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dc.contributor.authorChowdhury, Anup
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-07T06:56:16Z
dc.date.available2010-10-07T06:56:16Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10361/367
dc.description.abstractManagerial ownership and firm performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm’s contracting environment. To develop the testable hypothesis the extension of the cross-sectional results runed by Demesetz and Lehn (1985) (Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177) has been used and the panel data been used to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in a way consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects; it cannot be concluded (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership agent firm performance.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherBRAC Universityen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBRAC University Journal, BRAC University; Vol.4. No. 1 pp. 63-74
dc.subjectCorporate governanceen_US
dc.subjectMangerial ownershipen_US
dc.subjectEndogenousen_US
dc.subjectHeterogeneityen_US
dc.subjectPanel dataen_US
dc.subjectCross-sectionalen_US
dc.titleDeterminants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance; development of testable hypothesisen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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