number is relentlessly rising. However, today’s system is overstretched, and humanitarian assistance is often insufficient, late, and inappropriate for the local context (Gingerich & Cohen, 2015).

In many cases, especially in smaller crises, humanitarian response that is conducted and led by local people and organizations—governments in countries affected by crises, assisted and held accountable by local civil societies—is faster and often more appropriate, and thus saves more lives. Local and national actors are almost always the first responders to sudden-onset crises (e.g., cyclones and flash floods) and often the only responders in the critical hours immediately following a disaster. For this reason, local actors usually are best placed to identify and address the particular needs of men and women. Because local actors are assisting their families, friends, and fellow citizens, and because they remain in the community when the international humanitarian response ends, they tend to be more accountable to affected populations. Also, shifting the centre of preparedness and response to the national and local level puts responsibility, decision making, and power where it should be: in the hands of the people affected most by crisis. They know the context and speak the language (Gingerich & Cohen, 2015). A growing body of evidence also demonstrates that partnerships with national and local organisations enhance the relevance, appropriateness, accountability and connectedness of humanitarian responses, and ensure better linking up of relief, rehabilitation and development. *“With appropriate support, a response that places local action at its centre can achieve levels of speed, quality, scale and outreach to equal or better the direct implementation of the largest international agencies.”* (Corbett, 2010)

Despite this, the current system favours working with large international actors, who frequently ignore local and national actors. Today, only a small fraction of funding is given directly to local actors. More often, local humanitarian aid workers take direction



from the international humanitarian community, which tends to relegate them to the role of subcontractors, rather than equal partners. This role leaves the local actors in no better position to prevent or respond to the next crisis.

An estimate from UN OCHA FTS dataset indicates local and national responders received only 2% (USD 445 million) of the humanitarian funding globally (UN OCHA, 2016). Local and national NGOs combined – critical actors in shifting the centre of gravity for humanitarian action – directly received 0.3% (USD 66 million) of total FTS-reported assistance, and 15% of the total going to national and local responders. It is assumed that more funding has reached local and national actors than the amounts reported to the FTS, and that local actors received considerably more indirect support, as partners and recipients of funding from international organisations. Nevertheless, it is clear that global targets are a long way from being met. Nor can volumes of funding be a sole measure of progress on localisation; other aspects are also critical, including increasing the quality of funding, building partnerships that are more equitable and strengthening national capacities (Charter for Change, 2014).

Bangladesh is one of the most environmentally vulnerable countries in the world and as it only recently moved from low income to lower middle income country status (in 2015), domestic resources remain stretched. Climate change and population growth will likely increase its exposure to cyclones and flooding (GFDRR, 2017). Between 2000 to 2013, the cost of disaster-related damage has been USD 10.8 billion, while the total international humanitarian assistance has been USD 878 million (Asian Development Bank, 2016).

Bangladesh is exposed to a wide range of disaster hazards, and is consistently ranked amongst the most vulnerable countries in the world, because of a “*disastrous combination of extreme exposure and high vulnerability*” (Alliance, 2012). This stems largely from its position and geography. Furthermore, Bangladesh is rated as the nation most vulnerable to global climate change (Harmeling, 2012), with the coastal areas predicated to be badly hit, increasing the impact of future disaster events. Bangladesh is seen as an example of the gains that can be made when a government commits to investing in Disaster Risk Reduction.

Civil society actors have played a central role the development of post-independence Bangladesh. Often cited internationally as a model for the positive role that civil society

can play in development, the NGO/CSO sector here is neither homogeneous nor without divisions, but instead consists of a broad range of actors collaborating and competing for their stake in the future of the country.

International aid agencies have also been present in Bangladesh for many years, while some present since the independence. The Start Fund has financed responses to seven alerts between August 2014 and September 2017. Three related to flooding, two to a cyclone, one related to landslides and one related to refugee influx. Therefore, it provides an opportunity to better understand how the Start Fund members operate in this setting, and how current practices, which are, partially but not only, shaped by Start Fund policies and procedures, relate to “*localisation*”. It also provides a rich opportunity to hear the experiences and perspectives of national and local agencies, and listen to some of the communities who benefitted from Start Funded relief.

In addition, the first “*national level Start fund/window*”, i.e. a country-level pooled fund has been established by Start according to its global principles in February 2017. Therefore, recommendations on this issue are intended to contribute to the ongoing work.

## **1.2 Objectives**

The broad objective of this study is the following.

To know about the types of partnership, coordination among local / national NGOs and INGOs within the framework of localization.

The specific objectives of this study are the following.

1. To capture the best practices and weaknesses of these partnership and coordination
2. To assess the overall localization process and situation
3. To identify the challenges towards localization

## **1.3 Operational Definitions**

Following the proposed definitions from IASC, National and local actors are of two types. The first of these being Local and national non-state actors has been defined as “*Organizations engaged in relief that are headquartered and operating in their own aid recipient country and which are not affiliated to an international NGO*”. A local

actor is not considered to be affiliated merely because it is part of a network, confederation or alliance wherein it maintains independent fundraising and governance systems. Local and national non-state actors include:

#### 1.3.1 National NGOs/civil society organisations (CSOs)

National NGOs/CSOs operating in the aid recipient country in which they are headquartered, working in multiple subnational regions, and not affiliated to an international NGO. This category can also include national faith-based organisations.

#### 1.3.2 Local NGOs/CSOs

Local NGOs/CSOs operating in a specific, geographically defined, subnational area of an aid recipient country, without affiliation to an international NGO/CSO. This category can also include community-based organisations and local faith-based organisations (IASC, 2018).

### **1.4 Significance**

The debate on localisation of humanitarian action has gained momentum in the past two years, following the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, yet its implementation is at an early stage. Many WHS participants debated whether the aid system was broken, the necessity for transformation, improved effectiveness, and the consistent increase in humanitarian needs. The vision and journey of localisation has been repeatedly confirmed as the “*right direction*”, not only because it is considered morally and ethically right but because there is an increasing body of evidence that localisation increases impact and improves effectiveness (ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Concern, Oxfam, Tear Fund, 2017). “*Localisation*” was a strong theme throughout the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and has maintained momentum since through several processes and commitments. Most notably, the Grand Bargain calls for a global, aggregated target of at least 25% of humanitarian funding to go to local and national actors “*as directly as possible*” by 2020 (UN OCHA, 2016).

Since the WHS, the humanitarian sector has continued to heavily focus on the feasibility of tracking direct and indirect funding to local and national organisations, including through the application of a “*localisation marker*” (Poole, 2017). As a result

means of tracking local and national actors access to resources, have become highly essential in holding international donors and agencies to account.

As the current humanitarian system and its foundations are routinely challenged to “*work differently*”, this study has been carried out of the current opportunities, challenges and good practice in the relationships between INGOs and local humanitarian actors. The core argument is that INGOs have to improve their partnership practices with local and national NGOs to better recognize and respond to their leadership, as well as to adapt accordingly their advocacy, media or fundraising work.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Northern Flood 2017


As of 17 August, an estimated 20 out of a total 64 districts have been affected by floods.

The situation was raised as a concern on 11 August. An estimated 3.5–3.9 million people have been affected. The affected districts span north, northeast, and southeast

Bangladesh. As neighbouring upstream countries are also experiencing major flooding, floods are expected to continue. At least 48–57 people have been killed, but the death toll is likely to be higher. The total number of temporarily displaced people is unclear as numbers from government agencies differ and are likely to be incomplete. The NDRCC estimates that as of 15 August 282,400 people are sheltering in 1,400 shelters (NDRCC, 2017).

The following figure shows the extent of flooding on August 18, 2017.

*Figure 1. Flood Inundation Forecasted Map*



(Flood Forecasting and Warning Center, 2017)

Among the affected districts, the northern districts were the most affected. The following table summarizes the extent of damage at the northern districts of Bangladesh.

Table 1. Impact of Floods 2017

District	Affected Upazilas	Affected Union	No. people affected	Damage shelter	No. people displaced	No. of Deaths	Crop damage (ha)
Bogra	3/12	29/109	103,900		1,200	2	
Dinajpur	13/13	78/78	457,100		173,800	23	120,700
Gaibandha	4/7	26/82	252,100	31,500	20,300		5,000
Jamalpur	5/7	32/68	565,500	9,700	4,000		
Kurigram	9/9	62/73	421,500	102,700	25,000	15	42,300
Lalmonirhat	5/5	35/45	411,000		8,900	5	25,000
Nilphamari	6/6	51/51	166,000		4,400	5	38,000
Panchagarh	5/5	40/43	181,200		7,500		
Rangpur	7/8	42/76	222,500	n/a	300		
Sirajganj	5/9	40/83	263,300	8,400	3,100		
Thakorgaon	5/5	44/51	115,200	23,300	23,000	1	26,000

(NDRCC, 2017; Dhaka Tribune, 2017)

## 2.2 Start Fund

Calls for more localised humanitarian action (Funding for local and national responders have increased attention on how pooled funding reaches people affected by crisis. Among the small number of global and national pooled funds led by NGOs, notably the Start Fund with one of the world's fastest financing mechanism to fill funding gaps for small and medium-scale emergencies. Since 1 April 2014, the Start Fund has demonstrated impressive strength. Despite being only three years young, it has already enabled its members to respond 95 times in 48 different countries, out of 148 alerts coming from 63 countries. As such, it rather than being driven by the “CNN effect”, the Start Fund focuses on less visible, smaller scale crises. As a collectively managed NGO pool fund, it actively encourages collaboration among its members, both at central and country level. It is actively exploring the creation of “national Start window” funds

in several countries and in early 2017, it has established a national Start Fund in Bangladesh. These are all significant and, notably, transformative achievements within the prevailing modus operandi of the international relief system. Yet, the Start Network has also expressed strong commitment to “*localisation*” (Patel & Brabant, 2017).

### **2.3 Localization of Aid**

This section looks at the history of humanitarian policy, summarizing key documents in which agencies discuss and frame the role of local actors in theory, and in practice. This will help to demonstrate how the humanitarian system is in theory already committed to locally led responses and understand the extent that needs to translate in practice by identifying blocks and key factors in “*successful*” ways of working between local and international actors. It also collates specific key aspects of localized responses including local leadership, financing arrangements, working with local volunteers and governments.

It should be noted that, there is no agreed definition within the literature of the terms “*localisation*” and “*locally-led*”. Given the lack of clear or broadly accepted definitions, this study has used the adapted the IASC definitions and the term “*localisation*” as the wider, generic term referring any process that is seeking to involve local actors (governments, NGOs, and communities) in the design and implementation and coordination of humanitarian responses. Rather the term “*locally-led*” refers more specifically to responses that are conceived or shaped by the affected populations themselves that may be supported or strengthened by outside assistance. Also, while focusing on locally led responses it was found that the majority of literature available is on traditional models of partnership which more accurately fall under the broader rubric of localisation. It was found that Funding for partnerships remains a challenging issue as funding for contingencies, NGOs have faced problems in “*No regrets*” - early action or quick response to a humanitarian emergency and reconfirms the necessity, as currently planned within Start and other agencies, for local NGO contingency funds for response (ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Concern, Oxfam, Tear Fund, 2017).

## 2.4 Global Guiding Documents

### 2.4.1 Grand Bargain

The Grand Bargain is an agreement between more than thirty of the biggest donors and aid providers, which aims to get more means into the hands of people in need. It was first proposed by the former UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing in its report *"Too Important to Fail: addressing the humanitarian financing gap"* (UN, 2016) as one of the solutions to address the humanitarian financing gap. It includes a series of changes in the working practices of donors and aid organisations that would deliver an extra billion dollars over five years for people in need of humanitarian aid and commits to providing 25 per cent of global humanitarian funding to local and national responders by 2020. The signatories commit to:

1. Greater transparency
2. More support and funding tools for local and national responders
3. Increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming
4. Reduce duplication and management costs with periodic functional reviews
5. Improve joint and impartial needs assessments
6. A participation revolution: include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect their lives
7. Increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding
8. Reduce the earmarking of donor contributions
9. Harmonise and simplify reporting requirements
10. Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors (UN OCHA, 2016)

### 2.4.2 Charter for Change

Fifty Southern-based national and local organisations have endorsed the Charter for Change, an initiative that intends to practically shift the way the humanitarian system operates to enable southern-based national actors to play an increased and more prominent role in humanitarian response. International NGOs (INGOs) are encouraged to play an active part in this shift towards a more locally driven humanitarian system by changing the way that they work.



The Charter for Change includes eight Commitments that INGOs agree to implement by May 2018 for Localisation of Humanitarian Aid System.

1. 20% of humanitarian DIRECT FUNDING to NNGOs
2. Reaffirm principles of PARTNERSHIP
3. TRANSPARENCY of funding that is passed to NNGOs
4. Address & prevent the negative impact of RECRUITING NNGO staff during emergencies;
5. ADVOCACY to emphasise the importance of national actors to humanitarian donors
6. Address subcontracting and ensure EQUALITY in decision-making
7. Provide robust organisational SUPPORT and capacity building
8. PROMOTE the role of local actors to media and public

INGOs that signed up to the Charter for Change agreed to pass at least 20% of their humanitarian funding to southern-based NGOs by May 2018. A subset of the 29 Charter for Change organisations have already begun tracing their onward funding to monitor progress. Preliminary analysis of the data shows that many have already surpassed the target, with several reporting the onward transfer of between 60% to 87% of funding received to local and national NGOs. Others are still striving to reach the 20% goal (Charter for Change, 2017).

#### 2.4.3 Principles of Partnership

The Global Humanitarian Platform (GHP) adopted Principles of Partnership (PoP) in 2007. Leaders of 40 humanitarian organisations including NGOs, UN agencies, IOM, the World Bank, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, originally set up the GHP in 2006. It was an attempt to acknowledge some gaps within the humanitarian reform process, which included neglecting the role of local and national humanitarian response capacity.

The PoP provide a framework for all actors in the humanitarian space in order to engage on a more equal, constructive and transparent setting. With an ever-increasing number and diversity of actors in the humanitarian sector, the PoP remain a key point of reference for partnership inception, development, implementation and review serving as a reminder that the implementation of humanitarian activities seeks to involve,

respect and react to valuable input from all partners and crisis-affected communities. The organizations participating in the GHP agree to base their partnership on the following principles:

1. Equality
2. Transparency
3. Result-oriented approach
4. Responsibility
5. Complementarity (UNHCR, 2008)

## 2.5 Conceptual Framework

This study builds on the seven distinct dimensions of localization and benchmarks based on the Grand Bargain commitments (Patel & Brabant, 2017). The most prominent of these is the commitment that, by 2020, no less than 25% of annually available (international) financing for relief action is to go “*as directly as possible*” to national and local actors. The other dimensions has been ascertained from the detail proceedings of the Grand Bargain document and an examination of the long-standing critiques and demands held by many national and local organisations around the world.

Figure 2. Seven Dimensions of Localization

FUNDING	PARTNERSHIPS	CAPACITY	PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION	COORDINATION MECHANISMS	VISIBILITY	POLICY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 25%</li> <li>• as directly as possible</li> <li>• better quality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• less sub contracting</li> <li>• More equitable</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional development</li> <li>• Stop undermining</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• of crisis affected communities</li> <li>• gender, age, disabilities...</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• national actors greater presence and influence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• roles, results and innovations by national actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• national actors greater presence and influence in international policy debates</li> </ul>

1. **Funding:** The commitment to ensure that at least 25% of internationally raised funding reaches national and local actors “*as directly as possible*”. For local actors, it is a much the quality of funding that is important (flexible, covering core costs, maintaining cash flow etc.) as it is the quantity. For INGOs too, this holds true. Furthermore, in middle-income countries, NNGOs are also looking to increased domestic fundraising.
2. **Partnerships:** More genuine and equitable partnerships, and less sub-contracting.

3. **Capacities:** More effective support for strong and sustainable institutional capacities, and less undermining of those capacities by international actors (e.g. funding direct project costs only; hiring away the best staff of national actors for their surge capacity);
4. A “*participation revolution*”: Fuller and more influential involvement of crisis-affected people in what relief is provided to them, and how.
5. National actors leading in coordination mechanisms: More presence and influence of national governmental and non-governmental actors in “*coordination*” mechanisms such as clusters (UN OCHA, 2016).
6. **Visibility:** Greater public recognition and visibility for the role, effort, contribution, innovation and achievements of local actors.
7. **Policy influence:** Increased presence of national actors in international policy discussions and a greater accounting of their views and proposals.

## CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY


### 3.1 Research Design

This exploratory study concentrates on both primary and secondary data. The study has deployed a mixed research methodology covering both qualitative and quantitative research methods. This particular methodology allows members from the INGOs and N/LNGOs to share their experiences, stories and knowledge. The pragmatic methodology has helped to unpack the problem situation and highlight a thorough remedial action in order to improve humanitarian responses.

### 3.2 Study Area

The study was conducted in five Start Fund Bangladesh response sites (i.e. Dinajpur, Kurigram, Jamalpur, Lalmonirhat, and Sirajganj) as showed in the following figure.

*Figure 3. Northern Flood 2017 Affected Population and Start Fund Bangladesh Response Sites (Study Areas)*



(Start Fund Bangladesh, 2017; NDRCC, 2017)

### 3.3 Timeline

The study was conducted during January to March 2018. The work schedule was as followed.

Table 2. Timeline

Key Activity	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5
Literature Review					
Data Collection					
Data Analysis and Reporting					

### 3.4 Data Collection

#### 3.4.1 Secondary Data

This paper draws on a wide range of sources including evaluations, reports and policy papers. In addition to these formal sources, the paper also seeks to draw on less traditional material including newspaper articles, blogs, webinars and recordings of events such as lectures and policy debates concerning locally-led responses to humanitarian crises and ways in which institutional aid organisations (local and international) agencies are supporting them. So related documents and reports to Start Fund Bangladesh’s Northern flood response 2017 were reviewed. In addition, to gather insight of the localization agenda Grand Bargain Commitments, Charter for Change, Principles of Partnership, World Humanitarian Summit proceedings were reviewed. During this stage, the literature and discussions with stakeholders have informed a thorough approach and research design, data collection tools and helped to identify additional stakeholders and arrangements for data collection.

#### 3.4.2 Primary Data

The research has used a combination of both qualitative and quantitative tools covering key informant interviews, and semi-structured questionnaire surveys to explore and analyse the context, incorporating human experiences and knowledge. The flexible structure has helped to explore interventions that are relevant and contextually appropriate. Relevant primary data to gather evidence around the localization dimensions was collected from responding INGOs and their partner NGOs.

#### 3.4.3 Sampling

Respondents were selected in consultation with awarded INGOs to ensure knowledgeable representatives of humanitarian and disaster management stakeholders.

Data was collected from following seven INGOs and their corresponding nine N/LNGOs partners for the Start Fund response.

Table 3. Sampled INGOs and N/LNGOs and their response sites

<b>N/LNGO</b>	<b>Partner INGO</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Upazila</b>	<b>Union</b>
<b>AID-Comilla</b>	Relief Intl	Kurigram	Bhurungamari Nageswari	Tilai, Pathardubi, Bongosonahat Kaligonj, Noonkhawa
<b>ASOD</b>	Concern Worldwide	Lalmonirhat	Hatibandha Kaliganj	Dawyabari, Paticapara, Sindurna Votmari
<b>BACE</b>	ActionAid	Jamalpur	Dewanganj Madarganj	Chukaibari, Chikajani Balijuri, Jorekhali
<b>CDC</b>	Handicap Intl	Dinajpur	Dinajpur Sadar	Shekhpura, Sosora, Fazilpur, Chehelgazi
<b>MJSKS</b>	Save the Children	Kurigram	Ulipur	Bajra, Buraburi and Begumganj Unions
<b>MMS</b>	Save the Children	Sirajganj	Chowhali	Sthall Char, Umarpur, Soudia- Chandpur
<b>NDP</b>	CARE	Sirajganj	Chowhali	Bagutia, Ghorjan
<b>RDRS</b>	Plan Intl	Kurigram	Chilmari	Chilmari, Austomir Char
<b>Solidarity</b>	CARE	Kurigram	Fulbari	Shimulbari, Borovita

(Start Fund Bangladesh, 2017)

### 3.5 Data Processing and Analysis

Quantitative data was analysed utilising descriptive statistical methods, while qualitative data was analysed through principle content analysis.

### 3.6 Limitation

Only northern flood affected districts have been considered as Start Fund responses were limited to this region by its mandate to activate only for small and medium emergencies. Only Start Fund responses were considered, as Start Fund Bangladesh has a very specific mandate towards localization. The reason for focusing on Start Fund responses was also the availability of information and considering the shortage of time and resources. In addition, for practical reasons concerning time and scope, this study concentrates on literature dating from 2009, with a few exceptions for key papers and case studies.

- The research focuses on how outsiders (specifically international agencies) can support locally led emergency response and does not attempt to describe local response per se.
- It focuses on humanitarian crisis not development, where the literature on supporting community-led action is plentiful. Neither does this paper take full account of the work done in disaster risk reduction or resilience building.
- Whereas literature in these fields contain important lessons learned that will be applicable to the emergency "*response*" stage. This was due to time and resource constraints in writing this paper.
- Literature on aspects of international response models such as accountability, community based monitoring and evaluation and communication with affected populations is not explored in depth in this paper.

### 3.7 Ethical Consideration

All participants were assured about confidentiality of the information to create a safe environment to share their views honestly and openly. Permission was also attained to use the information provided by them for this study.




## CHAPTER 4: EXISTING LOCALIZATION STATUS

### 4.1 Funding

Quality of funding refers to that national actors receive quality funding: there is a reasonable and unrestricted “*management fee*”.



Figure 4. Funding a) Delivery chain b) Cost sharing c) Management fee sharing



(Start Fund Bangladesh, 2017)

Among the collaborating NNGOs, there is a lack of awareness or mixed understanding of the Start Fund processes and the Start Network. The responses from NNGOs indicates that:

- Little awareness about who is funding the Start Fund and how the Start Fund functions;
- They are not informed about the full project budgets. Sometimes NNGOs are involved in setting their part of the budget; other times they are told that funding has been obtained and how much they will get for the response. They are not aware of the 10% management fee that is part of every Start funded budget nor of the 1% or lump sum allocation for learning or the 10% budget variation allowance. Management fees are not normally shared with “*implementing partners*”, though some cover some core costs but turn the flexible fee into earmarked budget lines. All NNGOs mentioned how valuable a flexible management fee would be to them as it would give them flexibility to cover the extra costs that often arise – even more so when proposals and budgets must be developed super-fast. It would also help them too invest in capacity strengthening if required.
- Two Start members mentioned the short timeframe being a reason not to get partners involved in the budgeting process.

Not knowing such important financial information, puts them in a weak position to bargain with the member agency that asks them to be part of or even carry out the actual response.

The proposals and reports for the responses indicate that non-member collaborating agencies, typically Bangladeshi NNGOs, played a major role in the implementation of most projects.

Various other financial issues were highlighted in the responses:

- While financial transfers to Start members in country happen very fast once an allocation is decided, there can be delays in the onward transfer (of part of it) to a collaboration agency. Because activities must start within 7 days, they may have to advance cash, sometimes without a formal agreement yet being concluded. Some of the Bangladeshi NNGOs, including several for whom saving-and-credit schemes are an important work stream, have a certain “*emergency response*” budget at hand.

- The Start procedures mean that proposals and budgets need to be put together very fast. It is not always possible then to fully factor in or accurately assess all and real costs of the response operation. There have been instances when collaborating / implementing NNGOs had to mobilise extra staff, or added in some of their own funds. Not knowing that Start allows a 10% margin of variability on an approved budget, they do not seek to recover this from the member agency.

Different NNGOs expressed concern over the speed and the short project period. There is a risk that having to produce or finalise a proposal and budget very fast, and Start operations within 7 days, the conditions for Start funding become an unintended incentive for more sub-contracting behaviour.


- *“They collect information from us to put in their proposal. The partners supply them with number of people affected and the needs on the ground”. It feels like “extracting information from us and then they package it up and sell it, we never know how much money is being raised”.*
- Some said that the budget allocated was not realistic and others said they returned the money they did not spend. Yet in a situation that is now well known, or fast changing on the ground, it is important to have some autonomy and flexibility. (They are not aware of the 10% variation allowance in the budget).
- The 45-day limit sometimes leads to the partners *“roping in”* anyone who can help to get the job done in time. Sometimes it becomes a real challenge, as this is not allocated in the budget. Depending on the hazard location sometimes more staff are needed but it has not been allocated in the budget. *“If everything has to done in 10 – 15 days we are running to please the process”.*
- In some locations access is very difficult, there is not even enough money allocated in the budget to get staff to and from the field locations. One interlocutor said, *“It means we have to invest our own resources which are then not repaid”.* There is very little room for negotiation. One person said *“Modality of partnership depends on tradition of subordinate relationship; the junior partners does not have much say”.*

- The local staff of INGOs also confirmed that during the response because of the short time frame both local staff of INGOs and partners are overstretched. “*We are working very long hours and in difficult circumstance and there is no compensation*”. Partners felt that they were being squeezed.
- There is also a matter of how long it takes the funds to be transferred to the NNGOs. Some said that the fund transfer is coming late. They suggested that there could be an agreement on a standard amount that can be mobilised by the NNGO from its own resources to respond immediately, which then can be replenished by the Start member agency.
- The 45-day implementation obligation is also a challenge for INGOs, as they also must collate information and report within those timelines. Even when some have had a long-term partnership, the timeframe is very tight.

## 4.2 Partnerships

In partnership relations, national actors are involved in the design of the proposal and budget, can observe or are fully informed about the project selection process and the reasons for its decisions, know the full budget and not just their part, as well as the financial flexibility and additional provisions (for example lump sum for learning) that are available

Figure 5. Partnerships a) Project adaptation b) Information sharing c) Involvement in design and budgeting



Three concerns from international agencies, that we hear around the globe, also came up in Bangladesh: National and local agencies have “*capacity*” weaknesses; some of their leaders are connected to political parties, which may compromise their ability to

implement according to humanitarian principles; and some of their leaders have been there for so long, that it is seen as a governance problem. While valid, such concerns cannot remain at the general level, and are assumptions that need to be tested.

- Capacity weaknesses issue came up in the post-project learning exercise. They may be real for NNGOs, but might also exist for INGOs for not having these effectively addressed yet?
- Most national civil society organisations see themselves not just as service-deliverers but also as part of the governance dynamics in their country. A connection to a political party is not an automatic indicator that the agency will not be willing or able to adhere to humanitarian principles. Political connections may actually be used to protect the integrity of the relief operation. The NNGOs also confirm that some of the INGO Start members, who have been in Bangladesh for decades, and are (largely) staffed by nationals, are always totally “*outside*” the dynamics in their environment. INGO staff also confirmed that “*most of us have migrated*” to INGOs.
- No leadership alternation may raise questions but cannot lead to an immediate interpretation. There certainly are Western INGOs where directors continue beyond the two terms that most national constitutions would allow their Presidents. NNGO leaders staying for a long time can also be one of the central pillars of stability and continuity in the organisation, when many other staff move regularly, including to join international agencies.

Several Start members have long-standing collaborations with local and national NGOs, often for development-oriented work or DRR work. Some have also “*stand by*” arrangements with NNGOs, underpinned by a MoU, as part of disaster preparedness.

The term “*partner*” in Bangladesh is used as indiscriminately as elsewhere and can cover any collaborative arrangements, ranging from a strategic, joint-decision making partnership, to a very functional sub-contracting relationship.

The quality of partnership is one of the key aspects identified in the localisation discussions. The issue of genuine “*partnership*” came out clearly in this study. Several of the Bangladeshi NNGOs pointed out that, notwithstanding long-term relationships, they are not involved in decision or design processes but essentially used to

“implement”. Our interlocutors from INGO members acknowledged that prevailing pattern.

Nobody in either group seemed to be aware or making active use, of the 2007 Principles of Partnership for the relief sector. Bangladeshi NNGOs value equitable partnership and see its necessity. They requested that there be a joint development of partnership principles and indicators to measure the actual state, and progress in the quality of the relationship. The study came across only one Start INGO member who has a score card tool and regularly uses it to gauge “*partner satisfaction*”.

The NNGOs interviewed felt that there is way to go towards achieving equitable relationship.

- The relationship often depended very much on the individuals in charge of the partner relations at country level, more than the agency as such. Some of these were felt to be open and more equitable minded, while others maintained very controlling attitudes, using their control of resources to exert power.
- Mention was also made of international alliances “*re-structuring*” or “*re-allocating*” which one leads in a particular country. The consequences could mean a change in INGO alliance member, with the newcomer oblivious off or not necessarily maintaining the same relationships with the same NNGOs. Long-standing relations are broken when a new structure is put into place. Long-standing partners are not involved in the decision of who is going to be the international alliance “*lead*” in their country;
- Some of the Start members that were interviewed said that they were going through a review process. One member confirmed that, “*We decided to have a smaller number of partners, there was a partnership evaluation. There was assessment of the books, the policies etc. so there is now a shift from project to strategic partnership*”. They carry out a partner review every two years. This is can be seen as positive move, however, NNGOs are powerless in the face of these decisions being taken that can affect them profoundly.


The conversations with Start member agencies acknowledged the broad issues, and that change was needed:

- “We use them depending on the project” .... “We get the information from them, they are the implementers and we are the thinkers” ... “How can we transfer that knowledge”
- “We all migrated from national and local NGOs...there was a discussion about how we can compensate them ... almost like a transfer fee in a cricket team when a talented player is transferred from one team to another”.
- Within Start membership, the processes are “member centric” at present.
- True partnership and a shift in the Start Fund will come when partners are part of the decision-making processes, in the allocation committee, project selection committee and in the governance processes.
- The “national window fund” that is being set up at present, is “a real opportunity to do things differently and demonstrate our commitment to localisation.”
- The national organisations are very good at implementing but they need to improve on Monitoring and Evaluation and Accountability.

### 4.3 Capacity

Capacity refers to that the staff of national actors is not actively approached or invited to apply for vacancies with international agencies and be part of “*capacity assessments*” of the international agency. In addition, those organisational capacity-strengthening efforts address the challenges for national actors of: 1) Financially sustainable organisations in a particular funding market; and 2) Maintaining staff with humanitarian skills through periods of non-crisis.

Figure 6. Capacity a) Recruitment b) capacity building support



The capacity of local and national organisations to deliver a quality response has been discussed widely in the debates on localisation. In Bangladesh, the partners involved in the alerts response are of varied size and capacity. Some run micro-credit programmes, have larger incomes than several INGOs, are nationally known and enjoy credibility, a good reputation and respect. Others are smaller and very local organisations very dependent on INGO and donor funding. The majority have been working with INGO partners for a long time.

*“Localisation” risks (sic) giving rise to a new wave of “capacity-strengthening” by INGOs, without critical review of why the earlier waves apparently were “not successful”. Also in Bangladesh, there is a history of “capacity-development”, often focused on technical capacities. One INGO interlocutor confirmed that we are now taking a new approach. A few NNGOs pointed out that “We have had our capacity built for more than 20 years, they keep giving us knowledge, but when will we get resources to actually practice what we have learned. Why are we still talking about capacity building?”*

The bigger challenge for many NNGOs is not to “build” but to “retain” capacity. Many NNGOs do not have the resources to have staff dedicated only to humanitarian response. Most staff have dual roles; in two organisations interviewed, the organisations had integrated DRR into the job descriptions of their regular staff. NNGOs confirmed that over the years they have regularly lost their staff to INGOs. They said their best talent is drained by INGOs, in some cases to their “partners”. It is indeed the case that 95% of the INGOs staff interviewed had worked for local or national organisation at some point in their career. NNGOs are losing staff to INGOs as they can pay better salaries, benefits and working conditions. An example was shared by a partner agency. *“A Field Facilitators can earn 25, 000 BDT in an INGO where we can only afford 10,000 BDT”*. One partner described it as *“culture of discrimination”* because donors do not allow local NGOs to offer such benefits for their staff. NNGOs felt they were taking the risk and investing in staff yet the benefits were going to the INGO partners. *“They are always trying to squeeze us”*.

Staff, who had joined INGOs, confirmed that they did so because of better salaries and benefits but also better opportunities for career progression and the chance to travel abroad. One female interlocutor said that it was in her long-term plan to go abroad and



experience other cultures. She said, “*It is difficult to be single and work here*”. Views were also expressed that sometimes staff leave because of poor management in local and national NGOs, that they do not make the most of the opportunities that are offered to them. However, they all agreed that it poses a structural problem for “*sustainable capacity*” especially for NNGOs.

Within the particular framework of the Start Fund (time-bound crisis response), the opportunities for impactful capacity-development (including for member agency staff) are limited:


- There is some opportunity in “*learning-by-doing*”. One member organisation confirmed that they had learned much by being of the project assessment and selection process and could now better advise their collaborating NNGOs on how to put together a winning proposal. More regular and fuller involvement of some “*partners*” in the fully alert-response cycle, will offer a few more individuals such learning opportunities;
- NNGOs, when scaling up in a crisis response, also take on project staff on short-term contracts, which does not necessarily attract people that are more experienced. When the project is finished, they have to let these go, so that their “*learning-by-doing*” experience gets lost.
- NNGOs often take part in the post-Start Fund-project “*learning events*”. Some were involved in the learning activities at Dhaka level. Sometimes a learning event is also at district level, which makes it potentially possible to involve local authorities. NNGOs that are regular collaborators with Start Network members expressed a wish to meet regularly to exchange experiences among each other, especially after a specific response. They also suggested that it would be useful to have regular dialogue to discuss issue that come up in implementing Start Funded projects.

#### **4.4 Participation Revolution**

Participation revolution indicates that crisis affected populations are given opportunities for collective reflection and learning, identifying their own priority learning questions; they may also be given the opportunity to insert their own priority questions in a real-time or post-project evaluation. In addition, crisis-affected populations are asked about their longer-term experience with crisis-situations and their

suggestions and proposals how to reduce the threat and/or their vulnerabilities, and how to more sustainably strengthen their resilience.

Figure 7. Participation revolution: Engagement of affected people in the responses



INGO and some NNGO agencies in Bangladesh are committed to the Core Humanitarian Standards. The commitment to “*participation of affected people*” was re-affirmed at the World Humanitarian Summit as a call for a “*participation revolution*”. This goes further than consultations about “*needs*”. There is increasing interest in how affected people can be involved in decision making about the assistance they receive. The Start Fund project templates have specific questions around this issue. It is also something that is considered, though not necessarily discussed in any detail, in the project selection meetings.

It was clear that agencies took different approaches to community participation. Some worked with the Upazila level administration to identify the most vulnerable and high-risk zones, and then worked at the village level to verify the targeted beneficiaries. Focused group discussions were held with the community to find out who is the most vulnerable. What was really helpful for some NNGO partners is their INGOs partner providing the very necessary boats as part of preparedness, so they can reach the remote Char areas, which were affected. All partners mentioned that the communities’ needs were far greater than the funds available and it was difficult to manage expectations from the communities and the authorities. Some mentioned that sometimes they were under great pressure from the political interests and they must negotiate very strongly. It helped to have clear criteria for the most vulnerable and it helped when the community themselves identified the individuals and families. Cash was the most preferred mode of response. It gives the people affected by floods the power to purchase things that they required in their own period.

*“All the agencies made unconditional cash transfers as they were deemed the best form of support, after discussions with the affected community”*. Learning and Evaluation peer review meeting for Alert B003 Bangladesh (Northern floods) Lessons and Actions.

Start funded responders find it hard to manage expectations from the affected communities, whose needs persist beyond the (usually) one-off 45-day project. Where an NNGO is the one delivering, and therefore in direct contact with the people, they must handle the frustrations and questions.

#### **4.5 Coordination Mechanisms**

In recognition of the need to improve the coordination between actors during periods of emergency, new structures were established in 2012, most notably the Humanitarian Coordination Task Team (HCTT). There are national level clusters in place for early recovery and shelter. Most of the Start members are present in these mechanisms, but only two NNGOs. The NNGO implementing agencies, which often carry out most of the humanitarian responses, are absent.


The project proposals mention national coordination mechanisms and national authorities. However, there is tension between speed and coordination with others. Several interlocutors mentioned that the government was too slow. There is Joint Needs Assessment process (JNA) however, in the decision making it is shown that agencies did not wait for the results of that JNA.

There is a real concern from local and national NGOs who are not more regularly connected to INGOs, that INGOs create more and more networks, which exclude many local and national actors, and compete against already existing networks.

#### **4.6 Visibility**

Visibility refers that the names of all national and local collaborators, including sub-contractors, appear in all reports to donors and external communication.

Figure 8. Visibility



They are not mentioned on the Start Fund website. Their visibility or not seems to depend largely the individual Start member's attitudes and practices. Some mention them on their websites in general terms.

Collaborating agencies typically provide information, but they are not sure how this is being used. They assume that the information provided by NNGOs is being packed and sold to raise more money, but they were not sure if their name would even appear in there.

NNGOs want more visibility with donors. Some NNGOs mentioned that they never get the opportunity to meet the donors. DFID in Bangladesh indicated it is very open to this.

#### **4.7 Policy Influence**

Dedicated websites, video clips and newsletters in different languages provide regular briefings to a wider audience that cannot participate directly, who can also feed in questions and proposals that are picked up and attended to.



## CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

### 5.1 Recommendation

- As a matter of principle and good practice, those that are likely to be part of a response, must be involved in the design of the proposal and the budget. They also need to be fully informed about the financial provisions that the Start Fund makes in terms of management fee, budget variation, post-project learning etc.
- When a proposal is approved, and a budget finalised, those that are part of the response have information about the budget and how it is allocated and for what among the different collaborating agencies. Collaborating agencies need to get a fair and unearmarked share of the management fee. They also need to take fully part in the decision whether to apply for the post-project learning budget, and what to use it for.
- The overall financial tracking needs to become more refined on a mandatory, not an optional, basis: It needs to distinguish what amount of money goes to whom, and on what terms, and what “*goes through*” and what “*goes to*” the different agencies. Cash flow issues in country, and possible contributions in kind or financial, from collaborating agencies, need to be captured and included in the overall reporting.
- Provide the possibility for long standing partners to access fund directly from the Start Fund well before 2020.
- Ensure there is a percentage of fund that can be accessed by partners directly without competing with Start INGO members. Their ability to write thorough proposals (in English) is not necessarily a direct indicator of their ability to do quality work.
- If needed, create a window for different levels of direct funding for NNGOs depending on their absorption capacity, as is sometimes done in other country-level pooled funds.
- Discuss and set partnership principles for the Start Funded projects.
- Partnership Principles included in the DNA of the national fund in Bangladesh.
- Carry out periodic. Reciprocal, assessment on the quality of relationship (one option could be scorecard already used by one agency).

- Organise a regular dialogue between Start members and non-member collaborators, with independent and trusted third-party facilitation, to increase understanding and learning.
- Monitor on what terms the money is passed on to partners to ensure it is not leading to more sub-contacting behaviour.
- Appropriate funds are allocated for staff salaries in the budget so it does not lead to brain drain during Start Funded response.
- More attention should be paid to safeguarding partner relationships in times of INGO changes.
- More systematic involvement of collaborating agencies in all stages of a response process, from the decision to alert, over the proposal development, the PSC decision-making, the learning reviews and the post-action learning opportunity, provides at least exposure to how others operate (including in a collaborative manner).
- Share the 10% management fee, flexibly and predictably, as a modest capacity-contribution. Guidance on appropriate budget allocation for hiring staff during implementation of a Start Funded project can lead to retaining good staff. Do not actively seek to hire good staff away from NNGOs, when you as INGOs implement directly.
- More structural capacity-support, “*within*” and “*between*” national agencies, takes place before and after the crisis-response. As a pilot, the Bangladesh window needs a Starting point and to not introduce lengthy Due Diligence and other processes in this phase – the ability to scale up needs to be built on learning from pilot.
- Capacity-development investments should not continue to be made however, in the absence of broader strategies to help NNGOs retain trained, experienced and qualified staff.
- Affected populations can be more actively involved in the post-project learning, if the learning exercise is brought to their locations.
- Document and disseminate the learning from women led approach.
- As per demand from the communities, should Start Member agencies and their partners more proactively take up advocacy in terms of longer term structural issues with the government, this could be their value added.

- Ensure space is created for partners to be included in the Start Network collaborations
- Map existing network and avoid creating new exclusive networks of local and national organisations as this can lead to fragmentation of local network capacity. Instead, support the already existing local mechanisms.
- Ensure involvement of local and national authorities in learning events to raise awareness about standards and good practice.
- Ensure that at least the names of all national and local collaborating agencies, appear in Start external communications (website, Facebook, public reports, donor reports).
- The Start Fund and the members whose projects are funded, highlight the role, contribution, achievements, etc. of the national / local actors. This could be written up or simply documented more quickly in an audio/visual recording. Start can make more public the contribution of partners, which will contribute to changing attitudes and perceptions about local agencies.
- When practically possible, Start members bring one or more of their regular partners along to meetings with donor representatives, and do not stand in the way of them having direct contact.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

Governments and NGOs in developing countries are calling for humanitarian responses to be more local or national in nature, and less international. This is because the current international humanitarian system, despite past reforms, concentrates power and funding in the hands of a small group of humanitarian actors who are largely located in richer countries. This is not only unjust but also extremely ineffective. It marginalises the skills, knowledge and capacities of thousands of local and national NGOs working on the frontline in times of emergency. Whereas, localising humanitarian action involves shifting financial and other resources, as well as power and agency, to local and national responders.

The analysis of the response funded by the Start Fund provides recommendations on what changes need to be made to contribute further to localisation. The first issue this report highlights is that improving the quality of relationship with NNGOs is key. It will lead to improvement in funding flows and quality of funding. The second is the



tension caused by the speed of response and working in partnership as well as intensive participation of affected populations. The third is the need for Start Fund processes to ensure inclusion of NNGOs in the various moments of an alert-response process. The fourth is the need to ensure that the new Start National Fund is set up in such a way that it creates a level playing field for NNGOs and INGOs. There is a need to safeguard a window of funding for NNGOs, as they will not always be able to compete for funding on the same terms as INGOs, in formats, with a jargon and a mind-set that over decades have been honed by the latter. The inclusive approach to set up the new fund is crucial if it is to have national ownership, and the Start Fund wants to help the Network achieve its stated goal of by percentage of its (global) budget going to national actors by 2020, with at least a major reduction in intermediation.

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## Annexures

### Annex 1: Questionnaire for Partner Agency (N/LNGOs)

Name :

Organization :

Address :

Email Address:

Mobile :

Date :

Are you aware about Start Fund and its mechanisms? a) Yes b) No

If yes, how do you feel about the establishment of Start Fund Bangladesh as a national window?.....

Did you receive any management fee? a) Yes b) No

Were you aware about the detail budget for the Start Fund response? a) Yes b) No

Were you aware about the availability of a 10% management cost? a) Yes b) No

If No, can you think of a reason?.....

Did you feel any difficulty in implementing Start Fund response in the short timeframe?.....

Did you contribute to the Start Fund response financially? If yes, how?.....

Were you able to negotiate the contract? If no, why?.....

Were you able to adapt the project as per contextual needs? a) Yes b) No

Did you have access to all project information? a) Yes b) No

Were you involved in developing the project proposal and budget? a) Yes b) No

If ..... yes,  
how?.....

Do you have a long term contract with the Start member INGO? a) Yes b)  
No

Are you aware about the following? a) Grand Bargain b) Charter for Change  
c) Principles of Partnership

From your point of view, what are the key factors that affect quality of partnership  
between N/LNGOs and INGOs?

Do the INGOs take your consent for recruiting any of your staffs? a) Yes b)  
No

Did you receive any capacity building support from the INGO?

What kind of capacity building support do you require? What are the  
challenges?.....

Did you engage the community in needs assessment, project design, project evaluation?  
a) Yes b) No

What ..... were ..... the  
challenges?.....

Are your names and logos mentioned in the reports? a) Yes b) No

How ..... possibly ..... your ..... visibility ..... be  
useful?.....

Annex 2: Questionnaire for Awarded Start Fund Member Agency (INGOs)

Name :

Organization :

Address :

Email Address:

Mobile :

Date :

If yes, how do you feel about the establishment of Start Fund Bangladesh as a national window?.....

Did you provide any management fee to your partner(s)? a) Yes b) No

If No, why not?.....

Do you believe N/LNGOs should have direct access to donor funds? If no, why?.....

Has anyone from your humanitarian team ever worked for N/LNGOs? a) Yes b) No

If yes, why did they migrate?.....

Also, were they recruited with consent from N/LNGOs? a) Yes b) No

Are you aware about the following? a) Grand Bargain b) Charter for Change

c) Principles of Partnership

Do you have a long term contract with the partner N/LNGO? a) Yes b) No

In general how are partner N/LNGOs managed by your agency? How are they engaged?.....

Do you provide any capacity building support to the N/LNGO? a) Yes b) No

Did you engage the community in needs assessment, project design, project evaluation?

a) Yes b) No

What ..... were ..... the  
challenges?.....

Do you mention the names and logos of the partner N/LNGOs in the reports?

a) Yes b) No