RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UPAZILA NIRBAHI OFFICER (UNO)   AND UPAZILA
CHAIRMEN (UZC) : STUDY ON 02   UPAZILA PARISHAD

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MA in Governance and Development

Submitted by

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MAGD,4th Batch

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Match 2013

MASTER IN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

INSTITUTE OF GOVERNANCE STUDIES

BRAC UNIVERSITY

BANGLADESH

DEDICATED TO

My Beloved Son

Aarique

Who was deprived from me during the study.

Abstract

Upazila Parishad is an important local government institution for rural development and socio-economic empowerment of the country, but a significant number of the *Upazila Parishad*s(UZP) failed to run effectively due to the unfriendly relationship between Upazila Nirbahi Officers(UNO) and *Upazila Chairmen*(UZC). This study disclosed that a number of factors affect this relationship. Among the factors, political intervention and existing anomalous Act of *Upazila Parishad* impede the relationship. On the other hand higher educational qualification, experience, responsibility regarding training and spontaneous communication were supportive to eliminate the obstacle and help to construct positive working relationship between UNO and UZC. This study also revealed that awareness of UNO and UZC about the public needs, and sacrificing mind of both to implement government order were helpful to make positive relationship. Positive working relationship between the two core actor like UNOs and UZC can ensure smooth functioning of *upazila parishad* and to establish transparent, accountable and participatory *upazila parishad*. Government should take policy to remove dual control system in *upazila parishad* for the sake of establishing *upazila parishad* as a root of democratic institution.

Contents

List of abbreviations

UZC   Upazila Parishad Chairmen

UNO   Upazila Nirbahi Officer

UZP   Upazila Parishad

UPC   Union Parishad Chairmen

UP   Union Parishad

MP   Member of The Parliament.

Chapter 01   Introductory discussion

Trust is the glue of life. It's the most essential ingredient in effective communication. It's the foundational principle that holds all relationships. – Stephen R. Covey

1.1 Background of the study

There exist a three-tier rural local government system in Bangladesh. The *Zilla Parishad* (ZP) at the top and the *Union Parishad* (UP) at the base of the hierarchy of local councils. Both the councils have been in existence for nearly 150 years and performed a range of regulatory, promotional and development functions. The middle tier, the *Upazila Parishad* (UZP) received widespread national and international recognition in the 1980s. It provided a new framework for promoting local democracy, essential service delivery mechanism and effective framework for rural development. It emphasized a formally decentralized administrative structure with delegation of powers to government departments and devolution of powers to local government institutions. It was dissolved in 1991 under pressures from the centripetal forces, especially the Members of the Parliament (MPs) and the bureaucracy before it could reach the take-off stage.

A law was enacted in 1998 providing for its revival but could not democratize it. The Election Commission, however, conducted UZP elections in January 2009, nearly one month after the general election in December 2008. Government amended the 1998 UZP Act in 2009 providing for some changes in the structure, composition and functions of the UZP. After nearly two decades, an elected local government council now exists at the *Upazila* level. The *Upazila* -a vital administrative unit of government has been functioning with a huge number of functionaries and substantially big amount of fund from national government. The Upazila Parishad Act 2009 created the opportunity to re-establish the people's body as the highest policy making and executing agency at *Upazila* level. This body will be a Local Government Institution known as *Upazila Parishad (UZP)* and truly run the *Upazila*. (Nizam *etal 2011*)

There are eighteen departments of central government that have been placed under UZP. The officers of these departments provide services to the people through the implementation of the policies/programs/projects of the national government at the *Upazila* level. Other than the transferred

department there are a variety of nongovernment organization are working at *Upazila* level. Chairmen of UZP can visit the activity of transferred department. *Upazila,* in fact, is a composite of multiple departments and each department needs the support and cooperation of UNO (*Upazila Nirbahi Officer*), UZC(*Upazila Chairmen*) and others to implement departmental programs effectively and efficiently Financial matter is jointly operated by UZC and UNO. UNO can visit and monitor the work of all departments at *Upazila* level as well as the chair of all tender evaluating committee. UNO is authorized to give opinions on selection and approval of projects and supervise the implementation process.

UNO is assigned to act as a "safety valve" on behalf of the government. He or she is authorized to inform the Local Government Division about any unusual circumstances and even request the UZP to reconsider its decision if it is believed to be disrupting the lives, health and security of the people (GOB, 2010: 59; UNDP, 2010). Therefore, it can be argued that as it may happen to the planning and implementation of development projects as a whole,UNO's role is also be affected by political, institutional and operational factors.

So the relationship between UZC and UNO is important and it will determine the ways of operation of UZP. Hence there has been a growing need of positive relationship between the UNO and UZC for smooth implementation of national government policies/programs/projects. Chairmen of all *Union Parishad* are the member of UZP. MP is the advisor of UZP. According to existing law UZP is bound to accept the advice of MP. Conflict between UNO and UZC affects the governance of UZP. The resolution of conflict is not only depended on rules stipulation but the manner and behavior of the two actors. Governance of a UZP is not only depended on UNO and UZC, it also depends on the local MP. (GOB, 2010: 59; UNDP, 2010)

After the *Upazila parishad* election 2009, Initially in some cases UZC captured the offices and vehicles of UNOs. This result was unwanted and bitter conflicts between UZC and UNOs. Later on, there were severe conflicts among MPs and UZC over resource allocation at the UZP level. Officials from central government showed their concern about negative practice by the UZC in project planning and selection. As time passed, UZC were provided the capacity building training by various agencies which reduced conflicts to some extent. After that UZP system provided the opportunity to undertake highly customized development projects according to the local needs.

The press and civil society often refer to the possibilities of some kinds of deadlock in the operation of the UZP because of the risk of conflict between the UZC and the local MP. They consider the intervention of the MP in the UZP affairs should be repealed and the UZC should be given the latitude s/he needs to run the UZP in a relatively free atmosphere. Even if the MP's control is withdrawn, there is no guarantee that the UZP will be free from politics and will be run in an ideal manner. A positive relationship of the two core actors like UNO and UZC can be considered as a first major step towards initiating good governance in UZP. Besides this, If the UZP take any wrong decision UNO is authorized to inform the government and ask the *parishad* to reconsider it. Therefore, positive relationship is required to prevent conflict and confusion between them. (Nizam *etal 2011*)

Naturally some questions arise like what are the factors that affect the relationship between UNO and UZC? In what circumstance UZP functioning effectively? Is the local politics influenced the function of UZP? Are the UZC unhappy due to existing rules? What measures facilitate in enhancing positive relationship between UNO and UZC? Given the multi-dimensional nature of work in respect of technical knowledge, expertise, experience UZC need to cooperate with UNO for attaining the objectives of the UZP. With the active cooperation and support, UZP has to play a significant role in rendering improved services to people and establish discipline in civil administration in the *Upazila* level. There are some committees such as Coordination Committee, Inter-departmental Committee , Standing Committee and some circulars, manuals, charter of duties and regulations through which UNOs and UZC have to maintains positive relationship with each other. Some local government experts observe that because of absence of conducive rules, low level of informal communication, political influence, lack of experience, training and lack of mutual trust, desired relationship between UNO and UZC was not found in most of the UZP. Positive relationship between the UNO and UZC is essential for the effective implementation of development programs and projects in different departments in the UZP. In this circumstances, this study is intended to examine the relationship between UNO and UZC in the existing UZP.

The purpose of the study is to identify the factors that affect the relationship and assess the impact of the factors in this relationship. It will contribute to implement the policies/programs/projects of the national government in efficient and effective way.

1.2 Significance of the study

The current UZP lack experience in carrying out development activities. Government has assigned the UNOs to assist the UZC in discharging their designated responsibilities. The government has tried to ensure good governance and maximum utilization of resource in UZP through the UNO considering that the elected representatives are not expert in project management. Local project planning, executing, monitoring and sustainability depend on UNO, UZC and officer of the concern department. The proposed research aims to examine the relationship between UNO and UZC based on some factors that affects/stimulates their working environment and behavior in *upazila* administration. There have been a number of studies on UZP. Most of the studies concentrate on the structural and administrative issue like coordination, bureaucratic role in UZP, ADP, efficiency of UZP etc. No specific study on relationship between the two core actors like UNO and UZC has yet been done. This   study will identify the factors that affect the relationship between UNO and UZC.

It will also assess the impact of the factors on this relationship as well as explore formal and informal relationship between the two that play a vital role in *Upazila* administration. Negative relationship is the cause of bad governance and delays project completion in UZP. Positive relation makes the UZP citizen centric and ensure good governance that is expected to all.

In addition to that in line with the decentralization 'rhetoric' of the Government some measures have been taken to decentralize the field administration in *Upazila* level. In this connection this study could be of great use to understand the existing realities of relationship between the UNO and UZC. The most common notion of relationship is rule-based and hierarchically organized. The process and practices of building formal and informal relationship is required to ensure effective administration. Coordination, inspection, training, education, experience and informal communication are the important instruments for achieving positive relationship. Due to the lack of specific rules and regulations, desired level of relationship has not been achieved.

The proposed research will give us some insight information/factors that help to fabricate positive relationship between UNO and UZC. It also explores the existing practice of relationship. It will help to identify the nature of problem that resists positive relationship and causes for ineffective UZP. This study will provide new dimension to academic, policy scholars and policy makers to understand the existing problems and to offer appropriate policy directions to overcome those problems. It will

also bridge the knowledge of gaps between the process and practices of the existing reality for ensuring effective relationship between the UNO and UZC.

1.3 Scope of the study

0power. UZC is the chief of the UZP and UNO is the secretary of the UZP.

Duty of a UNO is to assist the UZC to implement the executive work of UZP. UNO has to implement the retain and regulatory work of the central government. Central government has also vested power to UNO for implementing of Humanitarian Assistance program.

As a representative of the national government UNO has to coordinate all the development activity of *Upazila* administration. UZC is the local public representative. He/she knows very well about the sentiment of the local people. So for the sake of effective operation of UZP, positive relationship between the two core members is necessary. However, this study attempts to examine the factors that play a vital role in the relationship. The study will cover the relationship between UNO and UZC from Upazila administration point of view under *Upazila Parishad* Act 1998(amended 2009).

According to existing *Upazila Parishad* Act power is not in the hand of UZC rather it has been vested on UZP. All *Union Parishad Chairmen*(UPC) are the member of the UZP. The scope of the study is limited under the following areas:1) to identify the factor that affect the relationship between UNO and UZC. 2) to assess the impact of the factors on this relationship from the perspective of working relationship in UZP.

The study areas were the *Narsingdi Sadar Upazila Parishad* and *Rajbari sadar upazila parishad* focusing on relationship existed between UNO and UZC. These two *Upazila* were selected because of UNO *Rajbari Sadar* was male and senior while UNO of *Narsingdi Sadar* was female and junior to UNO of *Rajbari*. On the other hand, UZC of *Rajbari* was experienced, higher educated, member of ruling party while UZC of *Narsingdi* was opposite in character. Both of the *Upazila* were the previous posting place of the researcher and well accessible to the researcher. It was assumed that a combination of male/female, junior/senior, level of education, variety in political party and experience may add value and quality of the research.

1.4 Research objective

Positive relationship between the UNO and UZC is required for the effective functioning of the policies and programs of central government at the *Upazila* level. Main objective of the research were:

- To identify the factors affecting the relationship between UNO and UZC.
- To assess the impact of the factors in this relationship.

1.5 Research question

The main objective of the research is to identify the factor affecting relationship between UNO and UZC at existing UZP and assess the impact of factors on the relationship. For achieving the objectives of this study the following question can be asked to the respondent:

- What factors affect the relationship between UNO and UZC?

1.6 Limitation of the study

This study had enormous limitations. Because of time constraint only two *Upazilas* were covered for this study. During the interview session, Politician were less spontaneous to express their views. In this study sixteen respondents were interviewed because of time constraint. Moreover, the study was conducted in the context of relationship between UNO and UZC. In spite of pressure from SUJAN and *Upazila Parishad chairmen-vice chairmen* forum government has made them powerless and actual power were vested on UZP. In this context they were reluctant to respond.

1.7 Methodology

Data have been collected from two sources:

1) Primary Sources(PS)
2) Secondary Sources(SS)

In-depth interview method has been used to collect primary data. Interviews were conducted through constructing questionnaires with concern MP, *Upazila Chairman*, UNO, Officers of transferred departments like *Upazila* Engineer, *Upazila* Agriculture officer, *Upazila* Education officer, Project Implementation Officer and one *Union Parishad Chairman* (UPC)   of each UZP.

Secondary data were collected by reviewing relevant literature and research materials.

1.8 Study Area

Narsingdi sadar upazila parishad and *Rajbari sadar upazila parishad* were selected for sampling. UNOs of these two *Upazila* were unlike in gender and experienced, UZC were also dissimilar in the point of age, education, experience and political view.

1.9 Structure of the thesis

This thesis is consist of four chapters which are presented in below:

C**hapter One: Introductory Discussion**- It gives an overview of the research that includes
 background, significance of the study, scope of the study, research objectives, research questions, limitation of the study, methodology of collecting data and structure of the thesis.

Chapter Two: Theoretical and Analytical Framework- This chapter discusses the concept of democracy , types of decentralization, operational definition of the variables and an analytical framework.

Chapter three: Literature Review- This chapter discusses the context of introducing UZP and relevant literature.

Chapter four :Analysis and discussion. This chapter gives a brief overview of study area, what are the factors that affect the relationship between UNO and UZC and to assess the impact of the factors on the relationship.

Chapter Four: In this chapter, research findings and conclusion are discussed.

Chapter 2   **Theoretical and Analytical Framework.**

2.1 Introduction

After the forty- two years of independence and twenty two years of parliamentary democracy, Bangladesh is still struggling to achieve an effective democracy. Everybody talks about democracy but state has failed to put it into practice. According to President Abraham Lincoln, democracy is a government of the people, by the people and for the people. Democracy is that form of government in which the sovereign power of the state is in the hand of the people and people are the source of the state power and the people take part in the government directly or through their representatives.(Moudud   1995) . To ensuring democracy decentralization of power is necessary. Centralized power makes the government autocratic and corrupted. Decentralization of authority through establishing and empowering local government is considered as useful mean to ensure important aspects of good governance (Sarker 2003; Faguet 2004). Decentralized government has distinct advantages of getting closer to people, receiving information and acting upon the information received.

Democratically elected local government effectively transforms the long channel of hierarchical accountability to direct accountability to the people. This type of government benefits decision making by ensuring improved information exchange about local needs and puts the performance of public officials to closer scrutiny (Faguet 2004). Like many other developing countries, Bangladesh has been striving to achieve this elusive goal of establishing representative local government system which is closer to people, responsive to their needs and accountable for its deeds. The restoration of the *Upazila Parishad* Act(1998) appeared to be a step towards achieving this goal. *Upazila Parishad* election was held in January 2009 but according to article 25 of *Upazila Parishad* Act(1998) MPs are the advisor of the UZP. This type of decentralized local government could neither improved the service delivery nor increased the popular participation of the local people in decision making process, because MPs always work for their party gain. Local government of Bangladesh is characterized by high dependence on central government for financial support. We need to establish

an accountable, transparent and participatory UZP for empowering the mass people. Government of Bangladesh initiated the process of decentralization by establishing UZP.

2.2 Forms of Decentralization

To avoid the use of decentralization as a blanket term discussion on its various "organizational forms" is needed to reach an operational version of the concept. A number of forms have been identified by different scholars which produce several dimensions with different variants.(Khan 2009).

2.2.1 Deconcentration

Deconcentration indicates the redistribution of administrative powers and responsibility only within the central government. It is a process which involves the transfer of functions within the central government hierarchy through the shifting of workload from central ministries to field office, the creation of field agencies, or the shifting of responsibility to local administrative units that are part of central government structure.(Rondinelli 1983). This involves appointment and out posting of regional, district and local official representing central ministries. UN advocated this form of decentralization because people will have a better understanding of the government programmes, use the services offered and eventually ensure participation in government programmes by contributing their effort and resources(UN 1997b).

2.2.2.Delegation

Delegation refers to a transfer of powers or functions to organizations that are not under the direct control of central government ministries. It implies the transfer or creation of broad authority to plan and implement decisions concerning specific activities within specific spatial boundaries to an organization that is technically and administratively capable of carrying them out without direct supervision by a higher administrative unit (Rondinelli 1983). Traditionally delegation has been seen as a way of offering public goods and services through a business like organization structure.

2.2.3.Devolution

Devolution refers to the transfer of authority to legally constituted local bodies. It is the most common understanding of genuine decentralization. Through devolution, the central government relinquishes certain functions or creates new units of government that are outside its direct control(UNDP 1997b). This type of local body should have own treasury, budget, and accounts along with substantial authority to raise its revenue. It should employ its own competent staff who it can hire, fire and promote. It should decide policy and determine internal procedures. Central government administrators should serve purely as external advisors and inspectors and have no role within the local authority (Mawhood 1987).

2.2.4. Privatization and Deregulation

Privatization is an arrangement to allow private agencies to plan and manage the activities which were previously performed by the government. Through deregulation some government functions are transferred to parallel organizations such as national, industrial and trade associations, religious organizations, political parties and cooperatives. This transfer of responsibilities allows the organizations to license regulate or supervise their members in performing functions (Rondinelli 1983).

2.3 Theoretical Framework and Relevant Theories

Hyatt and Ruddy (1997) and Champion *etal* (1996) studied that the following team effectiveness model should be used as a guide to create an effective teams. Team effectiveness has included objective measures of the team's productivity, rating of team's performance and aggregate measures of member satisfaction. The **four contextual** factors that appear to be most significantly related to team performance are the presence of adequate resource, effective leadership, a climate of trust and a performance evaluation and reward system that reflects team contributions. **Composition** includes variables that relate to how teams should be staffed. It includes the ability and personality of team members, allocating roles and diversity, size of the team, member of flexibility and member of performance for team work. Effective teams need to **work together** and take collective responsibility to complete significant tasks. It includes variables such as freedom and autonomy, the opportunity to use different skills and talents, the ability to complete a whole and identifiable task or product and

working on a task or project that has a substantial impact on others. **Process variables** include member commitment to a common purpose, establishment of specific team goals, team efficacy, a managerial level of conflict and minimizing social loafing.

Robbins (2005) illustrated that among the behavioral theories of leadership Ohio State studies found employee oriented leader i.e. leader emphasize interpersonal relationship, taking a personal interest in the needs of employees and accepting individual differences among member. Scandinavian studies found development oriented leader where leader values experimentation, seeks new ideas and generates and implements change.

Team Effectiveness Model

context

- Adequate resources
- Leadership and structure
- Climate of trust
- Performance evaluation and reward system

Composition

- Abilities of members
- Personality
- Allocating roles
- Diversity
- Size of teams
- Member flexibility
- Member preferences

Work design

- Autonomy
- Skill variety
- Task identify
- Task significance

Process

- Common purpose
- Specific goals
- Team efficacy
- Conflict levels
- Social loafing

Team effectiveness

2.4 Link with Theory

Both UNO and UZC are the leader of UZP in some extent. For example UZC are the chief of the UZP, he is the chair of UZP meeting but he/she is not authorized to coordinate and implement all the project of national government at *Upazila* level. On the other hands, UNO is authorized to coordinate and implement all the task of national government at *Upazila* level. Their interpersonal positive relation and idea to change for development can make the *Parishad* effective. So both should be employee oriented and development oriented leader. In context of present scenario of UZP of Bangladesh age, education, gender, experience, political influence, institutional and operational factors has been drawn up as independent variables in response of dependent variables relationship between UNO and UZC. Where political influence, institutional and operational and educational factors go with   conflict levels, allocating roles and personality factors respectively of team effectiveness model. Experience closely related with skill of that team effectiveness model.

2.5. Analytical Framework

The analytical framework has been drawn up to identify the factors that affect the relationship between UNO and UZC. It also planned to establish the relationship between dependent and independent variables and relate them with broad theoretical perspective. Relationship between UNO and UZC might be influenced by demographic, political, institutional and operational factors. From demographic factors education and experience might help to build positive relationship. The second independent variable is the political aspects. It incorporates the decision making dynamics in the UZP and the influence of different actors in the planning and implementation process. Institutional and operational aspects incorporates the existing Law, issues of training, coordination and communication. Independent variables can be argued to influence the dependent variable – relationship between UNO and UZC.

Independent variable   **Dependent variable**

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┌─────────────────────────┐
│ Demographic  Aspects    │
│                         │
│      • Age              │
│      • Sex              │
│      • Education        │
│      • Experience       │
│                         │
└─────────────────────────┘


┌─────────────────────────┐
│ Political Aspects       │
│                         │                    ┌──────────────────────┐
│      • Influence of MP  │                    │ Relationship between │
│      • Influence of UZC │                    │ UNO and UZC          │
│      • Influence of  UPC│                    │                      │
│                         │                    └──────────────────────┘
└─────────────────────────┘


┌─────────────────────────┐
│ Institutional and       │
│ Operational Aspects     │
│                         │
│      • Training         │
│      • Rules and        │
│        Regulation       │
│      • Communication    │
│      • Coordination     │
│                         │
└─────────────────────────┘
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2.6 Operational Definitions of Major Concepts

Upazila Parishad : Upazila parishad is a local government institution that has been installed by Upazila Parishad Act 1998 (amended in 2009). There are 18(eighteen) departments that have been transferred under upazila parishad.

Relationship: In this study, relationship refers to the working relationships which exist between *Upazila* Nirbahi Officer(UNO) and *Upazila Chairmen*(UZC) of a particular UZP. Positive relationships can play a significant role in dictating the overall effectiveness of UZP. Here positive relationship means the relationship that can make the UZP more efficient, transparent, participatory and accountable. There are a number of key factors which can determine whether these relationships are positive, productive ones or whether they will have a detrimental effect on the governance. Good relationships can build a cooperative culture where both of them can work to achieve the objectives of the UZP and ensure participation, accountability and transparency of the institution. Every one is unique in the world that's why good relationship depends on needs, emotions and objectives. A great deal of time and effort should invest and both should have sacrificing mind in developing a positive working relationships in UZP. A   good relationship can give   a clear idea regarding how they implement laws and regulations. Responsibility   of UNO and UZC is determined by *Upazila Parishad* Act 1998 (amended in 2009). If both are behaves   rationally and perform their responsibility properly UZP will be citizen centric. On the other hand, unclear and unspecified circulars and instructions impede the positive relationship between UNO and UZC. In this study relationship between UNO and UZC is used as a dependent variable. The UNO is an officer with the rank of senior assistant secretary from BCS(administration) Cadre appointed by the Ministry of Public Administration to serve as a representative of national government and UZC is a locally elected person who is the chief of the UZP.

Experience: The accumulation of knowledge in relevant field or length of service as UNO and public   representative.

Political Aspect: Means interference of political leaders like MP, Upazila Chairman and Union Parishad Chairman   on official work of *Upazila Parishad* for their personal gain or party gain.

Training : Public relation and responsibility related course or module arranged by the concern authority aim to enhance the efficiency of the officials.

Rules and Regulation: It refers to Acts, rules, regulation, and circulars made from time to time to regulate the activities of the UZP and its members including chairman. It provides the normative

guideline for work. It also includes manuals and instructions that specified the allocation of duties of UNO and Upazila Chairman to achieving the objective of local government institutions or decentralization.

Communication: Media of interaction. It may be formal or informal.

Coordination: Interactive relationship among the department. It may be hierarchic control or mutual adjustment and/or a combination of both**.**

3.1. Upazila Parishad: Its Emergence, Structure and Functions

The history of today's local government in Bangladesh started during the British colonial period in India. During that period, Bangladesh was the eastern part of the Indian province of Bengal. Like many other British colonies, the administrative system of Bengal and other parts of British India was centered on district-level administrative system where district was the core administrative unit. Under the district there were several sub-divisions (sub-districts) consisting of a number of police stations locally known as Thana. Below the *Thana* were the Villages. The Bengal Local Self Government Act was passed in 1885 establishing a three-tier rural local government system at three different levels, district, sub-division and union (Blair, 1985; Westergaard & Alam 1995; Siddiqui, 2005). Under the Act, the villages were grouped into union*s* for the first time (each consisting of around 15 villages). A local government council was established at the union level known as the '*Union Board*' (later known as '*Union Parishad'*). District councils were called District Boards (later known as *Zilla Parishads*). Sub-divisional Boards were also constituted which was rather short-lived. District and sub-divisional boards were under civil servant like deputy commissioner and SDO (Sub-Divisional Officers) respectively , whereas the *Union Parishads* (UP) were headed by elected representatives. During the Pakistan period a new level of local government, 'Thana council' was established under the direct supervision of the SDOs. However, the *Thana* council did not have the power of taxation, unlike district and union boards. After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, The Article 59 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh states that there shall be local elected governments at every level of administration (GOB, 1972) at the same time, three-tier local government system, with districts, thanas and unions, continued on (Blair, 1985; Ali 1987).

According to constitutional provision, the government promulgated the Local Government Act 1973. The Act proposed a three-tier local government system with the UP. *Thana* Training and Development Committee (TTDC) and the District Board (also known as *Zilla Parishad*). Elections of the UP were held in the same year but election for the other two levels did not. A new Act was passed in 1980 to create another level of local government at the village level called *Gram Sarker* (village

government) which died with the death of its initiator President Ziaur Rahman in 1981 (Blair, 1985; Ali, 1987; Khan, 1993a).

In 1982, Lieutenant General HM Ershad formed an administrative reform committee, Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR). According to the recommendation of the committee, subdivisions were upgraded to districts and *Thanas* were upgraded to U*pazila* (subdistrict). The committee suggested three-tier representative local government system- *Zilla parishad* (ZP) at the district level, UZP at the *thana/upazila* level and UP at the *union* level. Subsequently, the *Upazila Parishad* Ordinance was promulgated in 1982 and election was hold in 1985. After *Upazila* election, *Upazila Parishad* Acts as coordinating body for all activities at the *Upazila* level. The UZC was empowered to coordinate all the development activities of the UZP. In 1991, Government abolished UZP on the ground of misuse of money, corruption, and huge expenditure in an unproductive sector. In 1996, Government enacted the *Upazila Parishad* Act 1998. The Act proposed to make the *upazila* level the most important tier of local government (Habib, 2009). There were certain differences between the 1998 Act and the Act of 1982. According to the 1998 Act, in addition to the elected Chairman, provisions were created for three elected Vice Chairpersons (one of them a woman).

Chairmen of all UP, mayors of all municipalities (if there are any), and women members of the reserved seats would become ex-official members of the *Parishad* . It also created a provision of mandatory advisory role of the local Member of Parliament over the UZP activities. However, despite the introduction of the new Act, no election was held during the two consecutive democratically elected governments. Eventually, with an aim to conduct *upazila* election, the caretaker government of Bangladesh promulgated the   Local Government*(Upazila Parishad)* Ordinance 2008 and created a Local Government Commission to oversee the activities and performance of the *Parishad*. According to the ordinance, members of the parliament were removed from the advisory role and two new elected positions of Vice Chairpersons were created (of which one must be a woman). The ordinance also reserved 30% seats for the women. According to this ordinance upazila parishad election was held in January 2009. Due to not placed of the ordinance in the parliament in due time it was repealed. However, the Government enacted the *Upazila Parishad* (Reintroduction, Repeal and Amendment) Act 2009 keeping the provision of MP as advisor despite the protest from the newly elected UZC and Vice Chairpersons (Financial Express 2009). Under this legal framework, UZP is functioning and the UNO acts as secretary of the UZP .

The *Parishad* was assigned with a wide range of functions. The functions of the government at the *upazila* level were divided into two categories- retained subjects and transferred subjects. The regulatory functions and major development activities of national and regional coverage fell under the category of retained subjects and were controlled by the central government. All other development activities which were considered local in nature had been recognized as transferred subjects and responsibility for those had been given to the *Parishad*. Transferred subjects included establishment, agriculture and irrigation, primary education, health and family planning, rural water supplies and sanitation, rural works, disaster relief, food-for-work programs, cooperatives, and fisheries and livestock development. The retained subjects included law and order, justice, central revenues, large-scale irrigation, large scale industries, and higher and technical education. A large number of senior civil servants were deputed to the *Parishad*. UNO a central government functionary, acted as the head of civil administration and became the Chief Executive Officer of the *Parishad* (Ahmad 1991; Sarker 2006). However, there was a conflict of interests between the elected *Parishad Chairmen* and members of the parliament. Under this framework the UNO acted as the secretary of the *Parishad* and assisted the Chairman in executing the policies of the government. The UNO was responsible to the UZP and assisted him in executing of policies and decisions of the *parishad*.

3.2.Relevant literature review:

There have been a number of studies on UZP both on national and international level, though none of these have been analysed from the relationship perspective.The local government bodies in Bangladesh enjoy a degree of operational autonomy, but they are in no way independent of the central government or of the overall administrative system of the country. As a result, there are a number of areas of interaction between a local body and the government, which cover legal, operational and financial matters as well as control and supervision by the government. Its territorial jurisdiction, the functions it can perform and the taxes it can impose, are all determined by central government. Not only are its basic features carved by central Acts but its activities are also guided and supervised by departments of the central government. Thus in Bangladesh there is a clear patron-client relationship between the national government and the central government. Local government in

Bangladesh owes its existence to a number of Acts passed from time to time. Through this legislations, the government determines the structure, composition and tenure of the local bodies; mode of administration of oath and removal of functionaries; sources of funds and their expenditure pattern; method of levying taxes, rates fees etc; preparation of budgets; function, power, duties and roles of various local government functionaries; personnel system and benefits to be given to the employees; method of making by laws or regulations of local bodies and the extent of supervision and control by the government. Apart from enacting legislations on local bodies, the national government also formulates detailed rules relating to conduct of elections, business ,powers and duties of chairmen. The government retains the power to give direction to local bodies. In exercise of this power, the national government issues circulars and directives on various aspects to local government bodies. The relationship between the national government and the local government and the specific means of control exercised by the national government over the local government are done through institutional, financial and administrative.(Siddiqui 1995)

Nizam *etal* (2011) analyzed that transferred departments are not much aware of what has been transferred to the UZP; in fact, substantial confusion exists among officials of the transferred departments about the scope and nature of such transfer. Other actors, especially the UZC, are also not much aware of their roles and responsibilities. No uniform pattern of relationship among the core actors like MP, UZC, UNO can be noticed across different *upazilas*. They found confrontational and collusion types of relationship between MP and UZC at the *upazila* level. In some cases of conflict between the UZC and UNO have been reported from the field. They showed that some UZPs have performed better than others, with adopting an innovative approach to solve problems which deserve serious consideration (by others). There is no one best way of improving things at the *upazila* level. But training, orientation and sacrificing mind of the core actors appear to be especially important in order to help them understand their roles and responsibilities. Such training should be related to their day-to-day job and preferably be organised by peer groups, and not outsiders.

Aminuzzaman(2010) illustrated that relationship between elected representatives and officials at *upazila* level is characterized by mutual mistrust, suspicion and even hostility, but this does not preclude collusion eventually it make the local government institution ineffective. *Union Parishad Chairmen*(UPC) have the majority of the votes in the UZP and therefore on paper they are able to

resist anything they do not like. UPC , in a body, can practically resist any decision that they do not like.

 Rahman (2007)   analyzed that at the formative stage of UZP conflicts between bureaucrats and UZC have been reported and bureaucrats had to encounter that conflicts . As time passed, UZC were provided capacity building training by various agencies and the conflicts between them and the bureaucrats began to resolve. The chairmen started gaining decision-making capacity and began to communicate with the officials more effectively. In particular, the coordinating role of the chairman has been appreciated by most bureaucrats, both former and present. Author also mentioned that bureaucrats were better off in terms of education, experience, training and hence not confident about the technical knowledge of the chairmen. Yet, they felt that given adequate foundation training the chairman could pick up necessary nitty-gritty of administration as well. Author reported that there were severe conflicts among MPs and UZP *chairmen* over resource allocation at the UZ level. He found one of the negative practice by the UZP *chairmen* in project planning and selection. It was reported that UZP *chairmen* usually did not promote people's participation at great length. Rather they tried to make sure that only their political supporters and loyal UP *chairmen* received maximum benefit through their limited participation. His study found that UZC had allocated relief materials considering their personal and political rapport with the union chairmen where UNO wanted to follow government circular that is depending on area, population size and number of distressed people but the UZC did not want to follow strictly the relief distribution criteria. Hence the relationship between bureaucrats and elected representative is not desirable. Since most of the UZP *chairmen* had poor academic background and many UZP level bureaucrats continued to consult with district officers of line ministry instead of the UZP chairmen. This happened in almost all line ministries. This was proportional to the fund received from the line ministries. If the UZP's fund was very poor, the line ministry official's interaction with the chairman is also less. This created some tensions at the UZP at times, which affected the level of efficiency of the officials of some line ministries. In this study author found that poor academic background was one of the major sources of tension between UZP chairmen and bureaucrats. Therefore, many officials felt that minimum educational qualification such as graduation may be made mandatory for a candidate for UZC.

(15 JULY 2012 Daily Sun) Intervention of local lawmakers and bureaucrats, including UNO, is the main bar to effective functioning of the UZP, secretary- general of the association and *chairman* of *Manikganj Sadar*, Ataur Rahman Ata said. The performance of UZP largely depends on relationship between local leadership and bureaucrats.(Rahman 1986 and Rahman 1991). One of the UZC of Rajshahi division assaulted the UNO and the PIO for not issuing Delivery Order (DO) letter in his favour. This led to an inquiry against the *chairman*. The allegations have been proved in prima facie punitive actions by LGD followed. This is not to say that the working relationship between the UZC and UNO is less than desirable in all districts. Far from it, it varies from district to district, from *upazila* to *upazila*. The working relationship between the two is good in most cases.

The real conflict arises in areas where the UZC is prone to abusing his authority in clear violation of laid down rules or procedures. There is need for reorientation and training of both the UZC and the UNO to bring about behavioural change. Both should respect the procedures governing use or management of public funds or other public assets. While the UZC is expected to work for public interest, he should do so within the limitations of law and the rules. Similarly, the UNO should act to protect public interest and not be an aid to anybody who tries to act against it. **(**Rahman 2012)

 We need to know about the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats (Aberbach *et al* 1981). The criteria that lead a society to allocate decision-making power between politicians or bureaucrats is a major question. The starting point is the premise that politicians are motivated by the re-election goal, whereas bureaucrats are motivated by "career concerns". So, while politicians want to be re-elected, bureaucrats want to improve their professional prospects in the public or private sector which motivates them to perform well whatever tasks they receive (Wilson 1989). As a result, conflict occurs in policy formulation and implementation process.

(New age12 july/12**)** Deputy commissioners at their annual conference in Dhaka on 12 July 2012 said that field-level administrations could not function properly because of 'non-cooperation' of local representatives in many areas. They alleged that the conflicting relations between the UNOs and UZC in many areas had hampered development activities.

 Ahsan (2010) mentioned that a situation of cultural compatibility really matters in fostering inter-departmental relationship. Problem in coordination or organizational culture was also an important

factor in analysing the issue of coordination, owing to the role of cultural compatibility in establishing relationship among organizations.

In Bangladesh the member of the parliament who are known as advisor of *upazila parishad* play a great and controversial role in local affairs. They have steadily increased their influence and control over most local government activities. (Siddiqui 2005)

The induction of MPs in local government affairs introduces a third element that comprised primarily of their field level party activists. The Interest of MPs in local activities is to provide patronage to these activists. MPs direct the implementation of all local development and humanitarian activities through them, although the UZP legally is responsible for the project implementation. This is not only unfair, it also establishes a sort of MP government along with the central and local government at the grassroots. The introduction of the so called "MP government" at the local level has another ominous implication. Both Corruption and hooliganism have now become the most challenging issues in our society. The MP factor at *upazila parishad* accentuate this problem (Majumdar. 2010).

Tension may develop between political authority and administrators. Mutual suspicion, misunderstanding and differences over priorities between UNO and UZC are quite common. The administrator tries to follow the rules while the public representatives wan to accomplish the objectives within the shortest possible time. This differences in approach is the basic reason for the conflict and tension in most UZP. T he access of different interest groups to the political authority sometimes create problems especially when their demands become disproportionate to available resources or go beyond legal limits. The administrative leadership should possess the ability to deal with conflicts and convert them to public welfare by enlisting cooperation from all quarters (Ali 1995).

As a decentralization model, the UZP is best characterized as a limited form of devolution, where the decision making authority was transferred to legally incorporated local governments. The local governments were not completely autonomous, neither politically nor financially. The central government had ensured a wide measure of control over their policy making and the UZP were financially dependent on the central government. As regard decision making in planning process, the UZP did not act properly. Problems arose for a variety reasons, often reflecting strained relationships between the elected representatives and the *upazila* level officers (Alam *etal* 1994).

Uddin (2011) analyzed that *upazila parishad* is inevitable for rural development and socio-economic empowerment but unfortunately there is confusion, debate, discussion and argument in favour or against *upazila*. Since independence in 1971, successive governments have tried to use the local government system for their own political interest. The regime in power wanted to make the local government representatives for their power base and manipulated the system. The advisory position of MP in UZP has weakened the UZP. He was also explained that in case of UZPs incompatibility among different actors arises because of their different backgrounds. *Upazila* level officials are all professional bureaucrats. *Chairmen*, Vice Chairmen and the MP may have different political orientations and various cultural backgrounds. UPC and female members of the reserved seats are *union* and ward level political leaders respectively. As political leaders they are likely to display varied leadership styles. In case of conflict with the political leaders the bureaucrats including the UNO may decide to compete, collaborate, avoid, accommodate or compromise. The result of such conflict may have positive or negative outcomes. Positive outcomes might be reflected in a compromise situation resulting in sustainable decisions whereas negative outcome may generate standoff situation and poor quality of planning and implementation. Conflict between the elected representatives and the bureaucrats in the UZP is not uncommon.

In one particular incident soon after the installation of the current UZPs the government intervened so as to prevent occurrence of similar incidents in future. An unpleasant incident occurred in the District Development Coordination Committee meeting of Bagerhat district held in June 2009 (The Daily Star, 16 June 2009). It drew the attention of the government. A letter sent by the Local Government Division to the UZP *Chairmen* and the UNOs on October 11, 2009 termed the incident mentioned above and the others like this to be undignified for the bureaucrats and the political representatives. In this context the *Chairmen* and the UNOs were asked to "maintain their own specific limits in accordance with their duties and responsibilities and privileges" (GOB, 2010: 128). However, there have been reports of number of similar incidents in the subsequent period.

As-Saber, and Rabbi (2009) illustrated that democratic *Upazila Parishad* enhances its responsiveness and accountability to the people. In an ideal condition, the *Parishad* is likely to act in safeguarding and enhancing these two good governance principles. Since a representative local government enjoys significant devolutionary authority, it tends to have the capacity to reduce

bureaucratic hierarchy in decision making and implementation of programs and projects. It also emphasizes on bureaucratic accountability to elected representatives and, in turn, ensures the accountability of elected representatives to their constituents. They found that *Upazila Parishads* in Bangladesh with democratically elected representatives have somewhat failed to enhance their responsiveness and accountability to the people. A number of factors seem to have contributed to this failure which include the presence of a large number of rules and regulations imposed by the central government, inadequate local resources available to the *Parishad*, loyalty of the civil servants to the central authority rather than to the elected *Parishad*, hidden agenda of the government to consolidate regime, lack of *skills* and knowledge of elected representatives, corruption, domination of local elites in decision making process, and provision of ex-officio membership of the *Union Parishad*. On the other hand, weak bureaucratic accountability because of dual control of the civil servants and lack of active mechanism for political accountability for elected representative due to the absence of democracy or democratic practices at the national level contributed to the poor accountability of the *Parishad*. The control from the Ministry of Local Government and the recently implemented provision of mandatory advisory role of the members of the parliament (MPs) have complicated the scenario even further.

From the above discussion we found that as a democratic local government institution *upazila parishad* can ensure its responsibility, accountability, transparency and participation to the people if it work properly. Performance of *upazila parishad* mostly depends on bureaucrats,local representatives, political leaders and proper rules and regulation imposed by the national government.

Chapter 4   **Data Analysis and discussion**

4.0 Inroduction

UNO and UZC play an important role in implementing government agenda at local *Upazila* level. As a representative of the central government the UNO has to maintain vertical and horizontal coordination with various department, Where as the UZC is the public representative so he/she has to face the local public needs. The purpose of the chapter is to analyze the extent to which demographic, political, institutional and operating factors affect the relationship between UNO and UZC at UZP. It is also intended to examine how these factors facilitate to achieving positive relationship between them. The respondents were asked about the impact of the studied factors on relationship between UNO and UZC. To examine the relationship among MP, UZC, UNO, Officer of transferred department and UPC have been interviewed. Before going to analyze data, it is necessary to know about the background information of the studied *upazilas.*

4.1 A Brief Overview of the Upazila Parishads under study.

Narsingdi Sadar and *Rajbari Sadar upazila parishad* were the study area. Both of the *upazilas* are under Dhaka division. *Narsingdi* is located about 58 km east from Dhaka and *Rajbar*i is about 123km west from the capital Dhaka.

Narsingdi Sadar Upazila : Administration Narsingdi thana, now known as upazila, was established in 1930. The area of *Narsingdi sadar* is 213.44 sq km, is bounded by Palash, *Shibpur,Raipura upazilas* on the north, *Araihazar upazila* of *Narayanganj* on the south, *Bancharampur and Raipura upazilas* on the east, Palash and Rupganj upazila of *Naraynganj* on the west. Main rivers are Arial Khan, Meghna, Haridhoa. It consists of 14 *union parishad*, 152 mouzas and two municipality(*Narsingdi* and Madhabdi). Population 707525; male 52.61%, female 47.39%;Density of population per sq km is 3315. Literacy rate is 50.9%. There are 6 colleges ,2 teacher's training colleges , a technical college , youth development training centre , 23 high schools and 3 junior high schools at *Narsingdi sadar upazila.*

Main occupations are Agriculture 19.48%, fishing 2.31%, transport 3.54%, agricultural labourer 9.26%, wage labourer 5.09%, handloom 8.75%, industry 4.41%, service 12.61%, commerce 20.27% and others 14.28%.

There are four manufacturing Jute mill , a number of textile mill, flour mill, ice factory, printing press , power loom factory , dying mill , welding, cottage industries weaving , bamboo work, goldsmith , blacksmith, and wood work at *Narsingdi sadar upazila.*

Archaeological heritage and relics Stone image (Sena period) discovered at *Narsingdi* Town, silver coin of Gias Uddin Azam Shah at Algi Village, silver coin (Sultani period) at *Panchdona*, copper plate inscription of Bhoj Barmadeva discovered at village Belabo, 29 silver coins (1011 AH) discovered at Laskar Para, tomb of Kabul Shah, tomb and mosque of Hazrat Shah Osman.

(BBS Report 2012)

Rajbari Sadar Upazila: Administrative *Rajbari thana* was established in 1888 and was turned into an *upazila* in 1984 with an area of 332.34 sq km, is bounded by the Sujanagar and *Bera upazilas* and *Padma* river on the north, *Faridpur sadar upazilas* on the south, *Goalanda* and *Faridpur sadar upazilas* on the east, *Pangsha* and *Baliakandi upazilas* on the west. *Rajbari* is a railway town. Its expansion and development took place with the growth of rail communication and railway establishments. Main rivers are Padma, Harai, and Chandana. It consists of 14 Union, 200 mouza and a municipality. Population is 3,31,631; male is 51.46%, female   is 48.54%;.The density of population is 1029 per sq km. The literacy rate is 57.7%.

There are 02 (two) Government colleges, 03 (three) private colleges, 15 (fifteen) madrasa , 21(twenty one) secondary schools ,06(six) junior secondary schools, 97(ninety seven)primary schools, 03(three) mass education centers , a homeopathic college and vocational training institute are at *Rajbari sadar upazila.*

Main occupations are Agriculture 38.83%, fishing 1.28%, agricultural laborers 19.49%, wage laborers 3.22%, industry 1.07%, transport 3.42%, construction 1.5%, commerce 14.04%, service 9.58%, others 7.57%. Goalanda Textile Mills, Handloom, silk and bio-gas production centre, Dairy ,

poultry , fishery , hatchery , nursery, horticulture etc are main businesses centers at *Rajbari sadar upazila.*

Archeological relics and monuments are Barbakpur Zamindarbari, Sanmancha and Dolmancha at Rathkhola, Ram Mandir (Belgachi), Chand Sawdagar's mound, etc. (BBS Report 2012)

According to community report, total area of *Rajbari sadar upazila* is greater than of *Narsingdi sadar upazila*, literacy rate is also higher at Rajbari but population density is higher at Narsingdi. Most of the population of Rajbari are agriculture base but in case of Narsingdi most of the people are commerce base. Economic condition of Narsingdi is better than that of Rajbari. Administrative unit of both *upazila* are almost identical. UZC of Rajbari was experienced, was an LLM and senior to UZC of Narsingdi. On the other hand UZC of Narsingdi was a graduate , first time elected public representative and an industrialist. Beside this, UNO Rajbari was belonged to 22nd batch of BCS(administration) cadre, male and experienced while UNO of Narsingdi belonged to 24th batch of the same cadre, female and was working for one(01) year. It was assumed that it will add value.

4.2.Data Analysis

This chapter analyzes the data obtained from the structural interviews. The data has been analyzed in line with the analytical framework, which was developed in the previous chapter. The analysis is divided into two broad areas. The first part discusses the general findings from the primary data. Discussion in this part has been divided into legal, political, institutional and operational aspects. The second part analyzes the factor affecting the relationship between UNO and UZC. The analysis addresses the question what factor does affect the relationship and how?

A total of 16 respondents were interviewed with a questionnaire, which asked questions on three broad areas: demographic aspects, political aspects, institutional and operational aspects. The questions cover the independent and dependent variables of the framework. The findings from the questionnaire to the two (2) core members of UZP like UNOs and UZC have been crosschecked with the qualitative responses received from the elected Representatives(MP) and UPC(*Union Parishad Chairmen*) and other government officials.

4.2.1. Demographic aspect

Demographic variables of age, gender, education and experience can be considered as important factors. Studied 16 respondents were belong to age range 28 to 64 years, PIOs (Project Implementation Officers) are the most junior, UNOs were 36 to 40 years aged and public representatives were the senior. Among the 16 respondents UNO of *Narsingdi sadar* was only female. All respondents were agreed that age and gender have no impact on relationship between UNOs and UZC. Respondents of *Narsingdi Sadar* added they have seen male and female UNO but in both cases their relation with *upazila chairman* was good. They also thought that at the upper level of administration knowledge and mindset is the factor of good relation gender and age was not a factor of influencing the relationship.The educational qualification of UNOs were post graduate while educational level of Public Representatives(PR) were H.S.C, Graduate and Post- Graduate. PIOs were diploma in civil engineering , two of the transferred department officials were graduated and the rest of the officials were post-graduated.

All of the respondents opined that education is an important factor in building positive working relationship between UNOs and UZC. The majority of the respondents thought that Government should enact law for minimum educational qualification of public representative. Most of the respondents said that UNOs were higher educated comparing to the *Upazila Chairmen*. If the *Upazila Chairmen* do not have minimum educational qualification, his/her understanding level would prevail in below standard and he/she would not be aware about Rules, Regulation and circular of UZP, this might affect the relationship between UNO and UZC. One of the respondent (*upazila* engineer) opined that less educated UZC do not care about Law rather they always think that words of elected representative are Laws. UZC of *Rajbari Sadar* was an LLM(Masters Of Laws) and had two term experienc as a UZC while UZC of *Narsingdi Sadar* was graduated and newly elected UZC. Half of the respondents opined that experience can help to build positive relation but another half argued against this opinion. In spite of differences in demographic indicators relationship between UNOs and UZC in both UZP was found relatively good.

4.2.2 Political Aspect

Most of the respondents thought that political influence of MPs and Chairmen of *Union Parishad* (UPC) are obstacle in building positive working relationship. A significant number of respondents

opined that political influence of *upazila chairman* is one of the important factors that affects the positive working relationship between UNOs and *upazila chairman* . *Upazila Chairman* and MP of *Rajbari Sadar* were the member of same political party i.e. ruling party. In case of *union parishad chairmen* of both *Upazila Parishad* among the 14(fourteen) *union parishads* most of them were from opposition party. While MP of *Narsingdi Sadar* was the member of ruling party and *upazila chairman* was the member of opposition party

A significant number of respondents of *Rajbari Sadar* opined that MP was more powerful than *upazila chairman* whereas *upazila chairman* was the chief of UZP, government also allocated more fund in favour of MP *than upazila chairman* . So UNOs had to priorities the opinion of MP and hence MP,s political influence sometime play a vital role in facilitating cold war between UNO and *upazila chairman* . On the other hand, *upazila chairman* have no power to approve project of *upazila parishad* alone, he/she had to depend on voting member of *upazila parishad* i.e. *union parishad chairmen* and vice-chairmen of that *upazila parishad* . All of the *union parishad chairmen* were loyal to UNO where most of them were not respectful to *upazila chairman* . For this reason, before approving projects *upazila chairman* request UNO to convince the *union parishad chairmen* . So the influence of *union parishad chairmen* also impede the relationship between the two core members like UNO and *upazila chairman*. On the other hand, most of the respondents from *Narsingdi Sadar* observed that political influence impede the relationship but at *Narsingdi Sadar* it was not prevailed. To clarify the answer respondents were asked the question " why political influence did not hinder the relationship between UNO and *upazila chairman* at *Narsingdi Sadar* you think?" *Upazila Chairman* replied that he did not intefere the activity of *upazila parishad*, so the political influence was minimum there. Other respondents replied that personally *upazila chairman* was very good, he has no financial aspiration on UZP that's why there is no political influence in this UZP.

4.2.3 Institutional and operational aspect

Among the studied indicators most of the respondents thought responsibility related training help to make positive working relationship. To clarify this response another question was asked to the respondent "how do training help to make positive relationship?" They replied that at the early stage behavior of *upazila chairman* were antagonistic with ex-officio but after receiving training their

behavior had changed, they could realize their terms of reference and their jurisdiction and they behaved like responsible public representative.

A significant number of respondents opined that existing anomalous Rules and Regulation were encumbrance to making positive relationship between UNO and UZC. To know about this factor respondents were asked question " How existing Rules and Regulation impede the relationship do you think?" They replied according to Clause 25 of The *Upazila Parishad* Act 1998, MPs have the advisory role over the *Parishad* and actual power has vested to the *Upazila Parishad* not to the *upazila chairman* . Besides this UNOs were empowered to implement all project of National government at u*pazila* level. For this reason *upazila chairman* thought that what was seem to be got and what has got after *Upazila Parishad* election 2009, they could also not accept the supreme power of bureaucrats rather than elected public representative. *Upazila Chairman* of *Rajbari Sadar* said that they wanted to repeal the clause 25 of The *Upazila Parishad* Act 1998 to abolish MPs interfere (according to that article MPs are the advisor of the *upazila parishad* and *upazila parishad* will accept his/her advice . *Upazila Chairman* of *Narsingdi Sadar* replied that people of *Narsingdi Sadar* elected me to work for them, but we do not have absolute power, power has been vested on UZP, government promulgated Act, Rules and Circulars for conducting UZP, as a responsible public representative we had to accept and obey the government order.

On the other hand, UNOs were enjoying chief administrative power at *Upazila* level, they also do not like parallel authority. Although there was no visible conflict between UNO and *Upazila Chairman* but the uneasiness of the relationship was prominent . Officers of the transferred department of *Rajbari Sadar* opined that they did not feel comfort under duel coordination rather they feel better under the coordination of UNOs, Besides they also have a departmental superior officer. Half of the respondents thought that coordination among the transferred department by both UNOs and *Upazila Chairman* are one of the deciding factors in building positive relationship. They clarify that in some cases *Upazila Chairman* did not want to understand that they were not authorized to coordinate all projects of all departments but UNOs were authorized. Chief of the transferred department opined that dual role cannot be friendly. Another half of the respondents argued against this opinion. Respondents of *Narsingdi sada*r said they did not find any trouble in coordination of *Upazila Chairman* and UNO. To understand the positive scenario respondents were asked the reason behind not feeling any trouble. In case of coordination they replied that actually *Upazila Chairman* comes to

the *upazila parishad* rarely and he does not interfere in the work of the officials. Working relationship in both *upazilas* was relatively good. In case of Rajbari respondents viewed that this situation is prevailed due to UNO's skill and expertise as well as experience of *Upazila Chairman* and knowledge.

Majority of respondents believed that available formal and informal communication are useful to make positive relationship. They also added that outside of the official environment UNOs and UZC made a good relations during their interactions in the play ground/club or in other social program. Besides before approving any proposal if UNOs and UZC communicate with each other, we might get effective output.

4.2.4. Factors affecting the relationship

Among the demographic indicators higher education of both core members of UZP might help to build positive relationship between them due to their awareness about government Laws, Rules, Regulations, Circular and Official orders.

Political influences of ruling party MPs, *upazila chairmen* and *union parishad chairmen* mostly affect the relationship. According to existing Law *upazila chairmen* have no power and the power has been vested on *upazila parishad*. All *union parishad chairmen* , *upazila chairmen* and *Vice-Chairmen* are the voting members and ex-officio of national government are the non voting members. UNOs are the authorized officials in reporting about hazardous decision of UZP to the local government division. Decision should be passed in *upazila parishad*. upazila chairmen cannot take decision alone. UNO is authorized to implement project of national government in one hand and *upazila chairmen* were the chief of the UZP in another hand, this type of dual responsibility was the obstacle in making positive relationship between them.

Immediate after the UZP election in 2009 there were many unwanted situation. But at present most of the UZP is running smoothly. Most of the respondents opined that institutional training helped the UZC to become well equipped. There should be an opportunity to interact formally and informally within themselves to achieving positive working relationship. The following figure shows the affect of the factors on relationship.

One interesting matter was that when the respondents were asked the question "How do the relationship exist in this *upazila parishad*?" All of the respondents replied "good". To identify the factor respondents were asked "What are the causes behind this relationship you think?" Both of the MPs replied that UNOs and UZC are aware of people's needs, Laws and dedicated to implement national government's project. UZC *Rajbari sadar* replied UNO has enough knowledge about Law, stable mentality, aware about his responsibility and the MP was flexible and manageable.

Inference of MP was not found in a large scale, Here Interesting answer was found at Narsingdi where all of the respondents including UNO replied that UZC is personally honest, industrialist, solvent, aware about people need, have no any voracity on government fund/ project, benevolent, wanted to work with ex-officio in a team and in friendly environment. UZC replied that he did not find any greediness to UNO.


Figure -Impact of studied variables on relationship.

4.4. Assess the impact of the factors on relationship

Among the studied indicator age and gender did not affect the relationship between UNOs and UZC, whereas educational qualification highly affects the relationship. Both of the *upazila*s chairmen were educated and prevailed quite good relationship there. According to the respondents, political influences especially by ruling party were significant factor in respect of building positive working relationship.

Training and existing Rules and Regulations highly affect the relationship. After the *upazila* election held in 2009, initially *Upazila Chairmen* and vice-chairmen were annoyed that they had no authority to take action and to evaluate the performance of deputed official but after receiving responsibility related training and promulgation of government circular about the evaluation process of deputed officer their attitude have been changed day by day. UZC and UNOs of both *upazila* believe that they should be responsible for the mass people and they should work for the local development and poverty alleviation which is also the vision of the national government.

 Communication has also played a vital role to affect the relationship. Frequent formal and informal contact between UNO and UZC may help to take quick decision in respect of public welfare.

Chapter 5   **findings and conclusion**

5.1. Findings

Bangladesh is a multi-party democratic country. Local government institute at *upazila* level like UZP was initiated on the spirit of decentralization. It was expected that UZP will be a root of democracy. We need a effective UZP in respect of stronger financial position, prompt public service delivery and managerial capacity. Government delegated its responsibility to the UZP but did not strengthen its capacity and infrastructure. So they could not be able to mobilize local resource and they had to depend on central government fund. According to clause 25 of *Upazila Parishad* Act 1998, MPs were the advisor of the UZP while the responsibility of MPs were to make laws in the parliament for the country. UZC and UNOs are an integral part of the governance and policy processes of the UZP. The degree of success or failure in governing processes depends on the relation between them. However, this relationship has not been without difficulties. Tension occurs when conflict arises between two actors.

This study reveal that UZP of Bangladesh was constituted with a mixed concept of devolution and de-concentration theory. Though it was constituted by locally elected representative but had to depend on central government . Central government delivered some duties to the *parishad* and rest of the duties to the appointed official as well as kept option of MPs advisory role. Due to contradictory characteristics of UZP political and institutional factors highly affect the relationship between UNO and UZC. Mode of effective UZP depends on mode of interaction between two core members like UNOs and UZC. This study also indicated that age and sex have no impact on relationship. Educated and forward looking UNOs can manage and share view with any level and age public representative. On the other hand women empowerment is one of the vision of the Government, women can conduct any challenging duty as well as female UNOs were not less qualified than male. Beside this Public Representatives usually pay respect to the female officer.

The study found that in spite of political influences from ruling party experience, higher education, financial solvency of UZC and knowledge as well as innovative leading capacity of UNOs could recover the strain between UNOs and UZC. UZC of *Narsingdi Sadar* was the member of opposition party and he was the tentative candidate of next parliamentary election, he did not engage him in any

conflict as well as he wanted to work in a team spirit and respected the opinion of UNO. That's why there existed true positive working relationship between UNO and UZC. Awareness about responsibility and local people's need was helpful to make effective relationship.

In respect of relationship we studied 11(eleven) indicators under 03(three) variables. Among the indicators firstly political influences of ruling parties play a vital role to impede the relationship between UNOs and UZC. Secondly duel controlling system of existing Rules and Regulations made obstacle between their relationship. On the other hand training, effective coordination, communication, experience and education can help to build positive relationship. Age and sex have no impact on relationship, causes have discussed earlier.

Study also found that majority of the voting member of *upazila parishad* were *chairmen* of *union parishad* so their influence highly affect the relationship between UNO and UZC as well as activity of UPZ. <u>*Upazila chairman*</u> have no power, only act as the chair of *upazila parishad's* meeting. Actual power were vested on *upazila parishad*. This frustration impedes the relationship between them. Respecting government Act and Order along with sacrificing mindset are helpful to build positive working relationship. Good working relationship between UNOs and UZC can ensure transparent and accountable UZP.

5.2 Conclusion

This study reveals that positive working relationship between the two core members of UZP like UNOs and UZC can ensure transparency, accountability and participatory local government institute at *upazila* level. Most importantly, this system can ensure development at the grassroots level. Due to MPs advisory role, political interferences mostly impede the desired relationship. MPs often dictate development projects that is undertaken without his/her consultation. One of the UNO opined that Goal of Politicians are to be re-elected, whereas bureaucrats are motivated by "career concerns". So, while politicians want to be re-elected, bureaucrats want to improve their professional prospects which motivates them to perform well.

Vagueness in role and conflicting interests between MPs and UZC turn the UZP dysfunctional. One of the UZC opined that the first and foremost duty and responsibility of a MP is to make laws and policies they did not want MPs interferences in project implementation. Due to MPs intervention

UZP have lost its independency. Data in this study reveals that political intervention and loophole of Act impede the relationship in one hand and higher educational qualification, experience and training of UZC on the other hand help to construct positive relationship. Poor academic background was one of the major sources of tension between UZP chairmen and bureaucrats. Therefore minimum academic qualification for UZC should be decided. At least, advanced level training should be provided to elected chairmen.

Devolution of power and resources should be the main spirit of UZP, but the UZP is run by the mixed theme of devolution and de-concentration and this mixed theory impede the relationship. Due to the poor ethical value and lack of accountability of the public representative of Bangladesh. devolution theory might not be feasible.

De-concentration may be viable for Bangladesh because there is no source of tension between bureaucrats and public representative and will reduce corruption. Decentralization of powers and function of UZP should not only be a paper specific policy, direction should be in action for strong and independent UZP. In this way UNO and local leaders will be cooperative that can create a new chapter for UZP. Central government should develop infrastructure, transportation and communication networks, empower the UZP for resource mobilization and also monitor the responsibility and performance of field level personnel. Government should balance the power between MPs and UZC in the same parliamentary constituency. If government fail to do so political conflict will be increased. Thus it will affect the relationship between UNO and UZC. Empirical evidence showed that good working relationship can ensure transparency, accountability and participation in UZP.

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APPENDIX

Appendix- A, Table-1. Demographic variables of the respondents

Variables	Category of sample respondents								TOTAL
	MP	UZC	UNO	UE	UAO	UEO	PIO	UPC	
Age	number	number	number	Number	number	number	number	Number	number
25-29	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
30-34	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
35-39	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	2
40-44	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
45-49	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
50-54	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	1	5
55-59	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2
60-64	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
total	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Gender									
male	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	15
female	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
total	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
education									
H.S.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Graduate	2	1	-	-	1	1	2	-	7
Post-graduate	-	1	2	2	1	1	-	-	7
total	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Experience	In case of PR more than one term is imply as experienced and in case of bureaucrats more than three years at relevant field is imply as experienced.								
experienced	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	2	12
Not experienced	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	4
total	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16

Table-2. Impact of demographic   variables on relationship between UNO and UZC

| Variables	Impact of this variables on relationship between UNO and UZC.(number)		Total respondents	Percentage of respondents	
	yes	No	number	yes	No
age	0	16	16	0	100
gender	0	16	16	0	100
education	16	0	16	100	0
experience	8	8	16	50	50

Table-3. Impact of politically influenced variables on relationship between UNO and UZC.

Variables	Impact of this variables on relationship between UNO and UZC.(number)		Total respondents	Percentage of respondents	
	yes	No	number	yes	No
Influence of MP	14	2	16	87.5	12.5
Influence of UZC	12	4	16	75	25
Influence of UPC	14	2	16	87.5	12.5

Table-4. Impact of Institutional and operational variables on relationship between UNO and UZC.

Variables	Impact of this variables on relationship between UNO and UZC.(number)		Total respondents	Percentage of respondents	
	yes	No	number	yes	no
training	15	1	16	93.75	6.25
Existing Rules and Regulations	15	1	16	93.75	6.25
Communication	14	2	16	87.5	12.5
Coordination	8	8	16	50	50

Appendix B-Figure 01 : Impact of studied variables on relationship between UNO and UZC.

Appendix C- List of Transferred Departments

Ministry of Establishment
Ministry of health and Family Welfare
Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock
Ministry of Food and Disaster Management
Ministry of Social Welfare
Ministry of Primary and Mass Education
Ministry of education
Ministry of Women and Children Affairs
Ministry of Youth and Sports
Local Government Division

Appendix D- List of Functions of Upazila Parishad (UZP)

1. Preparation of five-year and different time-specific development plans

2. Implementation, supervision and coordination of programmes and activities of various government departments transferred to the *Parishad*

3. Construction, repair and maintenance of inter-union roads

4. Initiation and implementation of *Upazila Parishad* small irrigation projects to ensure optimal use of surface water in accordance with the government guidelines

5. Ensuring public health, nutrition and family planning services

6. Improvement of sanitation and drainage system and taking measures for supplying safe drinking water

a. Motivation and assistance for expansion of education at the *Upazila* level

b. Monitoring of activities of and giving assistance to the concerned institutions for improvement of quality of Secondary and Madrasha education

7. Taking measures for establishment and expansion of cottage and small industries

8. Giving assistance to and coordination of activities of cooperatives and non-government voluntary organizations

9. Implementation of and providing assistance to women, children, social welfare, youth, sports and cultural activities

10. Initiation and implementation of activities for improving agricultural, livestock, fisheries and forest resources

11. Review of activities of the police department along with improvement of law and order situation in the *Upazila* and sending reports to the higher authorities regularly

12. Initiation and implementation of self-motivated measures for creating self-employment and poverty reduction, and providing necessary assistance to the government in implementing related governmental programmes

13. Coordination and examination of and giving assistance to development programmes of Union *Parishads*

14. Taking various preventive measures including creating public awareness against committing crimes like oppression of women and children, etc.

15. Taking various preventive measures including creating public awareness against committing crimes such as violence, theft, robbery, smuggling, use of narcotics, etc.

16. Taking various measures including social forestation for preservation and development of environment

18. Other functions as assigned by the government from time to time

Appendix E- Charter of Duties of UNO

1. Upazila Nirbahi Officer will help and advise the *Upazila Parishad* Chairman in the exercise of his executive power. He will present all proposals for expenditure and administrative decisions to the Chairman for approval. He will exercise executive power of the Parishad if authorised by it.

2. He will provide secretarial support to the Upazila Parishad. As part of his official duty he will attend meetings of the Parishad and, if necessary, meetings of standing committees and participate in the discussion, but will not be able to vote.

3. He will convene the first meeting of the Upazila Parishad in accordance with the Rules. He can convene monthly meetings of the Parishad at the advice of the Chairman, and in case of emergency, call a special meeting of the Upazila Parishad if one-third of members of the Parishad give a requision notice.

4. He will express his opinion on any issue included in the agenda and move each agenda in the Parishad meetings with this specific opinion.

5. He will communicate the decisions of the Parishad to the Local Government Division if he considers it necessary to inform the government.

6. He will inform the Local Government Division if any abnormal situation/issue arises in the Parishad.

7. He will assist the Parishad in the execution of its activities and the implementation of policies. He will take steps to execute the decisions of the Parishad. He will request the Parishad in writing to reconsider any of its decisions that he thinks has not been taken lawfully, and may affect peoples life, health, and public security, if implemented. If the Parishad sticks to its decision that has already been taken, he will inform the government or prescribed authority about it with the knowledge of the Parishad Chairman. He will take necessary steps to implement the decision(s) if he does not receive any instruction from the government or the prescribed authority within 15 days.

8. He will perform the role of a coordinator in the discharge of functions by officials transferred to the Upazila Parishad.

9. He will assist the Chairman in supervising all developmental and administrative activities at the Upazila level. He himself will be able to supervise developmental and administrative activities.

10. He will assist the Parishad in the formulation and implementation of an integrated development plan for the Upazila.

11. He will assess the justification pf any expenditure in the light of the financial rules made for the regulation of fund of the Parishad. He will maintain the records of the income and expenditure of the Parishad.

12. He will assist the Parishad in the preparation and approval of the annual budget of the Parishad. He will take measures to release funds for financing developmental and project expenditure after the approval of the budget.

13. He will maintain records of the progress of development projects and expenditure within the Upazila.

14. He will control the Parishad s own officers/employees under the guidance and control of the Chairman and take disciplinary actions against them. He along with the Chairman shall collectively discharge the responsibilities of the drawing and disbursement officer for the Parishad s own officers/employees.

15. He will accept and distribute relief during natural disasters under the guidance of the Parishad.

16. He will discharge responsibilities under laws framed by the Parishad.

17. As directed by the government he will send different reports to the government or other authorities.

18. He will ensure the application of government directives and bring it to the notice of the government if there is any lapse.

Appendix F- Map of studied upazila parishad.

(source Banglapedia)

RAJBARI SADAR UPAZILA

Locations on map:

SUJANAGAR

BERA

89°32' 89°36' 89°40' 89°44' E

Ganges R

Ganges R

23°48' N

Khanganj

Mizanpur

Mara Padma R

Surjanagar RS

Paurashava

Barat

23°46'

Hara R

Chandani

RAJBARI SADAR

PANGSHA

Dadshi

Panchuria

23°44'

Ramkantapur

GOALANDAGHAT

Rajapur K

Alipur

23°42'

Banibaha

Khankhanapur

BALIAKANDI

Shahid Wahabpur

23°40'

Mulghar

Basantapur

FARIDPUR SADAR

23°38'

Rajapur K

Sultanpur

23°36'

1 0 1 2 3 km

MADHUKHALI

89°34' 89°38' 89°42'

(source Banglapedia)

Appendix G- Questionnaires

bgjvcÜo‡ (BD.Gb.I. Gi Rb)

1. bvg   t
2. eqm   t
3. yj½   t
4. Dc‡Rjv .... †Rjv...............................
5. wk¶WZ †hvM¨Zv (me©‡kl wWwMÖ)   t
6. BD.Gb.I wel‡q AwfÁZv   t
7. AwfÁZv Avcbv‡i ga¨Kvi K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©W/‡b †K ai‡bi fwgKv i‡L‡Q?

8. Avcb †K g‡b K‡ib Avcbvi Ges Dc‡Rjv†Pqvig¨b Gi g‡a¨ eqmi e¨eab Avcbv‡i ga¨Kvi K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©Wvbi †¶‡lÎ c‡ÚeÜKZv˜ZixxK‡i‡Q?

9. Avcb wK g‡b K‡ib Avcb guvjv vcÿ¨I weavq Dc‡Rjv†Pqvig¨b Gi mt_ K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©ZixxZ evav umn‡i K¬R K‡i ?

10. Avcb wK g‡b K‡ib Avcbv‡i wk¶WZ †hvM¨Zvi AvgZvvcvi¯úviK K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©Wbq‡tb evav umn‡i K¬R K‡i?

11. Avcb wK g‡b K‡ib Gg.ve. g‡b¨q Gi i‡R¾wZK c‡Úe Avcbv‡i `RRÜbi ga¨Kvi K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©W/‡b evav umn‡i K¬R K‡i?

12. Avcb wK g‡b K‡ib Dc‡Rjv†Pqvig¨b GKvU i‡R¾wZK `tji m¨mi weavq Zvi i‡R¾wZK c‡Úe Avcbv‡i g‡tSi K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©Wvb c‡ÚeÜKZvumn‡i K¬R K‡i?

13. Avcb wK g‡b K‡ib BDwbqb cui‡l¨i †Pqvig¨b‡l¨i i‡R¾wZK c‡Úe Avcbvi Ges Dc‡Rjv†Pqvig¨b Gi ga¨Kvi K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©Wvb c‡ÚeÜKZvumn‡i K¬R K‡i?

14. Avcb `ßuiK K¬vh@jxxmn‡uv¯‡b mmqK c‡k¶b MÖY K‡i‡Qb wK b‡? n¨uvntj Zv Avcbvi Ges Dc‡Rjv†Pqvig¨b Gi g‡tS nn‡uK©Wbq‡tb mmqK wK b‡?

15. Avcb wK g‡b K‡ib eZ©§b c‡Újv Z AwBb/weav Avcbv‡i g‡tS nn‡uK©Wbq/Aebui‡tZ K¬R Ki‡?

16. c‡Újv Z weav/weab Ablyvqx‡ßuiK K¬vh@jxM cuviPvjbvq Avcbv‡i ga¨Kvi K¬vhRixxmn‡uK©ZixxZ c‡ÚeÜKZvumn‡i K¬R K‡i wK b‡?

17. ‡ßuiK K¬vh@jxM cuviPvjbvq †hnMnhMe¨Z¨Z Dc‡Rjv†Pqvig¨b Gi mt_ Ab¨ †lKwb f‡tb †hnMnhMwnq wK b‡? n¨uvntj wK f‡tb?

18. Av‣ub ‣K g‡b K‡ib n¯všiŽZ `ßi ng‡mi K‣h@g ngšqi ‡¶‡Î Dc‡Rjv‡Pqvig¨‣b Gi mt_ Av‣bvi m¤úK@¹†K‣b Aeb…Z n‡qt0? n¨un‡j ‡K‣b ‡¶‡Î (m¥úófv‡e D‡jøL Ki‣ab|)

19. Av‣bvi Ges Dc‡Rjv‡Pqvig¨‣b Gi ga¨Kui K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹Kgb? fy‣j/g¨` n‡j ‣K ‣K Kui‡b m‡qt0 e‡j Av‣ub g‡b K‡ib?

bg‡h‡cŘ‡cŴ‡Î (Gg.we -Gi Rb¨)

1. Dc‡Rjvcu‣il` K‣hŘixfv‡e cuiP¥jbvi Rb¨ BD.Gb.‣I Ges Dc‡Rjv‡Pqvig¨‣b Gi ga¨Kui f‣gKv‣K nIqvD…PvZ e‡j Av‣ub g‡b K‡ib?

2. G Dc‡Rjvi Dc‡Rjv‡Pqvig¨‣b Ges BD.Gb.‣I Gi ga¨Kui K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹Kgb?

3. fy‣j/g¨` n‡q _K‡j Zv‣K ‣K Kui‡Y m‡qt0 e‡j Av‣ub g‡b K‡ib?

bg‡h‡cŘ‡cŴ‡Î (Dc‡Rjv‡Pqvig¨‣b -Gi Rb¨)

1. bvg .... t
2. eqm .... t
3. yj½ .... t
4. Dc‡Rjv .... †Rjv.......................................
5. ‣k¶‣MZ ‡hvM¨Zv (me©‡k‣l ‣WMŘ) .... t
6. Rbc‡Ž‣bu umt‡n K‣tRi Av‡fÁZv .... t
7. Av‡fÁZv Av‣bvt¨`i ga¨Kui K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹Ŵt‣b ‣K ai‡bi f‣gKv i‣vL‡t0?

8. Av‣ub ‣K g‡b K‡ib Av‣bvi Ges BD.Gb.‣I. Gi g‡t‣ eqt‣mi e¨eaab Av‣bvt¨`i ga¨Kui K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹Ŵt‣bi ‡¶‡Î c‣Ž‡eÜKZv¯Z ixK‡it‡tQ?

9. Av‣ub ‣K g‡b K‡ib Av‣ub c¥¯I weaq BD.Gb.‣I. Gi mt_ K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹Zi ixtZ evavmt‡tt KiR K‡ti?

10. Av‣ub ‣K g‡b K‡ib Av‣bvt¨`i ‣k¶‣MZ ‡hvM¨Zvi AmgZvcvi©ú¨iK K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹bqt‡b evavmt‡tt KiR K‡ti?

11. Av‣ub ‣K g‡b K‡ib Gg.we. g‡tv¨`q Gi ivR‰bwZK c‡Ž‡e Av‣bvt¨`i `ßR‡tbi ga¨Kui K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹Ŵt‣b evav mt‡tt KiR K‡ti?

12. Av‣ub ‣K g‡b K‡ib Av‣ub GKwU ivR‰bwZK `j‡i m`m¨ weaq Av‣bvt¨`i g‡tSi K‣hŘixnm¤úK@¹Ŵt‣b c‣Ž‡eÜKZv© mt‡tt KiR K‡ti?

13. Avcib iK gtb K‡ib BDibqb cwil‡`i †Pqvig`b‡`i iiR%wZK c$e/Avcbi Ges BD.Gb.I. Gi ga¨Kvi KvhRix nµíK¶M#b c$ZeÜKZvvmÄ‡te K\R K‡i?

14. Avcib `\ßwiK Kvh@jxnµív” #b mmqK céK¶|b MÖY K‡i‡0b iK bi? n¨untj Zv Avcbi Ges BD.Gb.I Gi gv#S nµíK¶Dbqtb mmqK iK bi?

15. Avcib iK gtb K‡ib eZ@b c$¨j Z AiBb/wen Avcbt`i gv#S nµíK¶AebiZ NUviZ K\R i‡i#0?

16. c$¨j Z wen/waib AbÐypx`\ßwiK Kvh@g cwiPÅjbq Avcbt`i gta” KvhRixnµíK¶ ¶¶#ˆ #K\b c$ZeÜKZvvˆZix K‡i#0 iK bi?

17. `\ßwiK Kvh@g cwiPÅjbq †hvM#hvM e˜ZvZ BD.Gb.I. Gi mt_ Ab¨ †K\b f$te †hvM#hvM nq iK bi? n¨untj iKf$te?

18. Avcib iK gtb K‡ib n¯ÍwšͺwiZ `ßi ng#ni Kvh@g ngtŠqi ¶¶#ˆ BD.Gb.I. Gi mt_ Avcbi nµíK¶ iK\b AebiZ ntqt0? n¨untj iK\b ¶¶#ˆ (m¨úóf$te D‡j øL Kiib)|

19. Avcbi Ges BD.Gb.I. Gi ga¨Kvi KvhRixnµíK¶Kgb? f¨j/gª ntj iK iK Kvib0b ntqt0 etj Avcib gtb K‡ib?

1. bvg   t

2. eqm   t

3. BDibqb.........................Dc‡Rjv......................... †Rjv.................

4. iK¶\WZ †hMÏZv (me#k¤ í¨WÏ)   t

5. Rbcﮬivbª umÄ‡te KvÏRi AvfÁZv   t

6. Avcib iK gtb K‡ib BD.Gb.I. Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b Gi gv#a¨ eqmi e¨eab Zvt`i ga¨Kvi KvhRixnµíK© M\‡bi ¶¶#ˆ c$ZeÜKZvvˆZixK‡i?

7. Avcib iK gtb K‡ib BD.Gb.I. Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b weciZ yj‡½i ntj Zv Zvt`i mt_ KvhRix nµíK$K c$ªeZ K‡i?

8. Avcib iK gtb K‡ib BD.Gb.I. Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b Gi iK¶\WZ †hMÏZvi AmgZv cviˆúiiK KvhRixnµíK© Dbqtb evavumÄ‡te K\R K‡i?

9. Av‥ub ‥K g‡b K‡ib Gg.‥. g‡mv`q Gi i‥R%‥ZK c‰ïe BD.Gb.‥. Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b G `ƒR‡bi ga¨Kvi K‥hRixnm‥ú‰K¶W‡Œb e‥av‥n‡te K‥R K‡i?

10. Av‥ub ‥K g‡b K‡ib Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b GK‥U i‥R%‥ZK `‡ji m`m¨ e‥av‥q BD.Gb.‥. Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨‡bi ga¨Kvi K‥hRixnm‥ú‰K¶K c‰ïeZ K‡i?

11. Av‥ub ‥K g‡b K‡ib BD‥bqb c‥il‡`i †Pqvig¨b†`i i‥R%‥ZK c‰ïe Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b Ges BD.Gb.‥. Gi ga¨Kvi K‥hRixnm‥ú‰K¶W‡Œb c‰ïeÜKZvu‥nm‡te K‥R K‡i?

12. Av‥ub ‥K g‡b K‡ib `‥ßuiK K‥h@jxnm‥ú‰v‰ †b mmqK c‰ïk¶‡b BD.Gb.‥. Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b Gi g‥lS m‰ú‰K© Dbqt‡b mmqK umt‡e K‥R K‡i?

13. eZ@‰‰b c‰ßuj Z AiBb/‥umn Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b Ges BD.Gb.‥. Gi ga¨Kvi K‥hRixnm‥ú‰K¶W‡Œb ‥K ai‡bi f‥gKvcyjb K‡t‰0?

14. c‰ßuj Z ‥umn/‥umnb Ab‰jnqx `‥ßuiK K‥h@‰g c‥iPyjbq BD.Gb.‥. Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b g‡a¨ †iK‥b Acﬂ‰ZKi NUbv N‡t‡U0 ‥Kb?

15. `‥ßuiK K‥h@‰g c‥iPyjbq thvMthvMe¨Z‰Z Z‰t¨ i g‡a¨ Ab¨ †iK‥b f‥te thvMthvMMnq ‥K b‰? n‰un‡tj ‥Kf‰te?

16. Av‥ub ‥K g‡b K‡ib n¯Íﬂ‰š‰Í‰viZ `‥ßi ng‰tni K‥h@‰g ng‰št‰qi ‥†¶‰tﬂ‰Î Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b Gi mt_ BD.Gb.‥.Gi m‰ú‰K¶ ‥Kb Aebﬂ‰Z n‡t‰qt0? n‰un‡tj ‥Kb ‥†¶‰tﬂ‰Î (mÿúof‡te D‡tj‰øL Kiab)|

17. G Dc†Rjv‥ BD.Gb.‥.Ges Dc†Rjv †Pqvig¨b Gi ga¨Kvi K‥hRixnm‥ú‰K¶‰Kgb? fyj/g‰` n‡tj ‥K ‥K K‥i‡tb n‡t‰qt0 e‡tj Av‥ub g‡b K‡ib?

bgjyv‰c‰b‰Î (n¯Íﬂ‰š‰Í‰viZ ‥efWng‰tni KgﬂRZ@ ‥i Rb¨)

1. bvg .... t
2. eqm .... t
3. yj½ .... t
4. c`ex.............................Dc†Rjv.............. †Rjv..................

5. ‍‍‍‍‍ t

6. ‍‍‍‍‍ t

7. ‍‍‍‍‍

8. ‍‍‍‍‍

9. ‍‍‍‍‍

10. ‍‍‍‍‍

11. ‍‍‍‍‍

12. ‍‍‍‍‍

13. ‍‍‍‍‍

14. eZ®\b cÐ\j Z A\Bb/\un Dc†Rjv†Pqig¨\b Ges BD.Gb.Ӏ. Gi ga¨Kui K\hℝixnªúK℗W\b \K ai‡bi f\u0001gKvc\jb Ki‡Q?

15. cÐ\j Z \un/\un\b Ab\ıu\qx`\Bu\iK K\h®\g cui\Pj\bu\q BD.Gb.Ӏ. Ges Dc‡Rjv†Pqig¨\b g‡a¨ †K\b Ac®ZKi NU\bv NJU‡Q \Kb? n¨un‡j Kvib \K?

16. `\Bu\iK K\h®\g cui\Pj\bu\q †h\Wſh\Mľe¨Z\xZ Zv†i g‡a¨ Ab¨ †K\b f\u0001\te †h\Wſh\MJnq \K bv? n¨un‡j \Kf\u0001\te?

17. A\v\ub \K g‡b K‡ib n¯Ӏ\všӀ\uſ\uiZ `\ßi ng‡ni K\h®\g ng\štqi †¶\f†Î Dc‡Rjv†Pqig¨\b Gi m\f_ BD.Gb.Ӏ.Gi nªúK℗ †K\b Aebu\Z n‡qt‡Q? n¨un‡j †K\b †¶\f†Î (mÿúóf\u0001\te D‡j øL Ki)|

18. G Dc‡Rji BD.Gb.Ӏ.Ges Dc†Rjv†Pqig¨\b Gi ga¨Kui K\hℝixnªúK℗ Kgb? f\j/g®` n‡j \K \K Kui‡b n‡q‡Q etj A\v\ub g‡b K‡ib?

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