dc.contributor.author | Chowdhury, Anup | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-10-07T06:56:16Z | |
dc.date.available | 2010-10-07T06:56:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10361/367 | |
dc.description.abstract | Managerial ownership and firm performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm’s contracting environment. To develop the testable hypothesis the extension of the cross-sectional results runed by Demesetz and Lehn (1985) (Journal of Political
Economy, 93, 1155-1177) has been used and the panel data been used to show that managerial ownership is explained by key variables in the contracting environment in a way consistent with the predictions of principal-agent models. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial
ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects; it cannot be concluded (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership agent firm performance. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | BRAC University | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | BRAC University Journal, BRAC University; Vol.4. No. 1 pp. 63-74 | |
dc.subject | Corporate governance | en_US |
dc.subject | Mangerial ownership | en_US |
dc.subject | Endogenous | en_US |
dc.subject | Heterogeneity | en_US |
dc.subject | Panel data | en_US |
dc.subject | Cross-sectional | en_US |
dc.title | Determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance; development of testable hypothesis | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |