

Challenging The Political Notion of Partition through Butalia's *The Other Side of Silence* and Analyzing Possible Reasons for Political Disagreements

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Declaration

It is hereby declared that

1. The thesis submitted is my/our own original work while completing degree at Brac University.
2. The thesis does not contain material previously published or written by a third party, except where this is appropriately cited through full and accurate referencing.
3. The thesis does not contain material which has been accepted, or submitted, for any other degree or diploma at a university or other institution.
4. I/We have acknowledged all main sources of help.

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Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the effects the partition had on the people. Usually, historical accounts of Partition are expressed from the viewpoint of political leaders. Such a view leaves accounts of people about actual events unrecognized. This paper aims to decipher partition's effect and pre-partition attitude of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities towards each other. The paper aims to show that partition was inevitable because of the existing insecurities and distrust within Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities. The aim is also to determine if the violence that took place was triggered by political mishandling of the 'communal problem'. This paper questions if the reasons behind the turmoil left by partition were purely because of political decisions or if political decisions intensified an already existing rift among the Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh communities. With Singh's *Train to Pakistan* and Butalia's *The Other Side of Silence*, this dissertation decodes people's perceptions of their communal differences before partition. It also tries to decipher the possible reasons behind political disagreements between the Congress and the League with Ambedkar's *Pakistan or Partition of India* supported with secondary resources.

Keywords : Congress, Hindu, Muslim, Identity, Violence

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Table of Contents

Declaration.....	2
Approval	3
Abstract	5
Acknowledgment	6
Chapter 1: Introduction	10
Chapter 2: Literature Review	12
Chapter 3: Analysis.....	41
Partition to the Public.....	41
Relationship between the Communities.....	45
The Blame Game.....	47
Reflection of Partition in Fiction.....	49
Anxieties of Partition	52
Political Mismanagements of Partition	54
Political Essence behind Partition	59

Conclusion	62
Works Cited	63

Chapter 1: Introduction

Partition as a subject has been analyzed by many scholars. Many analyses have been done from conventional political views of the separation. Yet what makes the bitter experiences of the separation real along with the political grievances are the people's mourning for the loss they suffered. Butalia's Text, *the Other Side of Silence*, bears testimonies of people who suffered the conflicts and riots of the partition period. Here she tells the story and effect of partition as experienced by the people whose lives were impacted by the dangerously ignorant decision of partition that did not take into account the geographical history as well as trade and social relations amongst people who shared the lands of Lahore and Amritsar. However, in her text, Butalia only implies that there were social and economic insecurities amongst Hindu and Muslim communities and mostly tries to state that Hindus and Muslims were united or in harmony with each other before the catastrophic decision of partition was made. I would like to argue the opposite; that Hindus and Muslims had deep social and economic issues before the suggestion and decision of partition was imposed on these communities. The political decision of partition further pressed on the ongoing social and economic divisions of the Hindu and Muslim communities. The political decision of partition did not divide the Hindu and Muslim communities; they were already divided on social, political, and economic issues because of existent racial and economic discrimination (as Butalia and Ambedkar's texts would reveal), which was further exercised because of both the communities' religious difference and different economic status. The political decision of partition did not divide a supposedly strong union between the Hindu and Muslim communities, it only made the internal rift and insecurities of both the communities a reality. In short, the political decision only created a path or a division

for the internal insecurity and difference to exist separately, whereas communities previously only coexisted for the sake of maintaining a sort of situational peace that prevented both the Hindu and Muslim communities from sharing their grievances, differences and complaints with each other. Both the communities wanted not to confront each other about any discrimination and injustice that they have faced from each other. This has resulted in continual bitterness that gradually increased to the point of no return as the decision of partition was implemented.

Overall, the division of the Hindu and Muslim communities in the Indian subcontinent did not just occur because of political decisions, it occurred because of Hindu-Muslim insecurities that existed before partition. These insecurities were born from religious and economic differences as evident from the primary texts and secondary sources analyzed. This also begs these questions; did the partition exaggerate previously existent discriminatory feelings of Sikhs and Hindus towards Muslims or Muslims towards Sikhs and Hindus, instead of the popular opinion that the political and ideological narrative of Partition is what drove these communities towards violence? Was the violence incited by Partition worth jeopardizing the lives of Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim communities? Did political disagreements create divisions between Hindus and Muslims? Or did it just intensify an already existing division more clearly?

I will support my argument using Butalia's *The Other Side of Silence*, and B.R. Ambedkar's *Pakistan or Partition of India* as well as the textual analysis of the following secondary resources that will help to understand the nature behind the impacts partition has left. The secondary resources will also help to explain how and why people have thought differently before and after partition for not just political reasons but because of the changes that they felt in their personal and communal lives.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

In Urvashi Butalia's text, *The Other Side of Silence*, the stories of the consequences of the Partition as seen from the eyes of people who were at the receiving end of the blow has been shown. History as viewed from the powerful people's perspective cannot decipher the many specificities that lie behind Partition, "this is the generality of partition: it exists publicly in historical books. The particular is harder to discover; it exists privately in stories told and retold inside so many households In India and Pakistan" (Butalia 4). Butalia's accounts of partition from the sufferers will not only shed light on unknown stories told from a social and economic perspective, but will also tackle the common narratives that flow in history portraying only the decisions of the political parties involved. "Working with memory is never simple or unproblematic. I am deeply aware of the problems that attach to this method I have chosen. There has been considerable research to show that memory is not ever 'pure' or 'unmediated'" (Butalia 10). In her book, *The Other Side of Silence* Butalia is aware of the inconsistencies her interviews of the sufferers of partition might have, yet she stresses on focusing in extracting the core meaning from the interviews, stressing on the fact that sometimes not only words but silences can speak. This means that from the silences, events and secrets of another nature can be discovered, such as the restricting influence the family exerts on their men and women when it comes to partition, the sense of loss and regret they feel as either victims or perpetrators of violence. Stories told by Damyanti, Rajinder Singh, and Bir Bahadur Singh show ordinary people's perspectives on how both Hindu and Muslim communities used to interact with each other before partition, what were the issues for which paranoia grasped both communities; the paranoia spreading also because of a politically induced perceived threat they felt from their

neighbors. Stories of women and children abducted during partition tell us of the muted sufferings these sections of people faced just because they were perceived to be on the weaker side of society and stereotyped as those sections of people who were not supposed to have any opinions of their own. Political narratives are only capable of expressing casualties in numbers that would inform someone of the amount of loss incurred by partition. However, historical narratives are incapable of expressing the psychological and physical toil partition had on different sections of people, more on the poor than the rich when the time came to cross borders. Though such narratives can't exactly denote the time and space where the events occurred they can tell you through their emotional stories and accounts of the social structures of the time, history from the psychological perspective of the common people. This makes the interviews taken by Butalia rich in content and opinions about the partition as a decision imposed on the common people. This can resonate with the public on the events of Partition and it can become a rich source by academicians to extract the contextual reality of partition instead of the partition reality captured by historical time and places. Such is stated in the book, "Whatever its limitations, the oral narrative offers a different way of looking at history, a different perspective. For, because such narratives flow into each other in terms of temporal time, they blur the somewhat rigid timeframes within which history situates itself" (13).

In Eric Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* it is stated that the contours of nationalism in the third world isn't as straightforward as that of European nationalism (153). Due to the emergence of print media and other platforms that express political opinions, ideologies could be molded according to the demands of any major group and this can often give the illusion of the reality that only the demands of the majority matters and all the peripheral groups

have to abide by it. Such is stated in the book, “By these means popular ideologies could be both standardized, homogenized and transformed, as well as obviously exploited for the purposes of deliberate propaganda by private interests and states” (141). Using politics as a tool, many propagandist leaders arise from localities whose key determination is to get their message across. Evolved in Western ideology, they often are disconnected with the multi-ethnic and multi-religious realities of their own territories. They use mediums of propaganda to their use to an extent where their ideas seem like the only truth. This happens because of lack of debate or conflicts between multiple ethno-cultural and ethno-religious ideologies do not take place in the media or in a broad way for which any one ideology that has successfully expressed itself through any propaganda for the public are seen and so gain importance as the only reality. Such is emphasized, “It seemed, to imperial observers, that in the dependent world it was often an imperial import, taken up by minorities of evolves out of touch with the mass of their countrymen, whose ideas of community and political loyalty were quite different” (152). The colonial structures have also attributed to the illusion of a homogenous population and this notion clashes with the multi-ethnic and multi-religious facet of the Indian subcontinent. Because Indian people are intermixed as different communities for the sake of their economy and social decorum, their strength lies not in homogeneity but in diversity where constant social interaction takes place that makes social bonds stronger. Indian subcontinent thrives not just on kinship values but also social ones that bind different communities together. Thus, division of such intermixed communities that are diverse in nature can lead to conflicts. Such is implied in the book, “They protested against the ‘national’, i.e. ethnic , or cultural, unreality of the territories into which the imperial era had partitioned the dependent world, though sometimes also against

the unreality of the Western-derived ideologies taken over by the modernizing elites which inherited the former rulers' power" (153).

In the article "Globalization, National Cultures and Cultural Citizenship" by Nick Stevenson, the concept of cultural citizenship and what it means to different cultural communities have been explored. Firstly, it has stated the impacts of globalization where people of different communities have not exactly been united together; rather they have only indulged in consumerism and in an individualistic lifestyle, which has replaced the national culture with a sense of lack of depth and place (41). Previously, cultural citizenship meant the enjoyment of full membership of a nation, an inclusivity in the dominant cultural identity of the nation (42). Now cultural citizenship has to adopt strategies to include minority cultures if it wants to promote inclusivity instead of exclusivity (42). This means that only one dominant cultural influence is not enough to uphold the ideologies of nationalism, as it can encroach upon the basic rights of minority communities. The article also states that a connection made through mass media in the globalized world cannot make people aware of their responsibilities toward each other and toward people of different communities (51). It also requires an understanding that "Moral consciousness and responsibility are more matters of everyday practice than seeking law like guarantees from an intellectual class who hand down moral orders to the masses" (61). This is to say that we need to develop a consciousness of moral responsibility towards people of different communities and understand our differences with them in order to cohesively co-exist together. This has not been achievable by the Hindu and Muslim communities during partition, they have not been able to recognize and accept their own cultural and economic differences that have led to different identities that now assume a different cultural citizenship. The article also indicates

that legislating moral rules on a civic society diminishes public participation in fulfilling their moral obligations; if the civic society's areas of spontaneity and independence were protected, it could better act as a 'pluralistic realm of overlapping identities' (59). That is if the civic society were allowed in solving social problems within themselves instead of state intervention, then they would be more harmonious and less distanced from their civic members.

In Riaz's paper, "Nations, Nation-State and Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia", the complicated issue of different ethnicities that have made a pluralistic India exist before partition has come hand in hand with the determination of Muslims in marking their religious difference. The problem Muslims faced because of being tagged as minority or of being communal in nature because of their demand for recognizing their religious distinctness is portrayed in this paper. Examples of riots like the Gujarat one had direct involvement of the state machinery, which claimed that it was secular in nature and not communal. Riots like these and as well as a state of economic dilapidation led the Muslims to secure a distinct identity for themselves so that they can be safe from Hindu insecurities and oppressions. Yet this posed a problem for them, the conundrum of being a minority. Such is stated in the paper, "On the one hand, it "gave birth to a sense of Muslims being a religio-political entity in the colonial image — of being unified, cohesive and segregated from Hindus; while on the other hand, "it effectively consigned them to being a perpetual minority in any scheme of constitutional reform"" (54). This proves not only the inability of Muslim communities in securing an identity that don't come under blows, but also represents the short-sightedness and the complacency of the Indian national Congress in allowing acts like The Indian Councils act 1882 and Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 to prevail. Such acts only indicated how different the politics was between Hindu and

Muslim political parties. Such acts allowed, “Separate electorates in representative bodies at all levels of electorate systems” (54). The economic insecurity and desire for recognition based on religious identity led Muslims to claim their unique identity, although they never wanted this desire in terms of gaining a nationhood (54). Thinking that Muslims would soon grow to become a significant political entity, The Indian Congress emphasized on a single nationhood. They also made the Muslim community as “religious communists” so that they can solely claim the flag of “secular nationalism” (54). Such insecurities based on religious identity has not only led to the partition of India and Pakistan, but also of Pakistan and Bangladesh, where although unity was claimed before based on religious identity, it soon got separated because of ethnic differences and for constant doubts on the sincerity of patriotism shown by East Pakistanis (55). Such incidents show that because of severe insecurities that are marked by economic subordination compared to another community and of social denigration of one community against another; i.e., of Hindu extremists against Muslim communities in India and of Muslim extremists against Hindu minorities in Bangladesh. The causes of such divisions and internal oppressions are complex since at the time of inception of such discriminating thoughts that attack different communities, political parties seem to take advantage of such thoughts and use it for their specific plan on nationhood.

In David Brown’s paper, “Why is the nation-state so vulnerable to ethnic nationalism?”, it is stated that although territorially based sovereign nationhood was the norm which was also supported by state elites, the reality of ethnic pluralism is slowly eroding it (1). The state elites have used nationalism as an ideology so that they can come to power and control the modern state in a way that replaces the previous rule of divinity by the monarchy (2). It is emphasized

that, “These elites constructed new myths of unity for the control of societies characterized by socio-economic complexity and cultural diversity” (2). Thus, it can be said that state elites almost act like a substitute of ruling powers and that in their nature they echo obsession towards nationalist ideologies, which focuses on excluding other communities. Instead of claiming the right to rule as a divine right, state elites have used the ideology of nationhood by making the masses obsess over new found historical past that encapsulated, according to both the masses and state elites, a golden period or ethnic glory. This is also stated in the paper, “State elites are seen to construct ideas of the natural nation by selectively reinterpreting historical symbols so as to portray the society within the state in largely mythical terms of historical continuity, claiming descent from premodern communities depicted in ethnic terms” (2). This means that state elites have selectively interpreted historical events, maybe even created some, to use them for their benefit in illuminating the public with the notion that only their ethnicity based on a common descent matters and were on the right side of history, unlike other communities of common descent. The fact that nationalism is a cheap trick in bargaining for maximum mass support is argued against by two factors: one is that nationalism was an automatic event to occur because nations were modernized and the other fact is that nationalism is an extension of premodern ethnic communities; i.e., nationalism originated from the premodern ethnic community whose roots were based on kinship (3). Diffusionist theorists stated the claim that though nationalism came because of economic growth and industry that generated a common language, culture and a literature that can imagine the ‘one community’, it doesn’t guarantee that modernization and nationalism ensure mutual development (3). Only the creation of a centralized bureaucrat ensures that barriers towards mobility between different communities are made to be absent and common

educational system be present (3). This means that nationalism's authoritarian side is implied in part by state entities, who injects "fundamental inequality between those of its few members who are qualified to interpret the collective will and the many who have no such qualifications; the select few dictate to the masses who must obey" (4). They are able to successfully insert authoritarian nationalism that focuses on exclusion of different ethnic groups in the name of social justice and happiness (5). Dominant classes also vouch for nationalism to serve their interests and suffering from economic deprivation, nationalistic ideas are preached by lower classes to get out of the clutches of the authoritarian centre (4). Nationalism mostly is a ploy for the distinguished elites of the civil society as well as bureaucratic political entities in putting their private or dictatorial interests first and they do this in the name of social justice. However, this social justice mostly means exclusion of different ethnic communities for the sake of economic growth or because of the claim that only a particular community based on a common descent is deserving of nationalistic identity because of their ethnicity.

In Behera's paper, "Identities in India: Region, Nationality and Nationalism - A Theoretical Framework", it is stated that identity is both an accumulation of internal essential characteristics as well as a connotation of boundaries leading to differences that makes us unique (80). Similar to this is India as a country. This paper focuses on the fact that this country is at once multicultural while also bearing a unique identity that is based on civilizational unity. According to Paul Brass, objective differences within different ethnic groups are turned into subjective experiences and they also gain a symbolic significance for which the rise of nationalism can be said to have a political undertone, rather it can be said to have a cultural and a collective desire for group solidarity (81). An ethnic group becomes a nationality when they gain

their solidarity based on their uniqueness by using political tactics (81). Countering that, Hayes believes on quite another explanation for the rise of nationalism. For him, nationalism does not bear a political undertone; rather it is simply a cultural phenomenon where a group of people resides together based on common language, rituals and beliefs. This cultural phenomenon only transforms into a nation when incidentally it acquires political unity and sovereign independence (81). Yet the paper delves into the fact that although nationalism can be said to be within a group of people with common beliefs and ethnicity that focuses on excluding other groups, the concept of ethnicity itself is murky in Indian context (82). There are two kinds of ethnicity, primordialist and instrumentalist; the former emphasizes that a person comes with specific attachments to language, culture and territory since birth and it is unchangeable, whereas the latter emphasizes that a person's birth land, language and culture can be subject to change that is ethnicity is malleable (82). This resonates with the fact of identity of the self, that it can mean that an ethnicity can have distinct features while also adjusting with other ethnicities to form a "civilizational unity". Although the paper further shows that ethnic conflicts can be resolved by political attempts at maintaining unity, it fails to show how that unity can be achieved in terms of the difference of religious identity. Yet the answer somehow seems to lie with the concept of identity and the emulsion of different ethnicities within the Indian sub-continent. Just as different ethnicities collide based on their differences yet form coalitions because of want of harmony and non-violence between different ethnic groups, different religious communities should aim for such coalitions and prioritize them above conflicts. Different ethnic groups like the Oriyas, Gorkhas and Punjabis have resolved their ethnic conflicts for the sake of securing their political and territorial rights. Perhaps the different communities based on religion; i.e., the Sikhs, Hindus

and Muslims should also strive to mitigate their issues based on religious identity by choosing to prioritize inter-religious harmony within each other and should also think that by co-operating and co-existing with each other, they can acquire their political and territorial rights. The different religious communities should realize the strength in their unity while at the same time acknowledging their unique characteristics based on their differences.

In Karl Umbrasas's paper, "Psychopolitics of the Current Nationalism", the dangerous effects of obsession with nationalist ideology are portrayed. The charismatic leader apparently delivers ideas that fulfill the psychological needs of the narcissistic followers; their emotional gratification is met (29). The followers may also have been deprived because of any existent social and economic system and this deprivation has led to disappointments that are then either supported by nationalist ideologies or through the propagandas spread by mass and social media the delicate "sociocultural fault lines are inflamed" (30). Various degradation like loss of income, disappearance of industries and having skills that have either become outdated or become non-transferable evokes in a person disappointments towards social structures and makes them pine after ideologies that would fulfill their social needs and satiate their psychological desires (31). This means that when existing social systems fail to cater to the needs of a specific class of people, they become disillusioned with that society and begins to look for ways through which they can recover from their mental and physical losses. Such is stated in the paper, "Jerrold Post describes the ideal-hungry follower as a narcissistically wounded person whose psychological needs attracts him to rhetoric that compensates for his feelings of alienation and inadequacy" (31). Yet the extent to which such people in despair follows nationalist ideologies that are for their convenience varies (31). However, the main issue here is that

disappointments that emanate from world economic systems like globalization and previous mercantilist systems can leave certain class of people helpless for which they may develop a deviated form of nationalism that makes them construct a fictitious past that neither existed nor would have been possible (34). This is known as discovered nationalism, which romanticizes the notion of a glorious past and emphasizes on its return fundamentally, ignoring any opposing viewpoints to the extent that violates humanitarian laws (34). Such fundamentalism that focuses on hatred of other ideologies should be handled tactfully. The paper implies that excluding such fundamental ideologies that come with socially deprived people can bring devastating consequences like terrorism to the forefront (38). Thus possibly fundamentalist ideologies should not be shunned because of their extreme nature; rather investigations should be made to see if their root problems could be solved. Social policies should be made keeping every class of people in mind so that their mind does not become weak in the first place towards extreme form of ideologies that echo exclusion practices. Political organizations also take advantage of social and economic despair that sections of the public suffers from. Democratic discussions that include every form of argument should take place so that it can inform of any unfair practices that can be then solved; this act can be a preventive measure against the rise of any extreme ideologies including nationalist ones.

In David Gilmartin's paper, "Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative", the lack of influence of the partition from the political point of view almost had no impact on the underlying tensions and regional unities shared by the people before partition occurred. Such is emphasized in the paper, "But the scholarship on the 'high politics' of partition has nevertheless tended to posit a realm of political negotiation relatively uninfluenced

by the everyday politics of local life” (1069). The paper has also focused on the inherent meaning of community that seems to change its meaning and limits based on religious and cultural debate as well as an emphasis of a moral order based on the unity of a larger community in public arenas where different communities would perform religious and ceremonial activities (1074). This means that confrontation between Hindu and Muslim communities would happen as well as internal confrontations within the communities would also take place. This is because though the communities could be united based on religion that would inscribe for a great moral order uniting these people; the communities also had internal differences based on region, local culture and language. In fact, because of shared culture, language and status there were times when Hindus and Muslims were united and were called Biradari identities (1076). Before the colonial system of education and structure ensued, there used to be such unions at public arenas locally where the internal differences amongst communities as well as their unity would play itself out (1074). Thus, there used to be many riots amongst Hindus and Muslims that would pan out. However, with the influence of colonialism in social structure and educational system that favored many rich Hindus, the form or ever-changing concept of community took place in writing in print media (1075). Now the debates that would take place based on religious moral order or cultural and economic dissimilarities on local public arenas began taking place in newspapers and other print Medias that focused on the definition of a Muslim community in unison (1076). This allowed localized political leaders like Jinnah to take charge of a unionized Muslim community and overlook the internal inconsistencies between Muslim communities and stress on a single unity based on Islamic moral order (1076). This proves that Jinnah did not want a separate state, rather recognition based on a separate identity that would acknowledge Islam as

the sole centre (1071). The Muslims wanted a reformation from the colonial structure based on their religious identity (1076). However, the Congress took advantage of this demand and cornered the Muslim communities first through violence and then by drawing up boundaries and blaming Jinnah for holding separatist policies whereas in actuality it was the Indian Congress's intention (1071). Regional tensions were always abound based on senses of religious superiority and economic differences both within Hindu and Muslim communities as well as against each other. However, political powers prioritized the narrative of religion because it was emphasized on print media that expressed local grievances and concepts of unity. This emphasis could earlier solve itself out in the form of conflicts in local spheres before print capitalism came into being in India. However, once print media gained importance through colonialist policies, the internal tension seemed to spew within the public in the form of rigid writing, whereas previously the tensions would take place in localized context and their nature would also change through riots and debates in the local sphere. Now as the local conflicts based on religion, economic differences were expressed in the form of writing that was comparatively rigid and available to everyone irrespective of their particular localities; religious, and economic tussles that took place in daily lives became political. Thus, Jinnah in Muslim League as well as the Indian Congress used such narratives and assumed different thoughts that focused on religion as the chief form of identity.

In the paper "Religion and nationalism: Understanding the consequences of a complex relationship", by Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, it is stated how intellectuals like Gellner, Hobsbawm and Anderson didn't include religion as one of the main forces behind nationalism and instead focused on economic forces as the main drive (220–222). In saying this, the contours of religious

nationalism is more difficult to comprehend than was previously thought. Religious nationalism demands political recognition for self-determination on the basis of religious identity (225). This recognition does not always mean that the particular community based on religion wants a separate state, it can also mean that they want a recognition based on their religious identity and their own political autonomy so that they can take decisions within their own territory where they are the majority (225). Thus, the paper echoes what Jinnah originally sought, “This need not lead to an independent sovereign state. Political autonomy for a region or area within a state is sometimes an acceptable substitute for statehood (225). Yet other religious groups can nevertheless perceive the existence of different religious groups around them as a threat and India is a common example as Muslim population surrounds them from all sides, i.e., Pakistan, Kashmir, Bangladesh, Malaysia etc. (226). Because of such perceived threats, many extremist groups have aroused from the Hindu population who constantly violate the rules of secular nationalism by attacking religious places like the Babri Mosque as well as inciting riots like the Gujarat one that have taken the lives of many Muslims (234). Before such attacks, leaders like Gandhi and Nehru took extreme Hindutva (RSS, BJP) groups as threats to secular nationalism than communalism (234). Yet their lack of foresight in understanding the demands of the Muslim minority cornered the Muslim community for which the extreme Hindutva groups could shower their religious insecurities on the general Hindu population and further annihilate the Muslim communities through violence incited in the form of riots. However, they attempted for a secular nationalism that would mimic the European nationalism, but they failed to keep in mind the multi-cultural dimensions of the Indian subcontinent where both the Hindu and Muslim communities are more intermixed than the Catholics and Protestants of Britain. Trying to

separate both communities claiming superiority of any common religious descent would not only exaggerate the existing religious and economic insecurities these communities suffer, but also create new misunderstandings based on perceived threats of violence from each other and this thought won't fare well for the mental health and moral consciousness of people of both Hindu and Muslim communities.

In Ambedkar's book, "Pakistan or the Partition of India", he makes a case for partition by diving deep into the Hindu-Muslim relationship dynamic in social and political aspects. Ambedkar shows us the social position of the Hindus and Muslims; he points to the causes which make it hostile for Hindus and Muslims to reside together under one nation. He admits that although there are commonalities between Hindus and Muslims, because of their religious ideology, their differences run far deep (43). The ideas of humanity and benevolent activity of Hindus and Muslims differ; the former believes cow sacrifice to be heinous while the latter considers it their religious duty (225). The former differentiates through castes while the latter strives for equality of their economically and socially backward population by giving them political rights in the Indian subcontinent (220). This divide between the Hindus and Muslims is not only linguistic, despite having similarities in the lifestyles of both communities (40). Hostility exists between the two because their opinions contradict each other to such a degree that one community's demand stops another community's development. The Hindu-Muslim division is expressed in social hostilities and political concerns of Hindu and Muslim leaders; they merely exist side-by-side. Each side wants to secure and profit in terms of their gains; be it at the cost of injustice to the other community. Although at the surface because of lingual and social commonalities, it may seem that the two communities get along, yet when it comes to

social and political rights, there is a denial of oppression of the Hindus by the Muslims and vice versa. The book reiterates the historical wars between Hindus and Muslims and states that the two communities still doubt each other because of which a national unity between them is impossible (281-282). The doubt between the two communities has benefitted the British government; their divide-and-rule policy has been validated by the fundamental differences between Hindus and Muslims. This divide has only worsened with time and has been far away from the concept of nationalism because Hindus and Muslims believe in different versions of social justice and development. The political advancement of Hindus has not benefitted Muslims and the political advancement of Muslims has not benefitted the Hindus because both run counter-productive to each other. The Muslim's nationalistic policies for their own well-being hampers the already existing economic benefits the Hindus have in being a majority. That is why Ambedkar supports the idea that a settlement between the two communities regarding their political and geographical existence should occur, instead of one community appeasing the demands of the other for a unified existence (325). This signifies that the Hindu-Muslim struggle in co-existing with each other had to be solved by considering Partition but applying it with the consent of people. Observing social incidents of the two communities, it becomes clear that partition was the apt solution, but the method used in applying it was undemocratic; the decision of the political parties imposed partition on the people like a mandate. Both Muslims and Hindus were not ready for it and that is why the loss of lives took place. This is why Ambedkar reiterates that "The political and religious antagonisms divide the Hindus and the Musalmans far more deeply than the so-called common things are able to bind them together" (43). Because of such differences, communal doubts are created between the two communities and are expressed in

cruel petty acts against each other or through communal riots (215). Because of the communities' social and religious differences, only a democratically approved and politically sound plan of Partition could have ensured a safe co-existence between Hindus and Muslims. It would have prevented communal conflict and ensured social development which is vital for each community. This means that because of political, religious, and social differences; Partition was inevitable between the Hindus and Muslims. Avoiding the issue has led to the conflict between the two communities whose wounds still ache.

In Khuswant Singh's "Train to Pakistan" the story contradicts the mass claim of one community blaming the other for the riots and states that both Hindu and Muslim communities massacred each other (8). Mano Majra is the peaceful abode of both Hindus and Muslims and Hukum Chand and his sub-inspector partner tarnished this peace because of their secret hatred against the Muslim community(18-19). They tried to frame Jugga and Iqbal as Muslim murderers of the Hindu Landlord Ram Lal to create hatred in the minds of the Sikhs and to trigger a hostile environment between the Sikhs and the Muslims so that a riot could take place (63). The story expresses the limit to human kindness and affinity. At first, the Sikhs were not willing to think negatively about their Muslim counterparts and were mentally against the idea of separating from their Muslim neighbors; doubts and negative aspects about the Muslims were spread in the minds of Sikh villagers by the Boy leader and police officers. Vandalism by Malli and his gang was shown to be representative of Sikh aggression whereas verbal and physical chaos took place as a form of aggression from specific haters like Malli, Boy leader, and Hukum Chand. This indicates that it is not the people who get aggressive and fight because they are filled with sudden hatred. Hatred in them is created through doubts and by pointing out the flaws

of the other so that they get enraged and forget about the positive aspects that bound the two communities together despite their differences. The Sikhs and Muslims of Mano Majra were intimate and cordial to each other but they also had flaws that they overlooked in each other so that they can thrive beside each other. But some people who wanted communal violence for their own sake instigated those flaws and made the two communities believe that any communal camaraderie the Sikhs and Muslims had was an illusion, one community hated the other and that violence was needed to establish justice. Singh shows us the fragility of human relationships too. The inter-community faith Iqbal witnessed between Sikhs and Muslims was weak and therefore it couldn't survive the conspiracy of Hukum Chand and the wickedness of the Boy leader. Although there was a feeling of communal kinship between Sikhs and Muslims, it couldn't defeat the religious dissidence and historical enmity Sikhs and Muslims had against each other; the haters just needed to fixate on the differences and enmity to initiate chaos and get what they want. Government officials and Sikh goons like Malli and his gang managed to separate the peaceful union of the Sikhs and Muslims with their hostile and derogatory comments and thoughts about the local people of Mano Majra. Even Iqbal belittled Mano Majrans though he was educated; he thought the people to be superstitious and irrational. Yet the protagonist, Jugga proved with his life that the two communities can do their utmost for each other if they focused on the friendship they shared as diverse communities that co-existed. Jugga's sacrifice for Nooran defeats the finely weaved conspiracies of Hukum Chand and the cowardice of Iqbal whose Western-minded ideologies blinded him in dedicating himself wholeheartedly to the Sikh and Muslim communities. No matter how many traitors like Hukum Chand and Western-minded pessimists like Iqbal cast a shadow on Mano Majra, the good deed and intention of just one

Jugga was able to save many lives and prove that while camaraderie may fail in many, it has succeeded in one individual whose one action defied the murder of Muslims fuelled by Hukum Chand's ill motives.

In Asim Roy's paper, "The High Politics of India's Partition: The Revisionist Perspective" challenges the conventional notion of Jinnah being the strong supporter of the Partition of India by analyzing key perspectives of Jalal's paper. The paper points to the Congress being the supporter of partition for their own gain because they had plans of a united India excluding the Muslims whom they consider as outsiders. The Lahore Resolution was not Jinnah's wish for Pakistan but his 'bargaining counter' to gain political rights for Muslims (388). Amid political instability, Jinnah was forced to put an end to his political career, yet that got revived at the insistence of Muslim minority leaders so that the League could be saved from the stifling policies of the Muslim provincial leaders (389). The League's main objectives were to share power at the center with the Congress excluding the British, its objective was never to sever India (389). After losing the 1937 elections, Jinnah strived for parity for the Muslims at the centre by wanting the right to self-determination because he knew that Muslims as an entity would be ignored by the vast majority (391). Jinnah's refusal of the Cripps offer is proof that he didn't want to separate Muslims from the prospect of a united India (394). Chundrigar, prime minister of independent Pakistan, believed "the resolution looked for an 'alternative to majority rule, not seeking to destroy the unity of India'" (396). Jinnah fought for Muslim's right to self-govern with Congress where they would share power based on equality; both Hindus and Muslims would form two federations where they would share political unity on a confederal basis. (398). Since the parity that Jinnah wished for as a representative for Muslims at the centre

was made difficult by Congress dominance after the 1937 elections, Jinnah accepted the Cabinet mission because it paved the way for Muslim political power at the centre, preserving the unity of India (399). According to Jalal's central idea, it was the Congress that conspired to break India's unity by cutting off the Muslims since they were preoccupied with their ambitions for an India where there would be no dominance of the Muslims (400). Instead of paying importance to their differences with the league, The Congress focused on having a strong centre by cutting off the Muslims because they failed to recognize the political rights of the Muslims and instead termed the Hindu-Muslim communal problem as an economic issue that needed liberation from third parties like the British (400). Leaders like Nehru believed economic development in a United India would take place where the centre was strong, or in other words, where a strong centre would exist if Congress were to be the dominant one-party in India" (401). In the paper, VP Menon supports this argument stating, "Partition, he said, would 'enable Congress to have at one and the same time a strong central government able to withstand the centrifugal tendencies all too apparent at the moment, and to frame a truly democratic constitution unhampered by any communal considerations'" (401). Thus the Congress put up a façade of unity to its Indian people while prolonging the discussion of political self-determination with Jinnah so that he got fed up and left India with his 'Pakistan' (402). This means that, Unlike conventional ideologies, Jinnah's plan was only to guard the political rights of the Muslims, his target was never to sever India into Muslim and Hindu geographical counterparts. Although from Jinnah's Lahore resolution, the idea of Pakistan can be carved, he never explicitly demanded it nor believed in a severed India, as was also believed by some of the political members who were part of the league. Pakistan with its boundaries was demanded by Jinnah when he saw that the Congress

failed to give The Muslim League its constitutional space. Jinnah never wanted a Pakistan. He wanted recognition of Muslim nationhood in India and wanted a political space for Indian Muslims so that in future Indian Muslims wouldn't be suppressed by Hindu Congress dominance. It was the Congress who wanted a severed India because they knew that once the communal problem is solved by severance, it will no longer be a responsibility of the Congress and after Partition the Congress can implement their ideas of development solely on an India where the Muslim existence won't be an issue. Partition and its subsequent violence happened because of political irresponsibility in guarding and recognizing political rights of a different community, i.e, the Muslims. It didn't happen because Jinnah wanted a separate homeland for his people. There is a difference in wanting political and social rights for a community, and in wanting a sovereign land where that community can reside separately. Jinnah's ambition was never to weaken the Muslims by dividing India, he planned to strengthen the Muslim's political and social existence by wanting recognition of their political and social rights as a distinct entity based on historical and political significance. It was the Congress who failed to recognize the Muslim's significance as a political and social entity. The Congress didn't want to act responsibly and concede political rights to the Muslim community, instead, they muzzled their discussions with The Muslim League so that the League becomes tired of unending discussions that were a political impasse and be compelled to entertain the idea of partition. The Congress selfishly wanted an uncontested power in an India where they won't have to share their political and social dominance with anyone. That is why they kept prolonging the issue of partition so that the League would at one time be forced to consider the idea of severance and then the Congress would be able to conveniently blame the League for severing India. The Congress were truly

behind the idea of partition and they achieved this by prolonging the Communal problem successfully. The Congress created mass confusion that led to the riots by hampering the effectiveness of political discussions they had with the League; it was the Congress that created social disruption by denying to agree on Hindu-Muslim Differences and take steps that would mitigate or provide a solution to such differences.

In Nicholas Mansergh's paper, "The Partition of India in Retrospect", the possible causes of partition are discussed. There were debates about the proposals of constituting a unified India based between the Congress and the Muslim League, but the debates did not result in any fruitful conclusions even though there were many (3). Gandhi insisted that the communal problem could be solved if the British left and the British insisted that they would not go until they solved the communal problem, such questions arose in the context of the Muslim demand for self-recognition, a recognition which according to Jinnah was demanded because he believed Hindus and Muslims to have "two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature" (7-8). Jinnah's belief is not invalid because, after the 1937 provincial elections, Congress left out the League and formed one-party governments in provinces (9). This left the League members with no choice but to be a Congress member (9). This means that the League member lost their political right to form a party that would project their demands as representatives of their community. The Congress was reluctant to include League members in their party, Rajendra Prasad "thought it contrary to the spirit of Parliamentary democracy to appoint any outsider in their Ministry" (10). Although Maulana Azad tried to prevent such exclusivist policies from taking place, the thought that if League members were to join then priority would be given to the Congress Muslims instead of the League ones prevailed, revealing the Congress party's

discriminatory thoughts (10). Such thoughts led to doubt about Congress's commitment to keeping a united India that sustains different communities (10). The British government's support of the Muslim demands and the Muslim public's heavy support for the League in the 1946 elections also made a strong case for Pakistan's creation (12-13). When Jinnah pressed for parity between Pakistan and Hindustan at the Simla conference, an insult to the League was expressed when Maulana Azad, a Muslim was made a representative of the Congress, signifying a confrontation between two Muslims (13). Jinnah's support for a two nation theory challenged Nehru, Gandhi, and Azad's insistence on claiming sole representation of all India (13). Secularism opined by the Congress members that was supposed to unite two different communities was seen by the League as a ploy to impose Hindu rule upon the whole of India, something that made Jinnah's desire for a communal state more strong (13). In the last phase before Partition during the time of the interim government, although Liaquat Ali became the finance minister, the reluctance of the Congress members to involve the League members for discussion and the financial budget drafted by Liaquat Ali heavily drawing from the wealthy Congress supporters only added to the desire for Partition (14-15). This means that internal conflicts between political parties of Hindus and Muslims existed and these conflicts erupted in the debates the two parties had. No political party enacted policies that would help to preserve unity, instead, each party implemented actions that were beneficial to their own party, even if that benefit was to be achieved at the cost of harming the other party. The Congress did not show a wish to coexist with the League for the sake of the people; it was concerned with its selfish ambitions of being the only dominant representative of an India where only they could apply their wants. The Congress did not entertain the notion of sharing power with another party

because if they prioritized democratic principles for the peoples' sake, they would not have the sole power in deciding India's future. The League was forced to choose partition as the only option where they could apply governance according to the Muslim community's demands; instead of severing themselves the League prioritized sharing power with the Congress to keep the unity of an India where diverse communities exist. Despite advocating for recognition of a community based on historical significance, the League felt helpless because the partition they got did not happen gradually with the necessary administrative institutions (14), while the Congress only scoffed at the idea of partition (16). The Congress lacked foresight and they only focused on their own kind, to them the Hindu-Muslim conflict didn't matter enough, what mattered was to gain independence from the British so that the Congress could get the power to rule, the League was welcome if they were willing to stay as inferior to the Hindu majority, otherwise they can separate themselves from India. The Congress didn't realize that by ignoring the pleas of the League they were ignoring the pleas of the Muslim community, an entity who were only second in terms of number and has been a part of India for centuries. Whenever the League presented any proposals for unitedly governing India, the Congress took it as an attack on Hindu privileges and position, and this is why the Congress could never enter into a dialogue with the League. The League indeed proposed the idea of Muslim self-governance, but they never insisted on partition. The conditions of partition can be deduced from their proposals but the want to separate was never emphatically insisted by the League. It was the Congress that insisted that the League wanted partition and that if the League couldn't accept the Congress's proposals of forming a unified constitution and government, they may very well partition themselves from the rest of India. The dialogues between the Congress and the League resulted

into a political impasse because none could trust the other. This distrust made both parties think and act selfishly with an intent to politically and socially look after their own community. The League identified themselves as representatives of a distinct group, namely the Muslims. Because of this the Congress must have felt compelled to look after the majority Hindu interests. But the League tried to secure Muslim interests keeping in mind not to hurt majority Hindu interests and sentiments, otherwise, the League could have openly advocated for partition. It was the Congress that didn't care about preserving India's unity. They ignored and tried to discredit Muslim interests by refusing to accept any demand of the League that was crucial in giving the Muslim community much-needed political significance and social rights. The Congress wanted to be the sole representative of all India, yet they were hostile in considering diverse opinions; they failed to consider the crucial aspect of sustaining democracy in a geography that has diverse communities: to listen and allow space for different voices so that interests of every community are safeguarded. In a democracy, not every interest of one community can be secured. Open dialogues are held to ensure that some interests of all communities are met so that all communities can coexist in harmony. The Congress only looked after their interests and tried to deny the League any right to ensure theirs. How can a united India exist when the Congress didn't behave democratically with the League?

In Paul R. Brass's paper, "Muslim Separatism in United Provinces: Social Context and Political Strategy before Partition," the UP Muslims' reasons for awakening distinct Muslim identity are discussed. Their role in upholding their social status based on merit and cultural importance is highlighted (167). The awareness of Muslim backwardness by the UP Muslims, coupled with the emergent social influence of the Muslim middle class brought a sense of

distinct 'Muslim communalism' in the community (168). In terms of education, data proved that although Muslims in North-Western provinces were better educated faster than the Hindus, due to their numerical existence, the Hindus were still dominant in urban cities and among the elites and the educated (172). In terms of employment, although in Bengal the Muslims were taken out of important government jobs and traders were ruined, in North-Western provinces many held important government positions (173). No matter how much the Muslims improved in their social conditions, the Hindus due to dominance in sheer number, always outnumbered the Muslims (181). The democratic system upheld by the West doesn't recognize the intellectual and social power of the UP Muslims, it seems only to realize the power of the majority in terms of number, which gives Hindus and backward Muslims of Bengal political space (184). This concerned the UP Muslims so much that to secure their social and political privileges, they introduced the concept of separate electorates (183-184). The Hindi-Urdu controversy is also behind the desire of Muslims to acquire an individual identity based on their religion and culture because the UP Muslims felt they were entrenched after the 1900 policy of equating the Hindi language with Urdu (185). Such causes only raise questions of whether the UP Muslims in particular were cornered and if partition and the expression of desiring a separate identity was because the UP Muslims felt a lack of agency and importance within India. Although the UP Muslims were privileged enough to rid themselves of backwardness, Hindu policies that threatened the spreading of Urdu culture and prevented Hindus from assimilating into it made the UP Muslims feel that they could not apply their political policies and social ideologies smoothly. The UP Muslims were in a precarious position; they formed highly educated political parties that were capable of achieving sound political aims but because they were communally less in

number, their intellectual quality couldn't defeat the Hindu policies because of sheer Hindu dominance in terms of number. The UP Muslims felt they were advancing but they couldn't fulfill their community's political ambitions and social needs because the Hindus would eclipse those ambitions and needs since they were the majority in the sub-continent. Politically, the UP Muslims felt none of the policies suggested by the British government or by the Congress quenched the demands of the Muslim community as a whole. The UP Muslims knew the socially and politically dire condition of the Majority of Muslims in Punjab and Bengal, they knew that Muslims in Muslim-majority areas were backward and this was one of their reasons for wanting political and social space in the constitution of a United India. Although the UP Muslims were in a sound position socially, they felt even this position was threatened because of Hindu policies that prevented the spread of Muslim culture. Moreover, The UP Muslims felt that since the Muslims weren't united geographically, they were scattered and such scattered communities often can't soundly impose policies that are beneficial to them because of the overwhelming majority existence of another community. The fear of losing the social and political improvements made by the Muslims made UP Muslims strive for a distinct recognition as a community. This fear only amplified further with defeat in the 1936 elections and gradually made the Muslim communities other than the UP Muslims support the idea of a sovereign land known as Pakistan. It can be inferred that fear and insecurity stemming from dominance by the majority community in terms of political policies and social culture made the Muslims strive for a separate identity of their own. Although the UP Muslims were qualified, they witnessed that the majority dominance of the Hindu community in terms of numbers had the last say in every policy the UP Muslims undertook. The UP Muslims felt that if they couldn't have the power to

decide and speak for the fate of their Muslim community even when they were qualified to do so in a united India with the Hindus, no good could come from a unity between the Muslim community and the Hindu community. This is the reason the Muslims wanted of a separate identity. The UP Muslims thought that if by being qualified they still couldn't ascend to political power and work for the upward social mobility of the whole Muslim community by co-existing with the Hindus, they might as well try to exist as a separate community or as a community that has special needs based on their intellectual capacity and historical significance. They did this by vouching for political space through separate electorates. At least by identifying themselves as distinct from the Hindu majority, they would get to formulate their own policies suitable to the needs of their own community and would have better control of their own fate.

In Nathlene Reynold's "Hindu Nationalism and Muslim Minority in India", a glimpse is given of the condition of the Muslim community residing in India after partition. David Runciman accuses the BJP and the RSS of constructing a coherent narrative and connecting it with deep social divides to divert the public (285). The Hindu party continues to adopt exclusivist policies against Muslims and continues to trigger feelings of enmity that question the Muslim loyalty to India (288). According to the Rajinder Sachar Committee Report, The Indian Federation didn't favour the economic, social, and educational development of the Muslim community, and that the communal violence between the Hindus and Muslims stemmed from their distrust towards each other (288-289). Due to poverty, Muslim families couldn't afford private and public schools and had to send their children to Madrassas (292). Muslim girls didn't continue education because of security reasons and also both the Muslim boys and girls couldn't ascend to higher education because of lack of recognition to madrassa education (292). Muslim

community didn't benefit from the 'economic boom' of India. Rather they were wiped off the traditional workforce and the industries in which they worked were affected because the craftsmen were not included in the 'new production chains' (293). In fact, the Muslims were blamed for their lack of will in alleviating their poverty (293). The Modi administration labelled the Sachar committee as unconstitutional whereas the objective of the report was to shed light on the perils of the disadvantaged community, i.e. the Muslims, this showed that the government was insincere in alleviating the status of the underprivileged community (295). The Hindus severed the right of the Muslims in inviting people to convert to their religion and dared to change Islamic laws like the Triple Talak and put the Muslim women in a precarious position within a patriarchal community (295-297). Due to the Modi administration and the cow vigilantes' violence, cows become stray animals with no support for food and the business of cow slaughterhouses have also been wiped; the vandalism preys on the weaker section of India (298). This paper indicates on the present status of those Muslims who reside in India and are now a disadvantaged community. The Sachar report revealed the dire condition of the Muslims under the dominant feeling of Hindu nationalism. The Hindus try to find every means to keep Muslims an underprivileged community in terms of poverty, education, and in terms of practicing religious rituals. From the Hindu dominant party BJP, there is blatant denial and carelessness in tending to Muslims as a community. The party has come to power to safeguard all Indians, yet through their policies, they keep creating divides between Muslims and Hindus. With the rise of Hindu nationalism, the practice of Muslim rituals have come under threat. Islamic laws that are supposed to be reflected in their effectiveness are being heiniously changed by the Hindus according to their view of righteousness, all the while ignoring Muslim viewpoints

on these. The Muslims are also being kept illiterate that have contributed to their backward position in society. The Muslims dire state in terms of employment have cornered them. the lack of initiative from the government in safeguarding their fundamental rights is telling of the attitude of the Hindu majority towards the Muslims, their hostile attitude is reflected on the absence of policies that were supposed to alleviate the Muslims dire lot. This dire state of the Muslims in terms of living a standard life at present certainly validates the desire of the Muslim League to have a separate identity of their own during partition period.

Chapter 3: Analysis

Partition to the Public

Although politically the Partition seemed like the proper decision at the time, the violence and instability it created within the micro strands of the public's life shook them to the core in ways that their present life has become tainted. History does not address This aspect of taintedness; it only focuses on the number of casualties and the fact that two communities were divided because of the repercussions of political decisions. What the public actually felt at the time of partition is rarely discussed and Butalia's text aimed to do just that. The political decisions were rigid and overlooked the situation of the common people for which partition brewed violence. It also aroused imaginary threats in the minds of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim communities about each other and because the amount of barbarism linked to either community was intense within the mind, the physical conflicts were also of a greater scale for a perceived threat that didn't exist. The partition happened for a reason that was mostly perceived within the political spheres, those who were unaware of the local realities of the subcontinent. Hindu and Muslim communities were not in a state of instability to the extent as shown or as thought by the

political entities that decided on the partition. It seems that only the decision of partition has incited the existent insecurities present in the minds of Hindu and Muslim communities; such insecurities although they existed, they did not have the intensity to cause riots. Partition played on these insecurities exaggerated them, and showed them as the truth; and because such truth was upheld, it incited riots and feelings of hostility amongst the Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims. The violence of partition has also given rise to feelings of extremism that still exists to this day because even today the different communities get involved in violence with each other because of a feeling of superiority based on their ethnicity and religion. Yet no one questions who won as a consequence of such riots and whether that victory is worth it at the cost of losing many lives. The paradoxical issue here is that although many people regret the violence of partition, religious and ethnic differences still exist among them, and because of the insecurities created by such differences, the desire to see one's own community holding power is there. It is a strange phenomenon, if asked how Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu communities used to co-exist, the answer would always be that there used to be no violence and that the communities were in fact in harmony with each other. Yet if this was the truth then why is there the insecurity that if particular communities were able to grab a hold of political autonomy then other communities would not be able to survive? There seems to be a lack of trust of one community towards the other, this would not happen if different communities used to live in harmony with each other before the partition. Thus, it is most probable that the situation between different communities before the partition was bittersweet. There were economic and social differences between Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims. These differences caused all these communities to think about their collective survival and this is the reason for which partition could gain access in their minds.

These communities wanted to seek their collective social and economic security and that is why they were unable to reject partition wholeheartedly. These communities had to have some justification for seeking economic and social solvency compared to other communities. And this justification was provided by religion. In a sense only religious superiority could grant the justification for filling up greater economic and social posts. It can be said that behind religious justifications that focused on past glory, they lay desires for a better social and economic position. This can be particularly true for the Muslims, “Here in Punjab, if Census figures were to be believed, Muslims were in a slight majority, but their economic and social position vis-à-vis the Hindus and Sikhs was seen as a reason for granting separate electorates” (Butalia 88). But this desire for a separate electorate would not have been so intensified had there been no exploitation of the Muslims before Partition in social and economic spheres. Muslims only wanted political autonomy so that they could exercise their own collective rights based on a religious identity. Yet this arose not from a desire to attain a separate nationhood that the Partition gave them. Such is implied in the paper, “What the Indian Muslims asked for was an affirmation of their difference and a recognition of the nationhood; what they got was a geographical partition of India and a division of their own nation” (Riaz 54). Political parties like the Congress took undue advantage of this demand, where they blamed Muslims for being communal and took the title of being secular themselves (Riaz 54). Such political behavior on the macro level probably stems from the minuscule humiliations the Muslim communities faced from the Sikhs and Hindus. The Hindu people didn’t treat the Muslims as their equals during many social customs that took place and this is probably why the Muslims became worried about their status in society and wanted some form of recognition that could provide them with social

and economic protection. Regarding the treatment the Muslims got some non-Muslims have admitted their fault and expressed regret. Bir Bahadur Singh from Butalia's interviews can be cited as an example, "yet when they came to our houses, we treated them so badly. This is really terrible. And this is the reason Pakistan was made." (Butalia 92). Yet even this demand of recognition of the Muslims did not stem as much from a sense of religious superiority as it stemmed from their relatively powerless position in society compared to the Sikhs and Hindus. Reclaiming the lost glory of religion probably meant reclaiming the lost glory where they were economically solvent. Behind the want for identification based on religion, the Muslims wanted economic solvency because otherwise, they were under economic repression from various communities. In this sense, their demand was of the kind Hobsbawm described in his book, the demand of that of a "national/citizen" of the Indian subcontinent. As conscious members of the Indian subcontinent, the Muslims wanted their citizen rights to be treated equally to other citizens. Yet their demand was pushed to the realm of religious nationalism and it was cited that it was the Muslims who wanted their political autonomy based on their religion excluding others, whereas it was them wanting political autonomy or wanting a seat of equal status as the others. at the time deciphering their demand was not possible not only by the non-Muslim political parties but also by the Hindu and Sikh communities. The Muslims wanted relief from economic repression and social discrimination but what they got was a territory that signified that it was they who wanted the communal exclusion. Then according to Hobsbawm at the time, "'nation' and 'class' were not readily separable" (Hobsbawm 145).

Relationship between the Communities

Not just the demands of the Muslims were misunderstood and misinterpreted which gave rise of communal conflicts born out of perceived insecurities and the Partition; the whole chemistry between Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh communities was misunderstood. Both like and dislike exist among people of different communities. There are some things to like and dislike about every person. Similarly, there are conflicts and merits within communities; no two communities completely cherish one another nor do they absolutely abhor each other. Forms of conflict and reunion are fluid within communities of any land, just like there are conflicts and moments of respite within a family. Such was the state of the Indian subcontinent as well. Multiple communities were bounded by some religions in a broader category. But they were a part of their locality and so their observance of their religion and social etiquettes also came in accordance with the particular locality's demands. That is why it would be very difficult to divide communities based on religion because there were differences of opinion even within religious communities. Yet such differences used to be fluid and their solutions could be found through discussion and fulfillment of customs. But mass media which can be called print capitalism and institutions of colonial structures made such conflicts look rigid and gave them a broad political outlook, which gave the impression that Muslims and Hindus of every kind of locality and community had problems with each other. However, this was false, the conflicts weren't intense as to warrant for a partition, in fact they wouldn't be able to coincide with the flexible definition of community in the broader India, "And yet this "communitas" gained meaning only in juxtaposition to the structures of power, status, and division marking everyday life. It did not replace such division; it represented a form of identity operating on a different plane of time" (Gilmartin 1974). Thus, it can be stated that the concept of identity itself is not

rigid. It's definition is capable of change because of circumstances. Thus, an Indian can at once be a Muslim and bear no grudge against his fellow Hindus who are his neighbours. This does not mean that he degrades his identity as a Muslim or it also does not mean that he will restrain himself from Hindus just because their customs and religion is different. An Indian's core identity can be attributed to his religion and at the same time as a well-wisher of people of other religions while bearing his uniqueness: "when we talk of identity, it at once implies certain essential attributes, as well as a context of oppositions and relativities" (Behera 80). The communities who suffered the partition have forgotten this fact as well as political entities. Surprisingly, a paranoia grasped them that no one person of one community will be safe from another. There was no trust between the Hindu/Sikh and Muslim communities, instead doubt was casted on obvious facts, "The workers in his factory were mixed: Jats, Hindus, but on the whole it was a Muslim village so most of the workers were Musalmaans...at the time they were respectful and humble. They seemed safe..." (Butalia 115). This was stated in the paranoia of the Sikhs for the Muslims so much so that they conducted honor killings; they murdered members of their family and instead of calling it murder people like Mangal Singh called those who died as "martyrs" and their death "martyrdom" (Butalia 195). They killed not only people of their own religion but regarded people of different religion as inferior to the extent that they prioritized death over mixing with them. A dangerous kind of religious discrimination also took place that gave rise to violence. People were not only fleeing their homeland in kafalas and planes, they were also killing their neighbours and people of their own localities as their enemy. The paranoia was stated several times throughout Butalia's book and here is one of those mentions, although mentioning it just once may not do justice to the intensity of killings that

took place because of a newfound hatred, “Here there was killing... there were Gujars and they started killing Musalmaans” (117). Many children and women were abducted and many people lost their ancestral properties. They were stranded from their homes only to adjust to a place that they forever considered alien, even though they were with people of their own religious community. Ranamama always used to watch Hindi TV content and support India in his mind because he considered himself as an Indian, never a Pakistani despite being Islamic (Butalia 39). This proves that one’s home is where their family existed within the local community, not where they were with people of the same religious faith. If such was the case, then Ranamama wouldn’t have had any problem in staying in Pakistan without contempt, where people took him to be a Muslim convert and never accepted him. This is evidence of what happens when the religious and cultural reality of a territory is not given importance while making decisions about it. Radcliffe did not have any ideas on the cultural heterogeneity of the Indian subcontinent for which he forged a line that would cut off territorial, social and economic facilities of living together as a community from millions. Such is stated in Brown’s paper, “The alternative version of multicultural nationalism involves the acceptance of cultural heterogeneity, and relies on a strengthening of the vision of the nation as a political community which is based on myths of constitutional consent” (13).

The Blame Game

In fact people who supported the decision of the Partition and indulged themselves in the mass killing of their neighbours are proof themselves that they are mentally ill and that they have supported the untrue basis for partition because they felt themselves to be victims of any previously existent social injustice. Additionally, one’s social thought linked to ideas of holiness

connected to their religion also did the trick. There was this notion that only Hindus were the honorable ones in trying to bring back their women from the clutches of the Muslims, whereas in reality no attempt was made in trying to know women's consent; there were allegations and thoughts of impurity thrown at Pakistan just because it became a place for the Muslim majority. The Sikh's honour mattered so much to them that women like Lajjawati jumped in wells to die like a 'martyr' instead of trying to survive (Butalia 208). There is an implied insult towards the Muslims in such thoughts of honor and a disrespect towards the value of life. Bir Bahadur Singh also became part of groups like Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and began conspiring against people of different religious communities in order to put his own community's interests first (Butalia 217). Many rationales were given by Hindu leaders in trying to 'rescue' Hindu women and in letting Muslim women stay with them so that they could get converted to Hindu faith (186). It became a question of "the manhood" of "every national of Hindustan" in trying to save and recover the honor of their Hindu women instead of trying to know what they wanted. The implications of a despaired person when a strong ideology is introduced to them are implied in the following paper, "People with an ideal-hungry personality gravitate toward strong leaders and causes because the affiliation with strength and the promise of hope offers ideal-hungry personalities an answer to a pervasive, and at the extreme, pathological feeling of ineffectiveness in their lives" (Umbrasas 31). It is as if Hindus forgot their previous friendship with the Muslims as a communal ally. Suddenly the backwardness of their religion got prioritized instead of reality. The Hindus forgot that they coexisted with the Muslims and that many Muslims did not carry any malice in their hearts, yet the extreme groups that arose because of their religious fanaticism gave rise to the thought that being Indian only

means being a true Hindu. Whereas the reality is that Indian subcontinent held people of many different religious communities. Such fanaticism is implied in the following paper, “Hindutva equates religious identity with national identity such that to be Indian is to be Hindu. The Sangh leadership actively uses religious discourse and Hindu gods in the development of the national movement” (Rieffer 234). The violence incited by partition took the lives of millions, and estranged many more people from their homeland. The violence also created feelings of hatred between otherwise peace loving communities who had their own problems that had the potential to get solved on the basis of discussions. In a sense the events of the Partition made Hindu and Muslim communities disobey the rule of cultural citizenship, where it means, “to adopt strategies to include minority cultures if it wants to promote inclusivity instead of exclusivity (Stevenson 42).

Reflection of Partition in Fiction

Even though violence is inevitable on many fronts, taking preventive measures against it should be the duty of every community. Continuous violence only leads to further violence that destroys people's critical ability to think as they become entangled in circles of revenge and despair. Although divisions are created by existing insecurities, letting them grow and explode to the point of violence is what destroys religious and cultural tolerance in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic territory. The experience of communal violence has been corroborated in the fiction dedicated to describing the dangerous terrain of communal thoughts in Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan*. Hukum Chand sets the example of a pure hater of Muslims, to the extent that his conspiracies in Cahoot with the sub-inspector successfully ignited a communal hostility between Sikh and Muslim communities. Throughout the novel, the villagers of the different communities

are seen to have patience and affection for each other, yet this patience and affection is ultimately marred with doubt and violence because negative aspects of history and the differences of religion pounced upon the fellow people of Mano Majra amid the context of violent riots happening in pre-partition India. Iqbal grew irritated with the villagers' obsession to stay socially connected even though they were members of different religious communities. Yet, when the tense moment came the Sikhs failed to protect the Muslims, they fell victim to the discriminatory thoughts of some Sikhs who were blindly angry against the Muslims based on historical differences. Meet Singh bore no malice against the Muslims but when the villagers gathered and discussed how to treat their fellow Muslim companions, his compassionate opinions towards the Muslims ultimately fell on deaf ears by his fellow Sikh villagers. However, these were the same Sikhs who expressed tears of sadness for the rise of the refugee-like status of their Muslim compatriots because of communal riots in the surrounding areas. The local goons and bloodthirsty young men successfully triggered hatred in the Sikh villagers' minds against the Muslim villagers. Khuswant Singh has shown the ascend of this hatred to be sudden because before the news of riots got intense, the Sikhs of Mano Majra decided not to be violent towards their Muslim fellow neighbors. Considerable empathy and affection were shown to be there between the Sikhs and the Muslims but their differences came in between. Although this difference couldn't damage communal unity between most Sikhs and Muslims, through some people the difference did express itself in the form of hatred and apathy. Subsequently, this hatred always became contagious among the major people of both communities. The villagers of Mano Majra didn't carry hatred among each other; they coexisted acknowledging their differences. It is Malli and the gang who managed to spread hatred among the common people

by committing crimes that created intercommunal misunderstanding and violence. By killing the cattle of Muslims, Malli and the gang became the symbol of those Sikhs who in the eyes of the Muslims bore enmity for them. This in turn would alarm the Muslims and create fear and anger in them for the Sikhs because according to the Muslim point of view, their property has been wrongfully damaged and this initial act establishes the justification for the Muslims to reciprocate this violence against them with violence. Only one act of violence intensifies the view that both Sikhs and Muslims are different and that it is difficult to coexist with such differences as conflicts have erupted. This anticipation of disputes because of religious differences creates further conflicts out of stress and fear in a bid to survive. The atmosphere becomes tense in a society that has different communities coexisting together because previously before any disputes erupted it was possible to coexist recognizing intercommunal differences. But when historical facts and contradictory differences are put forward in front of the different communities in a society, the intercommunal unity that was shared before shatters and distrust, fear, anxiety, and hatred take its place. When there were talks of Muslims departing from Mano Majra, both the Sikhs and Muslims became emotional about each other; the depth of their bond was shown to be such that in everyday life Sikhs and Muslims were like kin and were the same. But when the trains full of corpses came, this very bond struggled to sustain itself against the forces of anarchy and panic that those corpses created. The Sikhs became worried that an attack from the Muslims would be imminent and although people like Meet Singh were able to counter such belittling thoughts about the Muslims by reinstating their brotherly bond with the Muslims, they weren't able to protect themselves from such doubts for long because of the growing violence that grew around their surrounding villages. The tragic issue was that the violence that

grew in Mano Majra's surrounding villages was able to create a crack in the Sikh-Muslim kinship of Mano Majra; neither the Muslims nor the Sikhs of Mano Majra for once thought that just because violence and distrust erupted in their surrounding villages, doesn't mean that they had to be distrustful and violent towards each other. According to Butalia's *The Other Side of Silence*, it was as if a "wild wave of hatred" blinded the Mano Majrans into showing hostility for each other, they were in a state of mind over which they had no control (73).

Anxieties of Partition

This difference in fiction reflects the actual difference between the ways Hindus and Muslims perceived each other. According to Ambedkar, the Hindu-Muslim riots beginning from 1920 to 1940 reflect the dormant enmity these two communities have for each other (195-200). These riots were symbolic of intercommunal distrust and hostility. Although Hindus and Muslims coexisted socially, they had religious and ideological differences. Just because two different communities co-existed, doesn't mean they got along. To get along there needed to be similarities in ideology and an appreciation for each other's differences. Hindus and Muslims shared ideologies that contradicted each other. Although in terms of daily life, most people coexisted yet when it came to the political and social development of one community, the other community showed hostility to that idea of development. This happened not just because of political mismanagement or the political narrative of the Congress and the League leaders; this happened because individuals of both communities were fed up with each other and couldn't see one community's development be sacrificed at the cost of the other. Ambedkar supports this rationale when he states, "The one community naturally lays claim to the rights of a majority and relies upon its qualifications of better education and greater wealth; the other is all the more

determined on those accounts to secure effective protection for its members, and does not forget that it represents the previous conquerors of the country” (220). There was communal fear that if one community developed; then the other’s development would definitely be ignored or neglected. This is why both communities hurt each other’s religious sentiments and also got into trivial fights; one community couldn’t trust the other because they thought that their social and political rights wouldn’t be taken care of by the other community if the other community got social and political benefits. Both Hindus and Muslims were scared that if either one of them got their political and social demands met then one of them would suffer at the hands of the other. This inherent distrust stems from the historical past and social behavior of the Hindus and Muslims towards each other. The Hindus are apprehensive of the Muslims because they always think of them as foreigners who invaded India and will at any chance dominate India overlooking the Hindu majority. The Muslims are indignant at the Hindus because of the Hindu’s poor behavior towards the Muslims when they are in social contact, i.e. the Hindus keep the Muslims at a distance treating them like untouchables. The Hindus also overlook the political and social demands of Muslims possibly because they are a minority. If the social perception of both Hindus and the Muslims were negative then it would be expressed in their everyday behavior and culminate into conflicts in the form of riots as witnessed in the pre-partition era. If intercommunal social perceptions are negative then coexisting becomes exhausting and risky because then that community cannot be trusted since living in close contact means being financially and emotionally vulnerable to that community within a society. The Hindus and Muslims have coexisted for centuries but their understanding of each other at a communal level is meagre and insufficient. If the Hindus and Muslims understood each other, then they would

have valued their communal unity when they had to make policies and political decisions as a United India. Instead whenever the need for political reform arose within British India, such reforms always met a political impasse because of Hindu-Muslim distrust for each other.

Political Mismanagements of Partition

Now, whether that political distrust represented an already existing communal disharmony or whether that communal disharmony triggered political distrust between the political parties is up for debate. Some individuals pose as exceptions; in Singh's *Train to Pakistan*, Jugga is in love with Nooran, a Muslim. He shows compassion and understanding of Nooran's situation when he gets out of prison. He saves Nooran by sacrificing his life so that she can cross the border and start a new life. Meet Singh tries to live in harmony with his Muslim compatriots. Gandhi tried for Hindu-Muslim unity by conceding to Muslim demands of the Khilafat movement (Ambedkar 176). He also tried to hold fruitful discussions with members of the Muslim League for the Khilafat movement that represented Muslim demands and from it he encouraged the Muslims to support the non-cooperation movement so that the British could be ousted from India and a United India could exist with Hindu-Muslim unity (Ambedkar 177). But he overestimated the intensity of Hindu-Muslim unity. According to Ambedkar, Gandhi was not realistic to support the Khilafat movement because it wasn't accepted by the Turkish people who wanted a republic (174). Ambedkar also alleges Gandhi to be overly accepting of Muslim demands and assumes that Gandhi wanted Muslim support for the non-cooperation movement, that is why he was conceding to Muslim demands without prior judgment and without considering the reality of Hindu-Muslim communal disharmony that was evident in the Hindus offending the religious sensibilities of the Muslims by taking part in the Shudhi movement and in

the Malabar Moplas who committed atrocities against the Hindus (179-185). This means that the desire for Hindu-Muslim unity was an illusion; supporting it meant denying the inevitable reality of Hindu-Muslim conflict. The Hindu political leaders like Gandhi in their necessity to win independence so that they could rule tried to overlook Hindu-Muslim communal problems and win Muslim support just so that their Congress party could gain Muslim popularity and gain an independent Swaraj where they could represent all India. In that bid, they overlooked crucial Muslim demands like their need for self-identity through separate electorates and seats in the government. The Congress was in a hurry to get rid of the British rule from India and for this matter ignored any political disagreements they had with the League. Although Gandhi insisted on Hindu-Muslim unity, Congress grossly avoided the League after it won the 1937 provincial elections, proving the League right in its concerns of whether they would get their political demands fulfilled in a Hindu-majority India. The Congress didn't assure the Muslim League that they as a numerically large minority will get to keep their political voice forward. They mainly needed Muslim support to get the British out of India and that is why they entertained Muslim demands so that they could use it in exchange for Muslim support for their cause of a Swaraj (Ambedkar 179). For the Congress, a free India would mean that they would have the sole power to make policies and to represent all of India (Roy 401). Here, if the Congress accepted the League's demands for seats according to their weightage in the parliament, it would mean that the Congress wouldn't get a strong centre; in other words, they would have to share power with the League (Roy 401). Because the Congress didn't want to share power, they halted the League's demands for a separate representation so that Jinnah would be compelled to think of partition as their last resort for governing separately with a Muslim community's political rights

(Roy 402). This Congress strategy not only stalled the League in fulfilling their political demands within a united India, it also stretched the communal conflict of Hindus and Muslims since the communities were not getting a solution to their antagonism anytime soon. The Congress by delaying the Hindu-Muslim unity problem for their desire for a swaraj ignored common people's plights. Although Congress stood for Hindu-Muslim unity, their political activities confused the League about whether they wanted to stay united. It can also be said that because of the Congress's delay in coming to terms with the League on how to share power, communal riots intensified because both Hindus and Muslims couldn't get any political solution to the religious distrust and communal antagonism they shared. Thus according to Roy's paper, The Congress's focus on "freedom first" had considerable bearings on the issue of 'unity', as evident in subsequent developments where unity was sacrificed on the altar of freedom" (Roy 401). It was true that the League's demands hinted at a separate homeland (Roy 396). But initially, the League never insisted on partition, it was interested in discussing with the Congress arrangements of a shared power so that India could remain united. It is stated in Roy's paper that "Jinnah's ideal solution lay in two federations-one Muslim- and the League-dominated, the other Hindu- and the Congress-dominated – making it in every way possible to bring the two into a system of political unity on a confederal basis or a similar structure based on treaty arrangements between them" (398). It was the Congress that seemed to thwart the League's ambitions because it was in their self-interest to do so. The League didn't come to the Congress with any motive to exchange their need for political rights for partition, it was the Congress that pushed the League into a corner and left them with no choice but to partition. This means that the Congress for their desire for power ignored the reality of communal violence and mishandled their dialogues with

the League that further intensified the violence. The Congress did not take timely steps to mitigate the communal issue and their lackadaisical attitude towards the League's propositions inflated the communal disharmony that already existed. Almost all of the Muslim population was convinced by Jinnah's idea of Muslim nationhood because they could see that Congress didn't care to give a fair political platform to the Muslims. The Muslim population also supported Jinnah because they witnessed the growing hostility of the Hindu population and also their distrust and lack of understanding towards Muslim religious rituals. Both the Hindus and Muslims were growing intolerant to each other's religious practices like Bakri Eid and pujas and the political tensions and delay of solutions for the communal problem weren't helping. The political disagreements between the Congress and the League fuelled communal tensions that violently gave rise to Pakistan from India. The conventional knowledge is that the Congress tried to prevent partition and failed because the League was insistent on their demands. But the Congress while maintaining that they wanted Hindu-Muslim unity to sustain drove the League to be the villain for wanting partition. Unity means listening to each other's demands and coming to a conclusion where the demands of both parties would be met to an extent. The Congress showed a lack of political foresight by refusing key Muslim demands relating to an acknowledgment of Muslim identity. If Congress refused the League any political space, then it would become impossible for the League to stay united with a party that doesn't value different opinions, which is the foundation of a sound democracy. The League by choosing partition at the end didn't break the Hindu-Muslim unity of a united India, it merely accepted the reality that Hindu-Muslim unity didn't exist because for such a unity to exist Hindus and Muslims needed to have respect and understanding for each other's differences. Because of the absence of understanding,

both Hindus and Muslims would become insecure if either of them succeeded or improved in any social criteria like education and employment. This insecurity would be expressed in the form of concern by both Hindus and Muslims as losing their rights. For example, the Hindus were concerned when the Muslims wanted to assimilate Hindus into their religion by insisting on Urdu's importance in the provinces, and the Muslims were concerned when the Hindus tried to equate Hindi in Devnagari script with Urdu in Persian script as the official language in the provinces (Brass 181-185). However, Muslims were a minority compared to the Hindus yet the UP Muslims were educated and aware that if the Muslims wanted to improve their social status then they had to make their own policies in politics so that policies regarding Muslim welfare could be made without any fear of Hindu backlash. To them, this was the only way to get rid of Muslim backwardness spearheaded by a political party that had Hindu majority interests in mind. Since the UP Muslims were educated, they understood the importance of gaining a space in politics that could elevate the dire fate of the Muslim community scattered over India. The UP Muslims have witnessed that although they were educated and well employed as a religious fraction in the UP, they still couldn't influence educational and cultural policies because they were a minority that had no separate voice in India's politics. Brass's paper supports such concern of the UP Muslims, "the problem of the Muslims was not so much their backwardness but that no matter how fast they ran, the Hindus either ran faster or, even when they walked, nearly always outnumbered the Muslims in the end" (181). This desire to always ensure the self-interests of one's own community filled Hindu-Muslim coexistence with doubt. The doubt is if Hindus will overrule Muslims in political decisions or if Muslims will do the same thing. This doubt of Hindus and Muslims transmitted into the Congress and the League. To an extent the

Congress and the League projected Hindu-Muslim communal distrust but the political parties mostly intensified an already existing communal violence with their indecisiveness on how the Hindu-Muslim community will coexist together and share power after the exit of the British. If the communal violence had been a consequence solely of Congress-League disagreements, then the riots of the pre-partition era would not have been this intense.

Political Essence behind Partition

That is why exceptions to the Hindu-Muslim antagonism are not the general rule. Most Hindus and Muslims are not well acquainted with each other's differences and carry compassion for each other to the extent needed to tolerate each other. The Hindus and Muslims merely coexist and don't share their life values and goals. That's why they don't feel for each other entirely; they show basic humanity and tolerance for each other but that doesn't translate into safeguarding each other's fundamental social and political rights. The assumption that Muslim religious and social rights would be in danger of Hindu nationalism has become true after partition. The Muslim community has become a regressively backward community in terms of female education according to the Sachar committee reports in Reynold's paper (292). This shows the Modi government's lack of initiative in elevating the literacy status of the Muslim people; They are an Indian government that is supposed to look after the interests of diverse communities in India yet they couldn't care less about the findings of the report. Subsequently, the Modi government opposed a scholarship meant for the Muslim minority (Reynolds 294). By taking such steps the Modi government in its zeal for Hindu nationalism has become an obstacle

for the social development of Muslims in India. In its obsession with Hindu culture, the Modi government didn't even spare Muslim religious rights. The business of Cow Slaughterhouses was forcibly closed because The Modi government criminalized Cow slaughter (Reynolds 298). India is known for its diversity yet its government adopts exclusivist policies that prevents minority communities from elevating themselves from poverty and poor employment. This kind of action only justifies pre-partition worries of the League; it validates Muslim worries that because they are a minority, they will never get their fair share of representation in the political scene and be able to for their rights.

The reality is tolerance doesn't mean acceptance. Just because Hindus and Muslims were tolerating each other doesn't mean that they were accepting of each other's life philosophies and lifestyles. It can very well be that both Hindus and Muslims have been tolerating each other for centuries and partition was the time when their ability to tolerate reached a limit. The continuous riots expressed the pent-up anger of both Hindus and Muslims towards each other. Despite being neighbours, the atrocities that both Hindus and Muslims committed against each other made it seem like they were two nations fighting each other instead of two communities co-existing side by side. These fights inevitably point to fundamental differences between Hindus and Muslims and indicate that those differences created hostilities among them socially and politically. According to Ambedkar, Hindu-Muslim riots started as early as 1893, followed by peacetime till 1929 after which riots took place sporadically (215). This means that both Hindu and Muslim communities tried to coexist in harmony but ultimately failed to do so. Their differences affected social relationships and led to conflicts that made both communities overlook any sense of communal camaraderie they had shared in the past. No matter how many attempts there must

have been to sustain Hindu-Muslim unity, the differences were strong enough to break through that unity and make both communities worry about their own communal welfare. In the 1932 and 1936 riots 217 and 94 people were killed respectively (Ambedkar 215). Such evidence compels me to wonder if Hindus and Muslims were content with each other and in communal harmony after all. If communal harmony existed between Hindus and Muslims, it would not have been so vulnerable to political forces and religious differences. There were evidences of one community harming another community's religious sentiments, for example, when Hindus threw bricks at a Muslim procession and Muslims in turn burned the adjacent temple of Radha Krishna (Ambedkar 209). These can only express that Hindus feel communally insecure with the Muslims and Muslims also feel communally insecure about the Hindus when it comes to recognizing each other's religious and political rights. These riots enraged the editor of *Hindustan*, a Congress paper to state that Hindu-Muslim unity was an illusion and that for true unity to happen, it shouldn't just be the call of political leaders but also the call of millions of people in India (Ambedkar 218). The Hindu-Muslim unity was debatable because it was shrouded in intercommunal hostility and hatred. Yet apart from religious differences and social status, this inter-communal hatred in people was also triggered because of the political disagreements between Congress and the League.

The Muslims although they are a minority compared to the Hindus were still numerically significant. Unlike the British, they invaded India and settled eventually. As they are settlers, they will feel that they are entitled to their political rights even if they are a minority to the Hindus. Both the Hindu community and the Hindu political parties have continually neglected Muslim demands and treated them like distant minority demands that can be neglected. Although

the Muslim demand for self-identity based on their religion was put forward by the Muslims, this was likely done as a measure taken against Hindu arrogance and negligence of Muslim political demands. An example is the Congress party's refusal to let Muslim League members come for a meeting at the Tea Party during the last phase of partition in the interim government period (Mansergh 14). Another example is the Congress blatantly forming one-party governments excluding the League after their 1937 victory in the provincial elections, (Mansergh 9). This means that they were coercing the League to join the Congress which meant that the League members would effectively have no separate political voice and party of their own according to democratic principles. If the Hindus as a community and as a political party have neglected Muslim demands, then the Muslims would feel that their demand for a separate electorate in the parliament based on their religious identity is justified and urgent. Now to Congress, this demand may seem like a lot, as Muslims are a minority. But if they continued to sidestep the Muslims as a minority to the extent that they felt that the Muslims didn't need any separate representative seats and that they (The Congress) were ample to fairly represent the Muslims then they were wrong. As a democratic government bases itself on the representation of diverse opinions, Congress made a political mistake in not considering the essence of what the League wanted, which was a fair representation of their community in the political arena so that they could safeguard their rights as a community.

Conclusion

Ultimately the problems lay in Hindu-Muslim distrust and hostility towards each other. This distrust and hostility transferred to the members of the political parties and the parties also reflected such feelings that are symbolic of both communities. For unity, an understanding

between diverse communities is a must. If such understanding is absent, no political discussions can amend a broken communal relationship. It is the people of a nation that have to be convinced that they can remain united despite differences in religion, caste, or creed. If trust is broken between diverse communities, then it becomes almost impossible to repair that trust and work together for the sake of overall welfare. Because diverse communities can only get social benefits from a democratic government if the trust between people of differing opinions exists. The solution to the Hindu-Muslim conflict lies in trust. If people of both communities had trusted each other then amongst them benevolent leaders would have risen and would have been able to take policies that would have consisted of benefits for both communities.

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