Resource leakages in primary schools in Bangladesh: Do horizontal checks have an effect on the quality of governance?

Abstract

Bangladesh has successfully increased spending on primary education and achieved impressive improvements in enrollment rates; however, the quality of learning outcomes remains a serious concern. The governance of schools is an important determinant of poor learning outcomes as it can result in a loss or diversion of teaching resources. To improve governance, the state has focused on formal arrangements that we describe as ‘vertical enforcement’. Bodies such as School Management Committees, Parent–Teacher Associations and Social Audit Committees operate at the school level, while other bodies operate at higher levels and affect the flow of resources from the treasury to schools. This paper argues that the quality and effectiveness of vertical checks at any level depends on complementary ‘horizontal checks’. It investigates three important sources of corrupt leakages associated with poor governance in primary schools in Bangladesh: the inflation of student numbers, the misuse of school development funds, and the failure to check poor teacher allocation and effort.