

Social Accountability of Bureaucracy in Bangladesh

A dissertation
by
Rehana Yasmin
ID No. 07272018

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**Approved as to style & content by
Dr. M. Emdadul Haq
Professor & Supervisor
IGS, BRAC University
Dhaka**

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Statement of the Candidate

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Abstract

Good governance and rule of law in the developing world are affected by the threat of corruption, biased attitude of politicians and incompetent bureaucracy. It happens due to insufficient level of accountability in the public services. In general, accountability refers to the concept of answerability to the controlling authority who may be the employer or the representative of them. Thus public servants in Bangladesh are accountable to their controlling authorities. In democratic governance, public servants are the servants of the State, which is owned by citizens. So public servants should be accountable to both the controlling authorities and the people. Unfortunately history witnessed that bureaucrats of this Sub Continent were unfamiliar with the concept of considering citizens as stakeholders. They were always trained to be loyal to the employers and neglect citizen's welfare and participation.

Globalization has been successful in promoting awareness among the citizens about their rights. It emphasizes on satisfaction of the citizen and hammers governments to enhance citizen's participation in the governance system and highlight their views in policy formulation. 'Social accountability' thus emerged as a concept in the social research sector. The World Bank has defined Social Accountability as "an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e. in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability". The main thrust should be on citizen participation in governance, which would reflect the accountability of the public servants to the society.

Bangladesh has been identified as a country of weak governance. Low level of citizen involvement in the governance system has been pointed as the root cause of such weakness. Citizens in the country are also becoming aware of their rights and demands. As a result Governments are trying to enhance practices of social accountability in Bangladesh. Practicing participatory budgeting, participatory planning in the Union Parishad level, approval of Right to Information Ordinance 2008, Making Government websites accessible to the citizens are some positive indication of ensuring social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh. But these initiatives are not sufficient enough. The present study investigates the position of bureaucracy in Bangladesh from social accountability perspective, its challenges in the global arena and whether social accountability in Bangladesh is increasing or not using both secondary data and as a civil servant my practical experiences has been incorporated here.

Chapter I

Introduction

1.1. Prologue:

Accountability is an instrument of ensuring good governance. As an old institution a competent government establishes good governance, which is achieved through accountability actions of the civil servants. So, accountability is an important part of administration. It is a mechanism of answerability. It holds a person responsible for their actions. In fact the issue has come into being based on performance analysis because accountability ensures quality of performance. In other words, accountability ensures obligation of public officials to report to higher authorities about what they are doing. The current thesis argues that social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh can be improved by strengthening top-down oversight, increase professionalism through reforms, empowering the internal comptroller, establishing performance contracts and new public oversight agencies.

Civil servants are accountable to the appointing authorities or the higher authorities. This is generally identified as bureaucratic accountability. But globalization has opened the door of information and knowledge. People are keen to know what is going on around them. Expansion of web based information dissemination system has opened the window of knowledge to the citizens. They come across worldwide events sitting on their desk. This has increased their expectation of service delivery. They can compare with home and abroad at any time. So they seek better services and feedback from civil servants and want to be involved in the policy formulation and policy implementation process.

1.2. Literature Review:

Social researchers were keenly observing the changing role of bureaucracy in the age of globalization. They analyzed the root cause of such change. Finally they came to consensus that accountability of bureaucracy needs to be enhanced. Especially they suggested a new dimension of accountability initiative. The pro-accountability researchers identified the new dimension as 'social accountability'. It emphasizes on involvement of the civil society group in the governance process to ensure open-ended insulation of ideas and information. Sirker (2006) in *General Accountability Concepts and Tools* states that Accountability refers to the obligation of power holders to account for or take responsibility for their actions in both their conduct and performance. Power holders are those who hold political, financial or other forms of power. Social accountability refers to an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement i.e. in which ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability. Government or private sector or civil society actors can initiate it. Participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring of public service delivery, citizen advisory boards, social audits, lobbying and advocacy campaigns are considered as the mechanisms of social accountability.

Some other renowned writers worked on the accountability issue. Lebow and Spitzer (2000) in *'Accountability: Freedom and Responsibility Without Control'* mentioned that accountability can be ensured in two ways. These are 'control based thinking' and 'freedom based thinking'. The authors have identified that control based thinking can ensure better accountability through imposition of authority, reward offering activities and conditional freedom to the employees. On the other hand, freedom based thinking ensures better accountability by granting individual freedom asking everyone to be responsible for his/her duties and having faith on the employees. They also propose that freedom

based thinking is a better way to ensure accountability. But it highlights on the accountability of the employees to the employer as a whole. The authors did not focus on perspective of accountability of civil servants and civil society involvement.

Ackerman (2005) in a World Bank publication *Social Accountability in the Public Sector: A Conceptual Discussion* argues that the active involvement of civil society and the strengthening of the state apparatus are not mutually exclusive or even contradictory initiatives. If institutions are properly designed, a virtuous cycle that reinforces both state and society is possible. It is important to emphasize the devolution of state responsibilities to societal actors via market. It is better on part of the state to play the role of a facilitator of development, a central actor in the provision of public goods and the stimulator of investment and citizen's participation and lean towards performance based, pro-active, horizontal concept of accountability.

Bangladesh has a long history of democratic governance. But unfortunately democracy has not yet been institutionalized in Bangladesh due to negligence of both politicians and bureaucracy. The country has experienced the suppression of the British rulers, whose aim was to swipe property from the country and 'not to allow' citizen's voice. The situation continued in the Pakistan regime. Unfortunately the great independence could not change the nature of the people in power after 1971. Political leaders acquired the lesson of neglecting citizen voice and using public office for private gain. Some dishonest bureaucrats also get personally benefited in the veil of political corruption. It happens due to insufficient level of accountability in the public services. It is generally accepted that the best way to combat these problems and thereby guarantee the public interest character of the state is by strengthening government accountability.

In spite of all these barriers democratic governance could make its position against all these counter-wave. Globalization has brought countries closer. Inter-dependence of international economies compelled them to change. Civil society pressure also played a vital role in changing government policies and actions. Bangladesh Government has taken appreciable initiatives to ascend on the highway of social accountability. Issuance of Right to Information Ordinance 2008, establishment of active Anti-Corruption Commission And National Human Rights Commission, pilot projects for formulation of participatory budgets, participatory planning process in Sirajgonj needs to be cited here.

1.3. Background of the study:

Bangladesh Civil Service has a long history, which originated during British rule in India. It is said that the civil servants in British-India set-up an excellent tradition and a very high reputation for integrity, honesty, morale, initiative, objectivity and efficiency. But they were loyal to their appointing authorities. The purpose of their recruitment was to serve the colonial masters, not the citizens of the country. It is also true that by tradition and training these officers had been indoctrinated to regard themselves as the eventual "policy makers" (Morshed, 1997:75). Pakistan took of the officers at its inception and maintained the tradition. Bangladesh inherited the administrative structure and civil service system developed in Pakistan, which was a continuation of the system of the British period.

After long years of independence it is a general perception of the citizens that bureaucrats are inefficient. Whenever the government faces difficulty in managing any of the events, it is said that the bureaucrats are not responsive to government policies. They are not co-operating the government and are insincere in discharging their duties. People comment that bureaucrats are irresponsible, not trustworthy, disconnected from the citizens, corrupt, biased,

impersonal, politicized, lacking transparency, less accountable, lacking self criticism and are too lazy. But reality is that people have obscure idea of bureaucracy and even most of them are not well informed about the total number of cadres working with the government. They often fix the barrel of the gun to the members of Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) cadre whereas bureaucracy includes all the members of 29 cadre services.

1.4. Problem Area:

In the days of globalization peoples' expectation has increased. Free flow of information creates an urge among citizens to be updated about personal as well as national issues. So, people's perception about bureaucracy is neither totally false nor is it true in all aspects. Civil servants need to change themselves and become innovative to find ways to develop qualitative service delivery system. This is how they can serve people according to their expectations and help them coming out of misconceptions. Innovation needs empirical decisions. In Bangladesh academics and researchers are working on bureaucracy and accountability separately. They conduct research on different aspects of bureaucracy or specifically on bureaucratic accountability but often the perspective of bureaucracy and role of civil society involvement in ensuring bureaucratic accountability is ignored. Empirical research on the level of social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh may enable us to specify the causes of such misconceptions.

1.5. Objective of the study:

The present study will investigate bureaucratic accountability in Bangladesh from a historical perspective starting from the *Mauryan* era to the present. Initiatives were taken to look into bureaucratic culture or bureaucratic accountability in Bangladesh. But nowadays it is often assumed that bureaucracy in Bangladesh is facing some questions from the point of view of its quality, efficiency and level of performance. It is assumed that it is not

being able to play its expected role. Citizens are emphasizing on both 'top down' and 'bottom up' policy formulation techniques. Globalization is emphasizing on involvement of civil society representatives in the policy formulation process. The objective of the study is to analyze the comparative position of civic engagement in governance system and identify the status of social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh.

1.6. Research Questions:

- 1) What is the position of bureaucracy in Bangladesh from social perspective?
- 2) Is bureaucracy facing the crisis of losing its acceptance to the society?
- 3) Is social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh increasing? What changes in the global arena have pushed this situation?

1.7. Justification of the Study:

Bangladesh has been identified as a country of weak governance. The donor agencies are continuously hammering the government to ensure good governance as well as better accountability in the public sector. The citizens are also aware of their rights and services. So, establishment of better accountability of bureaucracy has become a prime issue. In Bangladesh civil servants are accountable to their controlling authorities. They are always willing to satisfy their authorities. Unfortunately they do not care the citizens as clients. They do not feel that they are employed to serve people. The ultimate purpose of bureaucracy is to serve people. So, social accountability of bureaucracy should be highlighted to meet citizen's satisfaction for better governance.

Bureaucracy reflects existence of a government. It serves for implementing government policies in the related fields. Bureaucrats are the representatives of the government at the doorstep of the citizens. But bureaucracy in

Bangladesh is now facing several questions. Its acceptance is thought to be under threat. Quest for answers to such questions is necessary. Research on social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh has been ignored. It is directly related with governance issues and holds a vital position in the sector of social research. This unattended perspective needs to be studied for better understanding and performance enhancement of bureaucracy in Bangladesh.

1.8. Hypothesis of the study:

Social accountability of Bureaucracy in Bangladesh is increasing with the changing demands of globalization.

1.9. Methodology:

Application of several methods will be fruitful to move forward to look for answers to the research questions and the hypothesis identified by the researcher. Each of the methods will contribute to cover every pros and cons of the thirst. These methods are:

- Content Analysis Method and
- Participatory Observation Method

1.10. Limitations of the study:

- The research was part of a Masters Program. Within the limited timeframe allocation of time for research was not enough.
- As there was time constraint comments/views of scholars, bureaucrats, both in service and retired, could not be incorporated.
- Inaccessibility to information also worked as a constraint in doing the job.
- Time constraint did not allow the researcher to use 'social survey method'.

Chapter II

Conceptual Framework

2.1. Prologue:

Responsible governance is largely ensured through accountability practices of civil servants in administration. Generally the term accountability refers to the ability for which someone can be accounted for or 'counted up'. This notion, however, does not reflect the effectiveness of the concepts like transparency, punishment, performance, corruption, external surveillance, the public interest, power, and principal-agent relationships (Ackerman, 2005:3). In administration, accountability is a relational concept where one assigns a responsibility and the other performs it depending on the obligation of answerability. Robert Behn has maintained that 'those whom we want to hold accountable have a clear understanding of what accountability means' and in an extreme situation it means punishment (Behn, 2001:3). Relating accountability to awareness and enforcement, Andreas Schedler defines accountability as to the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing and as the capacity of accounting agencies 'to impose sanctions on power holders who have violated their public duties' (Schedler, 1999:14). In other words, accountability implies an exchange of responsibilities and potential sanctions between rulers and citizens, and setting up of a more complicated, varied and competitive set of representatives who would typically interposes between the two.

2.2. Accountability Facets:

Richard Mulgan argues that accountability includes three central elements that are as follows (Mulgan, 2000:555):

- 1) It is *external* in a sense that the responsibility is given to some other person or body for making administrators accountable;

2) It involves *social interaction and exchange* wherein one side seeks answers and rectification while the other side being held accountable to respond and accepts sanctions;

3) It implies *rights of authority*, wherein those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority over those who are accountable.

Thus the term accountability is referred to the prevention of illegal or corrupt activity by public officials and includes the design and implementation of government programs within the general understanding of basic public duties for which public servants are responsible. To Paul Samuel accountability means holding individuals and organizations responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible (Samuel, 1992:1). This means that bureaucrats should be responsible both for the fulfillment of predetermined policy goals and for the responsiveness of policies to the specific needs of the public and the poorer section of the society who are mostly dependent on government services. Therefore, in this context the concept of *receptiveness* may be added, which refers to the capacity of officials to take into account the knowledge and opinions of citizens, as a third central element of accountability (World Bank, 2004: 8). Thus institutionalization of a powerful *accountability structure* holds every public official responsible for his/her actions as a public servant.

In a recent World Bank publication on *Human Rights and Social Accountability* by John M. Ackerman maintained that there are two broad schools of thought to explain accountability of public servants. (Ackerman, 2005:5). One stream equates accountability with honesty and rule following, and suggests evaluation, rewarding and punishment of the public servants in order to prevent them from corruption and illegal practices. This negative and process-based view of accountability requires public servants to restrain from certain activities. The second stream explores that accountability emphasizes the

affirmative task of effective performance and proactive decision-making. This perspective points out that the actions and decisions, which do not lead to effective policy outcomes, would prevent public servants to break rules and taking bribes. Thus, the World Bank study demonstrated that accountability involves the evaluation of the behavior of public servants. It is a process of social evaluation and to work with society and accounting agencies to improve government honesty and performance instead of doing one's best to hide from scrutiny. In doing so, accountability requires dialogue, explanation and justification.

In technical terms accountability is different from the concept of responsiveness, which requires the act of serving the citizens with an attitude of satisfying them. A government is 'responsive' if it adopts policies that are signaled as preferred by citizens (Manin, Przeworski & Stokes, 1999:9). Where governments are accountable, citizens can distinguish representative from unrepresentative governments and can sanction the later appropriately, retaining in office those incumbents who perform well and ousting from office those who do not (Manin, Przeworski & Stokes, 1999:10). In other words, responsiveness refers to the motivation for an action or decision and accountability refers to the quality of the action or decision itself. Accountability thus can be defined as a pro-active process by which public officials inform about and justify their plans of action, and their behavior and results are sanctioned accordingly.

Robert Behn in his work *Rethinking Democracy and Accountability* identifies three broad categories of accountability, which are as follows: a) *Accountability for finances*: It focuses on financial accounting—on how the books are kept and how the money is spent. b) *Accountability for fairness*: It ensures that government officials pay careful attention to ethical standard by fairness and equity. These rules ensure that government has been equitable and treated its

citizens fairly. c) *Accountability for performance*: It goes beyond partisan spending and fair treatment to involve the successful accomplishment of public purposes. While accountability for fairness reflect concerns for *how* government works ...signifies what it actually accomplishes. (Behn, 2001,6-10) This category of accountability highlights whether the policies, programs, and activities of government are being able to produce the results that they were designed to produce.

Accountability has also been categorized as, legal accountability and performance accountability by the World Bank (World Bank, 2004: 8). 'Legal accountability' involves keeping public officials in check by making sure that they respect the legal order both in their administrative tasks and in their relationship to society at large. It has to do with respect for the rule of law and preventing the abuse of public office. 'Performance accountability' involves the successful implementation of policies designed to benefit the public in general, with a particular emphasis on policies that attend to the needs of the poor. It involves questions of efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness.

Entitled *State Society Synergy for Accountability: Lessons for the World Bank* paper suggest that the participation of civil society can reinforce structures of accountability through three different mechanisms (World Bank, 2004: 8):

First, *Vertical accountability* mechanisms require government officials to appeal downwards to the people at large. Direct monitoring and pressure from civil society actors on particular issues or policies can complement as additional elements of vertical accountability. This increases the frequency and the clarity of the accountability signals that citizens send to public officials and thereby improves their vertical accountability towards the public.

Second, *Horizontal accountability* mechanisms require public officials and agencies to report sideways to other officials and agencies within the state itself. As O'Donnell (1999) has written, horizontal accountability is 'the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions' (O'Donnell, 2003, 34). Examples of horizontal accountability mechanisms include institutions like human rights *ombudsman*, independent electoral institutes, corruption control agencies, legislative investigative commissions and administrative courts. All of these are public institutions that are specifically designed to evaluate, control and direct the behavior of other government officials.

Third, in addition to pressuring from the outside and reinforcing existing control mechanisms within the state, civil society actors can participate directly in the government's own institutions of horizontal accountability. Such participation breaks down the division between vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, since it involves the participation of vertical actors in horizontal mechanisms. It is therefore a 'hybrid form of accountability' that might best be called 'diagonal accountability'. It represents a shift towards augmenting the limited effectiveness of civil society's watchdog function by breaking the state's monopoly over the responsibility for official executive oversight (World Bank, 2004: 8). Examples of this form of participation would include citizen advisory boards that fulfill public functions like auditing government expenditures, supervising procurement, or monitoring elections.

2.3. Pro-Accountability Reforms:

Democratic governance is generally viewed as the most dependable way to ensure accountable behavior. John M. Ackerman contended that democracy need to be complemented with reforms explicitly designed to improve government accountability. To him four general categories of pro-accountability reform can be identified as follows (Ackerman, 2005:8):

A. Weberian Reform: Max Weber understood bureaucracy to be the institutionalization of rationality in which each public servant had a specific task to carry out and was fully accountable for actions to superior. This created a vertically integrated triangle with power concentrated at the top in which 'good governance' is guaranteed through careful supervision and the rational organization of the tasks of government. This 'ideal type' of bureaucracy is viewed as important in the countries with weak governance. Civil service reform and the improvement of internal auditing, evaluation and surveillance are absolutely central elements of any pro-accountability reform package. If the central administrative apparatus does not have sufficient strength and legitimacy to control its own employees other pro-accountability reforms will surely fail.

B. Independent Agencies: One of the most popular pro-accountability reforms in recent years has been the creation of Independent Pro-Accountability Agencies (IPAs) that are autonomous public institutions that are responsible for holding government accountable in specific issues. Examples of IPAs include autonomous corruption control bodies, independent electoral institutes, auditing agencies, human rights *Ombudsmen*, and 'Public Prosecutors'. The transparency and openness to participation. There are also variations within the IPA institutions. For instance, while *Ombudsmen* tend to be open and to provide much needed information to the public, auditing agencies tend to be much more tight lipped. There is a direct relationship between the effectiveness of IPAs and the level and intensity of their interaction with society. Those IPAs that take their role as bridges seriously are the ones that fulfill their pro-public mandates more effectively, while those that separate themselves from either the government or society tend to end in isolation and ineffectiveness.

C. Social Accountability: Governments can do a great deal on their own to improve accountability through actions such as strengthening top-down oversight, professionalizing staff through civil service reform, empowering internal comptrollers, establishing performance contracts and creating new independent public oversight agencies. Nevertheless, pro-accountability reform is much more effective when societal actors play a central role side by side. Initiatives as participatory budgeting, social audits and citizen report cards all involve citizens in the oversight and control of government and can be considered as social accountability initiatives. Since society exists everywhere, the mere threat that society might respond in other more disruptive ways is often enough to control public servants. Any power that is given to society, however, risks being co-opted by criminal organizations and powerful interest groups who only look for personal and group benefits (Ackerman, 2005:11). Even then, society is a powerful potential force for strengthening government accountability. This force does not emerge automatically or always work in the most productive forms. Pro-accountability groups need to design mechanisms that can help translate their potentiality into action and insist privilege social actors to work for the public interest.


D. Marketization: The functioning of the market serves as an incredibly powerful pro-accountability mechanism. Nevertheless, marketization should not be confused with social accountability. While marketization seeks to send sections of the state activities off to society, social accountability seeks to invite society into the state. While marketization is grounded in the discourse of consumer protection and consumer choice, social accountability is based in the language of citizens' rights and empowerment. Social accountability also has a few important advantages over marketization since it retains central government control over service provision.

2.4. Basics of Social Accountability:

Social accountability emerged as a new concept in the arena of social science through pro-accountability reform initiatives. Civic engagement usually offers the institutional basis for public service delivery and contributes to conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts. Conversely, there is substantial evidence that an effective and sound public sector depends very much on the existence of a dynamic civil society and strong citizen involvement in the public realm. Such involvement can manifest itself in participatory engagement, in policy formulation and monitoring that brings transparency and effectiveness to public institutions. States with the capacity to enforce the rule of law, set clear rules to engage civil society and promote sound public policy to create an appropriate environment for civic engagement. The dynamic relationship between civil society and the state, which is in essence contradictory, can become symbiotic and crucial to achieving responsible governance and sustained development (Reuben, 2003:1). Citizen participation, non-discrimination, inclusion, equality and government accountability are the central concerns of social accountability and basic civil freedom and rule of law are precondition for effective social accountability initiatives.

Figure 1 demonstrates that social accountability is interconnected with the issues of responsible governance, citizen empowerment, social development and effectiveness as well as with service delivery to the citizens. Responsible governance is ensured through achievement of expected level of transparency and accountability through establishment of rule of law. Since society possesses the ability to oversee the societal factors that helps public sector service providers to be accountable, it becomes a crucial actor in ensuring social accountability. Moreover as the citizens form the society, their empowerment as key actors of societal change opens scope for better social accountability. On the other hand, social development and effectiveness of the society as well as service delivery systems in society are ensured through

intended level of performance of the public officials. World Bank practitioners perceive that achievement of such level of expectation in the service delivery systems and social development is possible through establishment of social accountability.



Source: Self compiled.

The existence of social accountability mechanisms can lead to significant changes in both the decisiveness and accountability of governments. In terms of decisiveness, or fulfilling expectations, vertical mechanisms enable civil society and government to work towards:

- ▶ Improving public expenditure targeting of social programs through improved knowledge of citizen needs;
- ▶ Enhancing the quality of services delivered through the issuing of citizens' report cards;
- ▶ Improving the allocation of budget resources through the incorporation of citizen feedback on budget proposals;

► Enhancing public expenditure effectiveness through participatory tracking and monitoring systems (Reuben, 2003: 4).

These mechanisms also lead to a better management of expectations. They provide civil society with a more realistic understanding of budgetary constraints and the difficult choices inherent in deciding where best to allocate scarce resources and how best to meet the needs of a diverse population. Thus social accountability can play an important role in the creation of more transparent and representative governments and aid public institutions in meeting the expectations of the population. It allows civil society and government to interact in a manner that acknowledges the limitations each sector faces while recognizing that collaboration is necessary for effective and sustainable development.

2.5. Strengthening Social Accountability:

The implementation of social accountability initiatives could be an excellent way to ensure citizen's development. The first step towards such a strategy would inform the citizens about their rights and explicitly help them understand to see public services' obligation, which the government has towards them. To establish such situation the World Bank has initiated to support a 'Community of Practice on Social Accountability' which would be a crucial step in the years to come. If successful, social accountability entrepreneurs would be able to tap into a great diversity of new practices and discourses, which would greatly strengthen their initiatives. (Ackerman, 2005:25-7). The perceived implications of the social accountability mechanisms are as follows:

2.5.1. Punishment vs. Reward Based dichotomy: Accountability is most commonly associated with punishment. From this perspective an accountable government is one that is constantly exposed to the guard of a government

auditor, public protest or media watchdog for the corruption charges. Punishment is an absolutely crucial element of accountability. But excessive punishment tends to corner public officials into a state of fear and paralysis. While this may be positive from the perspective of rule-following it is often counter-productive from the perspective of improving government performance. Rewards also have their difficulties. Although they stimulate already relatively honest and pro-active officials to perform even better and might persuade mediocre employees to better performance, they do not do a very good job at correcting the behavior of the bad once. The opportunity costs involved are just too large for such officials to be convinced by simple rewards. Corrupt officials, by contrast, would have already earning a great deal of extra money, probably much more than any reward scheme could offer them.

Social accountability is often seen to be closer to the punishment than to the reward side of the spectrum. Nevertheless, social accountability is also effective when it is grounded in constructive partnerships between civil society and the state. As a recent World Bank document on the subject states, 'across the world, we find citizens are mobilizing, often locally, to demand better services. Not by shouting, but by counting. Making sure their governments spend effectively, and keep their promises' (World Bank, 2004a: 2). One recent example of a reward based social accountability mechanism, which is grounded in a positive-scale, is the Citizen Report Card. The use of this instrument is on the rise throughout the world. The experience that began with this scorecard innovation was organized by Samuel Paul's Public Affairs Center (PAC) in Bangalore, India in 1994, and then repeated in 1999 and 2003. The report card methodology has been criticized by Robert Jenkins and Anne Marie Goetz for being grounded in a fundamentally naive view of politics and bureaucratic inefficiency (Jenkins & Goetz, 1999:619). Nevertheless, they point out that the best 'accountability system' is one that includes both

punishments and rewards so that public officials have strong incentives both not to break the rules and to perform to the best of their ability.

2.5.2. Rule Following vs. Performance Based Appraisal: A focus on rule following is linked to Public Management and its emphasis on the construction of a Weberian bureaucracy grounded in rational action and a structured chain of command (Zafarullah: 1992: 18). Although governments usually direct such strategies, society can also play an important role in such pro-accountability initiatives. New Public Management (NPM) argues that governments need to liberate themselves from strictly process-based evaluation, which slows down government action and opposes creativity, and turn to results based evaluation. Society can play an important role in evaluating the performance or quality of government services. Education, police and health care reform are key areas in this regard. In recent years there has also been an important wave of community policing reform. There are also problems with an exclusive focus on performance as well. In technical terms, there may be a dichotomy between 'accountability for rule following' or 'legal accountability' and 'accountability for performance'. Indeed, this is what Robert Behn has characterized as '*the* accountability dilemma' (Behn, 2001:10-2). The discretion that allows bureaucrats to focus on performance and to discover creative ways to solve problems might also open up room for increased controversy. Nevertheless, it appears that this risk is reduced when civil society actors are vigilant since they usually maintain a close watch on both procedural and performance indicators simultaneously (Ackerman, 2005:14,15). The best pro-accountability strategies are ones that simultaneously focus citizen participation on enforcing the rules and on improving performance process by which the products are delivered.

2.5.3. Level of Institutionalization: Most efforts at involving society to strengthen government accountability tend to be ad-hoc initiatives taken by

civil society activists and embraced by public servants who believe in the value and the power of democratic participation. Rarely do such strategies find themselves institutionalized into the law or otherwise permanently embedded in the structure of the state. A certain 'event culture' tends to prevail when the concepts of societal participation and civic engagement are brought to the table (Eberlei, 2001: 9). Many public officials would prefer in the holding of a series of hearings, workshops and consultations, not the establishment of a long-term participatory dialogue with civil society. Nevertheless, there are three different levels at which participatory mechanisms can be institutionalized in the state. *First*, it can be built into the strategic plans of government agencies, rules and procedures that require field level bureaucrats to consult or otherwise engage with societal actors. *Second*, specific government agencies can be created that have the goal of assuring societal participation in government activities or act as a *communicator* for building links with societal actors. *Third*, participatory mechanisms can be inscribed in law, requiring individual agencies or the government as a whole to involve societal actors at specific moments of the public policy process. Although the first level of institutionalization is more or less widespread and the second level is relatively common, the third level is extremely rare.

2.5.4. Depth of Civic Engagement: Most pro-accountability initiatives grounded in civic engagement tend to be "under-involved" or too "externalist". Except for taking part in some consultations, workshops, protest moves and electioneering events, it is very difficult to find cases in which societal actors are invited into the process to observe step-by-step the formulation of government policies. For instance, transparency laws often only give access to documents that report on concluded processes, not permitting citizens to have access to information about the process that led up to the decision or action. Governments usually claim the need to protect personal privacy and national security as their reasons for resisting a policy of total transparency. Although

this may often be the case, governments also frequently use such claims only as excuses to hide uncomfortable information from the public eye. Nevertheless, there is a limit to the extent to which citizens as agents of accountability can be invited into the core of the state. Pro-accountability initiatives based in civic engagement need to defend the autonomy of society. There is indeed a point at which individual citizens or civil society groups go so far into the state that they end up being consumed by the 'monster' that they were supposed to control. Funding is another crucial issue here. So far that very same government funds the individuals and groups, who are holding government accountable in a discretionary manner; this will compromise their ability to exercise their pro-accountability function.

2.5.5. Inclusiveness of Participation: The pro-accountability theorists suggest that a small group of NGOs, middle class professionals, and centrist politicians could be involved in the participatory pro-accountability mechanisms. Their argument is that the participation of broad based grassroots people, uneducated citizens and leftist politicians will only make things more difficult. The simplest option to them is therefore to only open up participation to those ones who already understands (Eberlei, 2001: 15). But the circle of participating actors established must be gradually and systematically expanded, in order to broaden the scope of dialogue and make it largely inclusive. Such broad-based participation is crucial for three reasons. *First*, civic engagement for accountability is usually more effective precisely when government officials *don't* know what to expect from civil society. Social accountability can be most effective when it keeps government officials on their toes. *Second*, the social trust that results from value-sharing weakens citizens' oversight and control capacities of what rulers do, and increases, in turn, the chances of opportunistic actions against them. *Third*, pro-accountability initiatives that involve a wide range of interests and ideological positions are much more legitimate than those based in a small handpicked

group of professionals (Ackerman, 2005:22,23). Expanding the circle of participation is clearly a challenge, but it is the only way to achieve broad based acceptance and ownership in such pro-accountability initiatives.

2.5.6. Branches of Government: Social accountability initiatives tend to be directed towards the executive branch. Since the executive manages the vast majority of resources it is most often the central target for pro-accountability reform. The central accountability question with regard to the executive branch concerns how citizens can control and evaluate the behavior of the 'monstrous' bureaucracy which seems to respond to the interests of no one and nothing but itself (Ackerman, 2005:24-5). Reforming the executive branch is indeed an important challenge. Nevertheless, we should not let it blind us with regard to the equally important tasks of reforming the legislative and the judicial branches. Of the three branches of government the judiciary is often the most inscrutable. Since judges deal with highly sensitive material and information it is quite easy for them to hide from the public eye simply by claiming that their work is "confidential" and that they need to protect the right to privacy of the parties involved. Nevertheless, civil society does have an important role to play in holding the judiciary accountable. Legislatures are the untapped gold mine for the development of innovative new pro-accountability initiatives grounded in civic engagement. Citizens can also work side by side with legislators to hold the executive and judicial branches accountable. Social accountability can have an important role in each of the three branches of government. Pro-accountability reformers should always keep their eyes open to possible missed opportunities in other branches of government.

2.6. Weakening Social Accountability:

Strategic interaction between government and civil society often limits the attainment of Bureaucratic social accountability. There is no permanent equilibrium to the governance equation. The changing conditions of the relationship between the government and civil society constantly shift the balance in one direction or another. This relationship is determined by many contextual factors, a fundamental example of which is the political regime and the type of approach a specific government adopts toward organized interests expressed by civil society. James Manor identifies seven possible types of strategies governments may adopt to reciprocate civil societies. These are as follows (Manor, 1999:12-3):

- (i) *Laissez-faire approach*: A passive approach that refrains bureaucracy from strong engagement with civil society organizations (CSOs).
- (ii) *Combination of conflictive and harmonic relationships*: A strategic approach in which government seeks to create factions among civil society by establishing alliances with some groups while confronting others.
- (iii) *Repression of all manifestations of citizens' organized interest*: An approach usually adopted by autocratic governments.
- (iv) *Cooptation approach*: Governments seek to co-opt some or all interests in an attempt to control civil society through relationships of dependency.
- (v) *Patronage approach*: This approach usually divides citizens' interests along clientelistic lines.
- (vi) *Proactive engagement*: Governments seek to mobilize all or the majority of organized interests in order to build political consensus. This approach may create a climate of strong citizen engagement in public debate and action, however it can surpass the boundaries of independent and critical mobilization.
- (vii) *Civic mobilization through nationalistic appeals*: In most cases governments would employ nationalistic appeals for creating, or limiting in different ways and degrees their interaction with organized expressions of the citizenry.

However, civil society organizations also implement their own strategies in defining their relationship with the state and other development actors like political parties, business organizations and international institutions. Four main civic engagement strategies can be identified (Reuben, 2003:3):

(i) *Confrontation strategy*: Civil society organizations view government as the main obstacle for achieving their objectives. This confrontation strategy usually gives way to social and political unrest and therefore to the narrowing of civic freedoms.

(ii) *Parallel track strategy*: Civil society organizations decide not to engage with the government and instead establish a set of parallel services that they themselves deliver directly to their clients and constituencies.

(iii) *Selective collaboration*: A strategy that combines collaboration on specific fronts and a critical distance, or even confrontation, on others. This strategy usually leads to complex tensions within civil society and between CSOs and the government, though it also opens up dynamic spaces for negotiation and constructive engagement.

(iv) *Full endorsement*: This situation characterizes the political and social climate in the aftermath of deep political and social crises and the emergence of national unity governments.

Given the heterogeneous character of civil society, the above strategies coexist and create all sorts of tensions among CSOs and between CSOs and the government. The complex mix of government approaches to civil society and civic engagement strategies frames the specific formula of the governance equation. Nevertheless, existing legal, institutional, and policy frameworks also play an integral role in determining the environment for constructive forms of civic engagement and governance solutions and their execution more truthfully reflects actual policy decisions and their implementation.

2.7. Conclusion:

Social accountability has been identified as a means of ensuring citizen participation in the governance process by social scientists and researchers. It has been taken up by the World Bank and other development organizations to encourage better services from the public sector to the citizens, as they are the ultimate authority of the public servants. Citizen Report Cards, Administrative Procedures Acts, Federal Electoral Institutions are serving as instruments for ensuring better social accountability in different countries of the world. In Bangladesh civil service is defined as service of the citizens. Unfortunately the citizens are not treated equally as a whole. The situation is all the same in most of the developing countries. Citizen's involvement in the oversight of the public sector may contribute to enhance quality of service from the part of the public sector. This is possible through introduction of the practices of social accountability of the civil servants. Identification of the existing level of social accountability of the civil servants in Bangladesh is thus necessary in the days of globalization.

Chapter III

Historical Perspective

3.1. Prologue:

Social accountability of Bangladesh bureaucracy has an assorted historical background that dates back to the Aryan civilization and spreads up to modern period. During the Mauryan era, in ancient India, the civil servants performed the role of personal servants of the Brahmin Kings and regulated public life by their 'super natural' commands. The administrators were bound to the king by ties of religious belief and personal devotion, and provided services to the powerful authority when they were called upon. During the medieval period, both under the Sultani and Mughal rulers, they were acting as state servants. The concept of 'civil service' was not officially used during Mughal era, because all civil servants were primarily enrolled in the army. By 1765, the term 'civil servant' had come to be used in the records of the British East India Company. In the British period, the civil service became a protected service of the colonial rulers. In this chapter I shall try to identify the services which were provided by the civil servants in Bengal during the pre-Mughal and Mughal era, the British period and carried over in the then East Bengal under united Pakistan. The objective of the chapter is to look into the extent of social accountability of the civil servants during those regimes.

3.2. The *Mauryan* Bureaucracy:

The Mauryan state that rose in 321 B.C. and covered greater part of India, including Bengal, had a service oriented bureaucracy with a Brahmin autocratic ruler at the top. Under the orthodox bindings of the caste system, civil servants were drawn from *Kshatriya* background. Kautilya's *Arthashastra* mentions about the variety of subjects that were covered by the 'widespread and rigid bureaucracy' in ancient India. In a 'police state', bureaucrats were

involved in 'espionage' for maintaining external and internal peace and for collecting revenue from trade and practice of religion (Cited in Nehru, 1973:125). They regulated agriculture; inspected markets, manufacturers, slaughterhouses, cattle raising, water rights, sports, courtesans and drinking saloons. They standardized weights and measures and inflicted rigorous punishments for adulteration of foodstuffs. In his *The Discovery of India*, Jawaharlal Nehru further maintained that if there was a breach of regulation or some other offense in temple management, the temple monies were confiscated by the bureaucracy, who also monitored the calamity, sanitation, hospitals, and managed relief to widow's, orphans, and the unwell. Distribution of famine relief was a special kind of activity provided by the *Maurya* bureaucracy (Nehru, 1973: 125). Nevertheless, most of these services provided by ancient bureaucracy were confined in the upper caste urban centers than to the villages.

To ensure better services for the citizens, Kautilya in his *Arthashastra* maintained that, a well-managed administrative system was necessary. He identified that loyalty and sincerity were to be the two main qualifications in a person to be appointed as a civil servant (Mishra, 1997:1). Kautilya also suggested some checks and balances on the appointment of civil servants. He prescribed a clearance by the vigilance department of the state for the appointment of civil servants. He recommended a continuous watch on the functioning of the civil service, and a briefing to the king on the performance of the civil servants on a regular basis. Kautilya laid down a code of conduct for the civil servants who prescribed swift promotions for efficient and effective officials, and severe punishment for those who were corrupt. The severest punishment suggested by Kautilya was 'beheading' of such corrupt civil servants. He advocated about the responsiveness of the civil servants since he believed in the view that the power of the state came from its subjects.

Since the days of the Kautilya, nevertheless, civil service gone through major changes in their makeup, being moderate during the Gupta dynasty (4th century-750AD), egalitarian under the Pala dynasty (750-1150AD) and orthodox during the Sena dynasty (1150-1206AD).

3.3. The Sultani Administration:

Bangladesh Bureaucracy is an institution, which carries its history from thirteenth century in the Sub-Continent. After Bengal fell under the control of Turks in 1206AD, a new administration came into force that interfused Islamic traditions with indigenous customs and practices. As the Turkish rulers were liberal, they appointed non-Muslims in the administration, even in the higher offices like ministers and in the army. In the reign of the Giasuddin Azam Shah, Raja Ganesh rose to the position of a principal minister, chief of administrative and revenue matters (Karim, 1977:234). Under the Sultani rulers, bureaucrats were involved in the administration of justice and they entertained written complaints, and decided cases on the basis of witnesses. The application of criminal law was mild and humane, and Brahmins were exempted from capital punishment. Theft was punished according to the value of the property stolen. Taxation was also mild; the state took only one-sixth of the produce of soil, and exempted Brahmins from taxation.

Among the early Sultani rulers Giasuddin Balban, who came to power in 1266, organized the internal administration on a most efficient basis. In a half civil and half military setting, Balban established administration of justice in Bengal (Prasad, 1974: 74). A well-established espionage system was in force to make the administration of justice more efficient, check crime and protect innocent people from the high-handedness of those in power. At the turn of the 13th century Alauddin Khilji set up an administration, whereby bureaucrats worked without being influenced by the *ulema* and depended

upon the will of the monarch (Prasad, 1974: 92). Mutilation of dishonest and corrupt officers was the rule of the day.

Services of the state were organized in an efficient manner under Muhammad Tughluq, who came to power in 1325. As there was a shortage of capable officers in the country, the Sultan employed foreigners in administration and presented rewards and gifts to them. As major activities, bureaucrats would manage the department of presents and Industrial department for the preparation of costly fabrics (Prasad, 1974: 112). After the death of Muhammad Tughluq his son Firuz Tughluq took over power in 1351. To collect taxes, Firuz employed his civil servants in accordance with the Quranic laws. Under the directives of the Sultan, the later protected the agriculturists and constructed canals for irrigation facilities. During the rule of Mahmud Gawan, in mid-15th century, civil servants worked for the finance department, administration of justice, public education, and survey of village lands for equitable revenue collection. Their involvement in corrupt practices was less prevalent.

3.4. The Mughal Bureaucracy:

The Mughal Empire in India was founded in 1526 and Bengal became a part of its administration during Emperor Akbar in July 1576. The Mughals established an elaborate, feudal and military type, well-defined and well-coordinated system of administration in India (Hakim, 1995:1). Coming from central India they modified their administration according to Indian traditions and combined Perso-Arabic system in local setting. Its complicated orderliness compelled the bureaucracy of much record keeping, and for ensuring partial acquiescence of the people, 'because the new government was more humane, tolerant and beneficent' (Prasad, 1974:313). Consequently, the Mughal bureaucracy respected social usages and allowed the villages to enjoy their right of self-governance.

The provincial administration in Bengal was a miniature replica of the central government, which was organized by Akbar in Delhi. Officials were freely and frequently transferred from one to another without serious consideration being given to their expertise. It seems that the emperor assumed that all state officials were competent enough to perform any state function, military or civil (Hakim, 1995:1). Their appointment, removal and promotion were in the hand of the Emperor. Their pay scale was awarded depending on the number of horses one owned under his command. The duties of the officials of the provincial government were collection of revenue, keeping financial accounts, allotment and disbursement of salaries, managing 'jagirs' of the province, realization of taxes etc. People came with direct touch of the officials in the local administration (Arora & Goyal, 1995:24-33). People used to come in touch of the civil servants to pay taxes and other offerings for the King and they expected least services from them.

In the Mughal bureaucracy Qazis hold the highest military and judicial position in the province and issues of law and order were left to his jurisdiction. Below the Qazi, there were: (i) the *Diwan*, (ii) the *Sadr*, (iii) the *Amil* or revenue collector, (iv) the *Bitikchi*, (v) the *Potdar* (vi) *Khizanadar*, or the *Faujdar*, (vii) the *kotwal*, (viii) the *Waqianawis* and (ix) other officers of the revenue department like the *Qanungo* and the *Patwari* (Prasad, 1974: 322). On top of the Mughal bureaucracy the Emperor had a council, but their suggestions were not binding on him and they could never influence his policy except by gentle persuasion (Arora & Goyal, 1995:22). Having instructions from the Emperor, however, the Mughal bureaucracy used to take care of peasantry with sympathy. In times of drought advances were made to the cultivators and public works were constructed to afford relief to the poor (Prasad, 1974:330). The peasant could pay his rent into the treasury and the treasurer wouldn't demand a single extra coin. The *Patwari* had to give a

detailed receipt stating the amount of rent and area of land cultivated and the name of the village to which the cultivator belonged.

The Mughal bureaucracy used to look after finance and revenue department, Imperial household department, military pay and accounts department, canon law department both civil and criminal, religious endowment and charity department, censorship of public morals department, the artillery department and intelligence and posts department (Prasad, 1974:314). The list of activities suggests that except for the execution of public morality, there was not a single official department, which could work for people's welfare. As if the motto of the administration was not to serve the public, but the Crown's interests.

Some writers contended that because of large territory, coupled with slow means of transport and communication, the Mughal bureaucracy had to face difficulties in running day-to-day administration. Having no pro-people political initiative, the state apparatus contended itself with police duties and revenue collection. Social progress and economic welfare of the citizens were neglected by the administration (Arora & Goyal, 1995:21). Education, health and promotion of art were left to private initiatives and the administration served as an entrepreneur to produce certain commodities in big cities. To the critics, thus, the issue of service delivery was a matter of dream or far cry for the commoners during the Mughals.

Nevertheless, under the Mughals a career in the state service was highly attractive and prestigious. As Ishwari Prasad observed, 'the highest ambition of every aspiring youth, Hindu and Muslim, was to get an opportunity of serving the state, because it meant honor, prestige, and high emoluments' (Prashad, 1974:319). The Mughal policy of 'career open to talent' attracted able aliens from many countries of Asia who, in their search for employment, came

to India and found a position in the Mughal administration. Once placed in the corridor of administration, they served for making the Crown happy and get better awards from them rather being accountable to the citizens.

3.5. Under the British Raj:

The biggest change the British government brought in the administrative structure of India was to introduce the rule-bound administrative system on a status-bound society. They replaced the 'warlord aristocracy' of the Muslim rulers by an efficient bureaucracy and army. Comprising bureaucrats and other members of the government they formed the Civil Service and employed them as personnel to the power holders of the colonial state. The term civil service is an Indian contribution to the discipline of public administration. To distinguish the government officials from the army officials, the term, civil service was used by the British government in undivided Punjab in the later part of the 18th century.

The government of East India Company (EIC) covered the background of colonial bureaucracy up to 1858 in terms of administrative development. Established in December 1600, the company was an organization of the commercial bourgeoisie that promoted overseas trade, banking economy and colonial bureaucracy in the overseas. The traditional system of the EIC had been to pay its servants fairly modest salaries, and to let them supplement their income from private transactions. This arrangement worked reasonably well before the conquest of Bengal, but was considered inefficient as a way of remunerating the officials of a colonial government because too much of the profit went into their hands rather than the Company's coffers (Maddison, 1971: 2). The Company had in its service various categories of employee such as Apprentices, Writers, Factors (a term applied to an agent transacting business) and Merchants. The colonial government emphasized on unquestionable loyalty of the civil servants during that regime. In view of the

objectives, the colonial authorities adopted Pitt's India Act 1784, which provided for an effective machinery of Parliamentary control over the Company's civil and military administration in India. Later on, the Government of India Act 1858 invested the Crown with direct responsibility for Indian administration.

In 1977, Misra in his work contended that the development of the civil service under the Company witnessed three broad phases. The *first* phase ended with the Mughal grant of the *diwani* in the Bengal in 1765 when it first emerged as a trading partner. The *second* phase from 1765 to 1798 was to consolidate the colonial administration in Bengal by personal contributions of Warren Hastings and Lord Cornwallis. In 1798, the *third* phase began with Lord Wellesley's administration that led the triumph of *laissez-faire* and the transformation of trade into politics.

The *first* period witnessed the adoption of the Regulating Act 1773 that provided for a distinction between the civil and the commercial functions of the Company. The Act prohibited Collectors and other officers engaged in revenue and judicial administration from participating in the Company's commercial transactions, to be conducted by a separate class of servants (Misra, 1977:46). Trade was thus separated from the function of governance. In 1785, Cornwallis created a professional cadre of Company servants who had generous salaries, had no private trading or production interests in India, enjoyed the prospect of regular promotion and was entitled to pensions. All high-level posts were reserved for the British, and Indians were excluded. Cornwallis appointed British judges, and established British officials as revenue collectors and magistrates in each district of Bengal. The Indian civil service was therefore able to secure high quality people because (a) it was very highly paid; (b) it enjoyed political power, which no bureaucrat could have had in England.

Lord Wellesley marked the beginning of the *third* era, which called for an organized and continuous flow of talent to administer the Company's Indian territories as permanent imperial dominions. In 1829, the system was strengthened by establishing districts throughout British India small enough to be effectively controlled by an individual British official who henceforth exercised a completely autocratic power, acting as revenue collector, judge and chief of police (functions which had been separate under the Mughal administration). This arrangement later became the cornerstone of Imperial administration throughout the British Empire. Lord Macaulay first of all introduced the system of recruitment of civil servants through competitive examinations in 1853.

The colonial bureaucracy was far away from the common people, as they never tried to mix with and impress upon them that they had been there to bring about a transformation in the Indian society (Mishra 1997:1). They were in a state of obeying the orders and taking care of the welfare of the colonial ruler. Nor did they consider the citizens as their stakeholders or as the owners of their services. The Company's servants were involved in collecting rents, dealing revenue cases as well as administering civil and criminal justice. They served on juries and acquired experience of judicial administration according to English law. If found fit they also received military commission and then immediately engaged in commercial pursuits, and made use these varied opportunities to learn the art of government (Misra, 1977:44). The motto was to apply the art of ruling not for serving the people or for ensuring welfare services to the citizens, but to extracting the surplus values.

M. Emdadul Haq, in his groundbreaking work *Drugs in South Asia: from the opium trade to the present day*, demonstrated how the colonial bureaucracy was engaged in the rampant collection of revenue from drugs trade in South Asia. Soon after the annexation of Bengal in 1757, they emerged as the

managers of the Bengal opium monopoly and forced local farmers to grow opium poppies and sale them to the EIC at an arbitrary price. In Patna and Benras, two opium industries were managed by two senior bureaucrats, along with their chain of administration at the local level (Haq, 2000, 20-2). Under their command the opium production was controlled and the commodity was supplied to the China market and elsewhere. Civil servants were engaged in the distribution of drugs in India, Burma and Sri Lanka. They also help the local zamindars or private traders from interfering in the trade. The bureaucracy; was also involved in the reckless exploitation of India's natural resources and drain the wealth of its citizenry through the extraction of excessive and unreasonable taxes. Physical violence was also inflicted in case of failure to pay the taxes.

Nevertheless, as the civil service was ultimately subject to the control of the British parliament and the British community in India was subject to close mutual surveillance, the administration was virtually incorruptible (Maddison, 1971:3). The government's job was to protect the state and leave rest of the masses on their fate. Their public finance dealt with military expenditure, police, civil administration and interest on debt. The economic needs of the citizens were not looked after and were sacrificed to British interest. The outstanding feature of British rule was their concentration on everything that went to strengthen their political and economic hold on the country (Chitkara, 1994:13-4). The key role of administration till 1935 was the maintenance of law and order and enforcement of the due process of law, maintenance of efficiency in all basic matters like crime, land revenue, record of rights and economy.

3.6. Bureaucracy in East Pakistan:

In August 1947, Great Britain relinquished its sovereignty over India, but left a stronger influence over the administrative apparatus both in India and

Pakistan, Bangladesh being the eastern wing of the later. Soon after independence the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS) was created and named in 1950 as the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). Instead of being under ministerial and legislative control, as it had happened in India, the CSPs emerged as the most powerful 'ruling clique' in Pakistan often exercised control over the Bengali people and their leadership. Following independence the Pakistani civil service isolated it from the masses and as such is unable to keep pace with the socio economic changes. It particularly belied the hopes, ambitions and expectations of the Bengali people (Chitkara, 1994:61-2). The Bengalis as 'value laden' instrument of Punjabi power structure viewed it.

The higher bureaucracy kept ruling the country in almost the same fashion as it did before independence. The members of the CSP emphatically claimed that they represented the people and held most of the key positions in the central and provincial secretariats; personnel agencies like the Federal Public Service Commission and the Establishment Division; major training institutes like the Civil Service Academy, National Institute of Public Administration, and the Administrative Staff College; and government corporations. The CSP also occupied a large number of top positions in the divisional and district administration. The CSP, like the ICS during the post-independent era, was autonomous. It controlled its own recruitment, training, and indoctrination, disciplinary procedures, performance ratings, promotion and transfers, and administrative investigation (Goodnow, 1964:231). By holding these strategic posts, the CSP was in a very comfortable position to exert enormous influence over the preservation of its status as a privileged group in the administrative machinery of the government.

3.7. Conclusion:

In summing up the discussion we can say that over the centuries civil service in Bengal has changed itself from personal servants of the Aryan Kings to

development partners in the modern era. But it did not play the role of service providers welfare partners of the citizens during any of the regimes. The issue of accountability existed in every regime. But it was applicable to the controlling authorities. Citizens were not considered as stakeholders or the ultimate owner of their jobs. They were not provided services let alone honoring the power of their authority. Administration felt unnecessary to take into account the issue of citizens view or citizens participation rather they were expected to serve the government according to policy of the government to ensure more profit on behalf of the government and to facilitate drain of property to the ruling part. Prior to independence the bureaucracy was regarded as a tool of foreign domination though it was liked and even respected for its efficiency and impartiality. But they were loyal and dutiful to their appointing authorities. The issue civil society participation was absent everywhere. The historical journey thus shows that social accountability of bureaucracy as well as the social accountability of civil servants was absent during those three regimes.

Chapter IV

Post-independent Bureaucracy

4.1. Prologue:

Bureaucracy is an inseparable organ of the government. It has been inherited by Bangladesh from East Pakistan as a descendent of the British. The bureaucracy in this part of the sub-continent has undergone numerous changes during the three distinct periods: the British era (1757-1947), the Pakistan era (1947-1971) and the ongoing Bangladesh era (Rahman, 2002:46). After 1971, different governments have tried to reorganize bureaucracy according to their needs. They have taken initiatives to ensure efficient services from the part of the bureaucracy. But disrupted democracy, military and autocratic regimes as well as practice of weak democracy did not let such initiatives to sustain. The aim of this chapter is to look into such initiatives and find out the extent of the effectiveness of post-independent Bangladesh bureaucracy in ensuring social accountability.

4.2. The Mujib Regime:

Bangladesh bureaucracy started its journey with a parliamentary form of government after 1971. But in 1975, one party presidential system of governance was established' by the then Mujib government. Since then the regime became a personalized rule and supplemented and transcended all kinds of political institution. During the first two and half years of independence, the Awami League (AL) government compelled the bureaucracy subservient to political will (Ahmed, 1980:141-142). Before independence the Awami League harbored a great antipathy towards the status-oriented and elitist bureaucracy of Pakistan. It was expected that the existing government would attempt to initiate steps to redefine the position of bureaucracy. Practically, it was difficult to take such initiative because it had a century-long

tradition of domination and experience in the policy-formulation as well as in the implementation process (Hakim, 1991: 9).

The initial passion and drive crucifying against the bureaucracy withered away at the exposure of the regime's overriding political motive. In the name of rooting out bureaucratic malfeasance and securing accountability in administration, promotion criteria were discarded, new appointments were made on irrational excuses and dismissal were decided arbitrarily (Rahman, 2002:53). As a result, job insecurity of the civil servants became rampant during Mujib regime.

A practice of biased attitude to civil servants was introduced during Mujib regime. A selected group of civil servants were patronized in an undue manner. It split the civil service into many factions. It negatively affected bureaucratic morale and enterprise. Sympathizers and supporters of the ruling party benefited from such policies. People who even never held any public office were quick to find themselves seated in government office. Even secretaries of ministries, chairmen and directors of corporations and ambassadors were appointed on political choice whether they were qualified for such position or not (Zafarullah, 1987: 461-462). Even in the first recruitment scheme candidates' active participation in the liberation war was the basic criterion of joining the civil service. Supporters of the ruling party who had fled to India during the liberation war and had some sort of experience in administration were rewarded with accelerated promotions and increments without appraising their suitability and qualifications. Thus politics overrode merit and seniority criteria (Rahman, 2002:52). This impeded the doors of accountability of the civil servants to the citizens. They felt and acted as powerful representatives of the government and no one could dare to question for their ineffectiveness as civil servants.

Both before and immediately after independence the Awami League leaders promised a total overhaul of the colonial administrative system which is considered to be unfit to serve the administrative functions of an independent country. The government appointed the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) for diagnosis of the administrative ills and recommend corrective measures, to propose future structure of administration based on the changing functional requirements of the government, to examine whether an unified service is befitting, determine future mode of recruitment of government employees at various level and to prepare and recommend a comprehensive design for administrative reorganization (Khan, 1982:139-151). It needs to be pointed that the initial reorganization initiative after independence did not take into account the perspective of satisfying the citizens rather government's need fulfillment was the matter of prime emphasis.

In April 1973 the ASRC report recommended reduction of classes and special services and barriers between these two. Consequently, suggested to reduce consciousness of ranks, classes, titles and service membership, enhance consciousness of membership in the public service and job responsibilities. Because ranks has no significance, than identifying responsibilities the Committee also emphasized that "all key positions at all levels must be open to competent men irrespective of the services to which they might belong. The placement of personnel should be governed by the policy of "the right man in the right place" and "to provide opportunities for exceptionally talented persons to quickly move into upper levels", in fact from the lowest positions to the higher positions. The recommendations of the Report were radical in nature and aimed at a complete restructuring of the inherited bureaucracy. The Report emphasized against the privileges and prerogatives of the members of former CSP. It was understandably difficult for them to accept these recommendations, which were designed to dilute their cadre identity and to

snatch away their traditional hold upon the top policy-making and managerial positions in the administration. Given the Awami League leaders' repeated assertion about the dysfunctionality of an "outmoded" colonial bureaucracy, it was expected that the recommendations of the ASRC Report would be accepted and implemented by the government. The reality, however, was contrary to what was expected. The ASRC Report was shelved and kept confidential (Hakim, 1991:13).

Rising problems of economic crisis, social and political turbulence and deteriorated law and order situation compelled the regime to turn back to the bureaucrats since the early days of 1975. In most of the corporations civil servants were appointed and the party nominees were removed, in the secretariat, the former CSPs were placed in key positions (Ahmed, 1980:161). Thus a bureaucracy that had been denounced by the regime for its impervious character began to be relied by the same regime for its political artifice (Zafarullah, 1987:466). Initially bureaucrats began to act as loyal subordinate of political masters but later when the politicians became the allies of bureaucrats, they regained their pre-independence position. This created new opportunity for bureaucracy to dominate and rule citizens rather than serving them.

The August coup proved beyond any controversy and confusion that the Pakistani praetorian tradition of the military's non-acceptance of civilian supremacy was very much alive in the armed forces of Bangladesh. The coup established the military as a formidable force in Bangladesh politics and relegated the political parties and politicians to a secondary role in the affairs of the nation. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib, Major General Ziaur Rahman emerged as the new leader of Bangladesh (Hakim, 1991: 14).

4.3. Military Regimes of Zia and Ershad:

From August 1975 to December 1990, Bangladesh experienced the rule of two consecutive military regimes, Zia regime (1975-1981) and Ershad regime (1981-1990). During this long 15 years, they tried to tinge their regime with civilian color by holding elections and running the parliament. They had usurped the power illegally breaching the constitution and maneuvered the constitution as a safeguard to perpetuate their stay in power. They resumed with the presidential form of government. The sovereignty and supremacy of parliament were circumscribed by all-powerful executive-the president. This phenomenon had far-reaching repercussions on the political development of Bangladesh (Rahman, 2002:53).

Under the military regimes of Zia and Ershad, top civil servants had direct access to the president and could sometimes even override the decisions of the ministers by invoking the President's support. There are many instances in which the President preferred the decision of the bureaucrat by negating minister, which ultimately helped the civil servants, develop a sense of superiority complex vis-à-vis their ministers (Choudhury, 1994:220).

During the second part of Zia's regime from February 1979 to May 1981 the country made the transition from martial law to civilian rule. All actions of the martial law period were legitimized by Parliament through an amendment to the Constitution in April 1979. Democratic form of governance through multi party system was introduced, checks were put on some executive and legislatures powers of the president and the independence of the judiciary which was curtailed by Mujib was restored (Zafarullah & Khan, 2005:5).

During Zia regime The President's Order No. 9 of 1972 was annulled. Earlier it was used to dismiss government officials without providing them any chance of explaining reasons for such dismissal. CSP officers were placed in most of

the top positions in the secretariat, public corporations and District headquarters. The planning commission was headed by a former CSP. Likewise bureaucrats had strong hold on the secretariat. Thus the bureaucrats remained as powerful as they were during the former regime. Their services to the citizens did not change its looks (Rahman, 2002:54).

Administrative reform efforts continued after the change of government in Bangladesh in August 1975. The efforts were an indication of the ruling elite's attempt to reform colonial administrative system. In February 1976, the military government appointed the Pay and Services Commission (PSC) under the chairmanship of Rashid, who retired as Secretary of the Central Government of Pakistan. On May 27, 1977, the PSC recommended to abolish the provision of reserving the higher positions in the Secretariat for any of the services, to raise the status and pay of specialists and introduction of a new apex cadre of senior officers drawn from all branches of the civil service (Hakim, 1991:15).

The government accepted, in principle, some of the major recommendations of the PSC. They introduced a "classless" civil service called the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS), which consisted of 28 services under 14 cadres. Equality of status was assured to all the cadres. All designations were made functional and pay scale became the only index of determining the positions and privileges of the government functionaries. Converting a caste-like system of public service into a "classless" structure was no doubt a big accomplishment. Although the form of the colonial bureaucratic structure was changed, its content remained virtually the same. So, bureaucracy remained the service provider of the government and served for the elite class of the society at best (Hakim, 1991:17).

An open competitive examination was introduced during Zia regime in 1977, to systematize the recruitment and selection process in the civil service, to select quality personnel for superior positions. The process held off and on for such purpose. These examinations were of a fairly high standard and akin with civil service examination held in United Pakistan. They attracted a large number of candidates and some of the best graduates of the country (Zafarullah, 1996:95).

During Zia regime, no remarkable initiative was made to evolve a mechanism for effective accountability of the bureaucracy. Despite crawling towards a democratic order, he entrusted the civil-military bureaucracy to run and manage the state of affairs. He kept his party and parliament away from the bureaucracy. Despite widespread and frequent criticism of the bureaucracy on the charges of corruption, lethargy and malpractice Zia refrained from taking drastic action against them. Thus, Zia's most reliable ally was bureaucracy in the governance of the country (Ahmed, 1995:124-125). Thus bureaucracy was a friend of the then government than to the citizens.

Ershad was the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) during his military rule. A council of advisers was appointed to assist the CMLA. The bureaucracy extended its support to Ershad regime during his nine-year rule and developed an unholy symbiotic alliance (Morshed, 1997:209). But in the wake of mass upsurge against authoritarian rule in the end of 1990, the bureaucracy manifested its dissent against the regime and thus involved overtly in politics. It should be noticed that the bureaucracy whose support helped Ershad regime to achieve stability the same members of bureaucracy revolted against him. It means, they served for Ershad but finally they were awakened when people revolted against the autocratic regime and they became part of the mass. People did not get the expected level of services from the government as well as the bureaucracy during this regime.

Within a few weeks of coming to power through a military coup, Lieutenant-General Ershad constituted the Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR). The purpose was to recommend an administrative system based on the spirit of devolution and the objectives of taking the administration nearer to the people. On June 29, 1989 the cabinet sub-committee headed by Deputy Prime Minister Professor Matin submitted its report to the President. On the basis of the recommendations of this report, the government decided to abolish the Senior Service Pool (SSP), which helped in removing longstanding grievances of officers who felt they had been deprived of the opportunity to ascend to secretariat job and considered SSP as a tool of discrimination (Hakim, 1991:18).

During Ershad regime civil service examinations were being held almost regularly. But the standard of test eroded and attracted mediocre youths. Status and merit started fading from the civil service. Political connections and affinity with ruling class, closeness to the chief executive rather than merit and competency appeared as the dominant criteria of promotion of civil servants during this regime (Rahman, 2002:55-6). At one stage, the government stopped all promotions for a prolonged period (Zafarullah, 1994:9). Moreover, during the initial years of martial law regime of Ershad, army officials dominated all the key policymaking and implementing institutions.

From the very beginning of Ershad regime he had been severely suffering from legitimacy crisis. No effective measure was adapted to hold the bureaucrats accountable. On the contrary, corruption became institutionalized during his rule. In process of manipulating and engaging all possible means to consolidate the regime's illegal power and position, bureaucracy played an instrumental role and developed an unholy symbiotic alliance (Morshed, 1997:209). Revival and consolidation of bureaucratic dominance was apparent

in the governance system. Their role may be characterized as allied partner of military/politicians and or negotiator (Rahman, 2002:58).

4.4. Democratic Regimes of Khaleda and Hasina:

After 1990, Bangladesh has reverted to parliamentary form of government. Two parliamentary elections were held during this period, which were believed to be free and fair. Parliament was relatively active during the regime of Khaleda and Hasina compared to earlier ones. Theoretically the country was under democratic regime but in practice citizens had bitter experience.

During the reign of Khaleda, initial dominance of politicians over the statecraft was a transient affair. Soon continued conflict and dissent between the position and opposition parties became intense and led to seemingly unending political stalemate and in the mean time, the dominant role in governance was passed on the hands of bureaucrats (Choudhury, 1998:274-275).

The Khaleda regime like its predecessors continues to maneuver bureaucracy for achieving its parochial objectives. In this process the bureaucracy has been politicized. Field administrators have played a key role in working on behalf of either of the two major parties in both national and local elections. The overt support by a section of bureaucracy for Awami League (AL), in its crusade against the democratically elected government, prior to the 1996 elections points to a very alarming trend. Even several of those civil servants who actively participated in anti-Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) movement were awarded with lucrative positions by the Awami league led government.

Bureaucracy played overt role in regime change. It is currently divided on party line. Career advancement seems to be dependent on the contentment of the incumbent government. Bureaucracy itself is beset with factionalism. As an institution it is on decay with waning elitism and esprit de corps.

Consequently bureaucracy is eager to develop a mutual dependency relation with the ruling elite (Rahman, 2002:59).

As a first step towards consolidating its political position it shuffled and reshuffled the entire administrative apparatus repeatedly in search of party sympathizers to install them in key positions of administration. However, politicians were the leading force of the governance system. They placed party loyalists in crucial position in civil service, appointed diehard supporters as key functionaries in Public Service Commission (PSC) with whose assistance the BCS (Bangladesh Civil Service) recruitment process was allegedly manipulated in favor of the candidates having links the ruling party and mass promotion of officers apparently submissive to the ruling regime(Rahman,2002:59).

During Hasina regime, the chairman and members of PSC had been politically appointed keeping an eye over their distinct political tinge. Quota for the freedom fighters has been made applicable for the children of freedom fighter family. This is an instance of disregard for merit principle in civil service. The standard of the recruitment examinations during these two regimes was moderate. A large number of civil servants were promoted several times on the basis of political affinity with the incumbent government. Seniority was utterly discarded on the issue of promotion let alone counting merit as one of the prime yardsticks of career advancement (Rahman, 2002:60).

With regard to administrative reform, the Hasina government only constituted a reform committee, which spared over three and a half years and defaulted to propose reforms that conformed to Good Governance Paradigm (GGP) as prescribed by World Bank and other external agencies. The pay scale of the civil servants was revised and increased twice during this regime. The reform committee made a number of recommendations on the rationalization and

reorganization of government offices and presented its report to AL government. But instead of implementing the recommendations the government constituted its own commission Public Administration Reforms Commission (PARC) almost entirely composed of bureaucrats. The commission submitted the report with 137 recommendations. Recommendations include among others the elimination of corruption and insurance of accountability at all levels. Of course the recommendations are yet to be implemented. The issue of accountability of civil servants began to be uttered officially during this regime. Unfortunately accountability was ensured in the administrative level but in the social level it was not even uttered, let alone the act of (Rahman, 2002:61).

Accountability of bureaucracy emerged as a matter of care by this time. Measures were taken to hold the bureaucrats accountable. Committee system was modified and its scope was broadened. The minister is appointed as the chief executive of the ministry and the Upazilla system has been reintroduced. The Upazilla chairman - an elected representative- was the chief executive officer of an Upazilla. This initiated a brake on bureaucratic dominance. Bureaucrats became development partners of the incumbent government. The ruling governments established some sort of control over the bureaucracy by regulating their career development. (Rahman, 2002:61).

But bureaucrats' influence on politicians remained evident during second regime of Khaleda led government. Apparently it was experienced that bureaucracy was highly politicized. A large number of officers were posted without any specific duty, many of them were deprived from due promotion on political ground and a large number of officers were sacked from job without any legal ground. They were suspected to be closely affiliated to the former Hasina led government.

4.5. Conclusion:

In post independent Bangladesh bureaucracy went through much experimentation. For achieving a well-structured institution such initiatives were necessary. But immature and biased political attitude, biasness of the rulers and bureaucrats for personal benefit, illegal ascendance to power and lack of visionary leadership did not let bureaucracy to grow in a systematic way. Moreover, politics of military rule indirectly worked against to transform bureaucracy into a disabled entity. They were against a competent bureaucracy because bureaucracy and political rulers are in vise versa position. Both the groups prefer to work with each other than the military. Moreover a competent bureaucracy possesses the competence to work in democratic environment. They can be trained to be friends of mass people. But the civil servants did not receive training to identify the real owner of their services and their stakeholder. Thus accountability of the bureaucracy though developed to some extent in the administrative level but it could not involve itself actively in the societal activities.

Chapter V

Bureaucracy in the age of globalization

5.1. Prologue:

Globalization has forced bureaucracy to redefine its role as one that encompasses the roles of catalyst, enabler, gatekeeper, consensus-builder, mediator, negotiator and specialist in a specific sector. It is the process of integrating economy, culture, technology and even the governance institutions of States. Thus globalization has led to the development of new roles, relationships and partnerships among government, citizens and business. It has heightened the influence of the public on governance policies and institutions. Nowadays citizens are achieving greater input into government decision-making, central governments are decentralizing to local government levels, and governments are partnering with the civil society and the private sector in the delivery of programs and services. As a consequence of such redefined roles and activities social accountability of bureaucracy has acquired a notable position in the society. This chapter is an attempt to focus on these challenges, which are being faced by bureaucracy in different parts of the globe and how they are reinventing their roles and services from social accountability perspective.

5.2 Role of Bureaucracy Redefined:

One of the most significant impacts of globalization has been the evolution of the traditional form of bureaucratic public administration into one based on a broader, more holistic concept of governance. The focus is on the interface of the public administration with civil society. In response to external pressure and internal demand, modern public administrations are no longer conceived of as insular systems with a uniform organizational structure under the command of one authority, but rather geared towards their 'public' with

organizational patterns and procedures adapted to specific client groups so as to promote effective service delivery. This shift connotes a conceptual change that emphasizes flexibility, responsiveness, pro-action and multi-sector partnerships that encourage transparency and accountability.

Thomas Friedman in his book 'The World is Flat' has stated that globalization requires a quality bureaucracy to channel, govern and enhance the creative energies of a country so that its people cannot only imagine new products and services but also bring them to life and take them to the market place. In this statement two paradigms are preeminent: a quality bureaucracy and creative energies (Kolapo, 2007:1). This generates the necessity of understanding and practicing good governance.

The term 'good governance' has acquired notable importance in the context of the developing countries. But most of the developing countries are still grappling to achieve the requirements of good governance. In these countries government and administration play both the roles of regulator and facilitator. Merilee S. Grindle points out that when determining their priorities and taking steps to ensure good governance, most developing countries go too far. They chalk out a plan or strategy far beyond the limited capacity of the institutions charged with implementation responsibilities. Grindle redefines 'Good Governance' as 'Good Enough Governance', as a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward (Jahan, 2006:1). Thus involvement of civil society opens the door for making bureaucracy accountable to the society.

Transformation of States through globalization has two effects. It has strained the traditional roles of all the players and the new challenges have strained the

capacity of governments and their non-government partners to deliver high quality public services (Kettl, 2000: 1). Increasingly, the State is called upon to act as linking pin of processes of planning, consultation, negotiation and decision-making involving diverse players, State and non-State, at different levels of governance. It is the hub of activities connecting multiple partners and stakeholders from very varied fields, activities, regions, cultures, professions and interests. The compact, pyramidal structures of public administration certainly do not sufficiently respond to its concerns and cannot meet its needs in an effective, timely and user-friendly fashion (UN, 2001: 30-1). Some may feel that the State as an institute is disappearing because it is loosing its solely owned kingdom. In fact, the State is not disappearing; it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts as an effect of globalization. Government institutions have formed networks of their own and creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new trans-governmental order. Emerging from 1970s trans-governmentalism is rapidly becoming the most widespread and effective mode of international governance (Slaughter, 1997: 184). It is nothing but the outcome of globalization.

5.3 Accountability and Globalization:

The standards of accountability have changed considerably under the current mode of public governance as an impact of globalization. Public servants were accountable for enhancing human progress, maintaining law and order, resolving poverty and unemployment, providing public welfare, ensuring impartiality and equal treatment, safeguarding citizen's rights and guaranteeing justice and fairness. But with the recent paradigmatic transition in the mode of public governance its objectives have shifted to economic growth and productivity and its normative standards have toward efficiency, competition, profit and value for money. Thus, under the current mode of governance the standards of public accountability have become instrumental in nature especially in terms of an overemphasis on procedural, economic

criteria rather than substantive public concerns. This is due to the redefinition of citizens as customers or clients receiving public sector services (Haque, 2000: 602). This is an indication of leading bureaucracy to become socially accountable.

Empowerment of the citizen also forms a major plank in the managerial platform. It is assumed that privatization, outsourcing of public services and de-bureaucratization are avenues that lead not only to greater citizen/consumer satisfaction, but also to more freedom and more complete democracy. Public servants were assigned direct responsibility for their conduct, not merely a derivative responsibility through their minister and parliament. Their accountability covers omissions as well as commissions, i.e., failure to act in order to stop a wrongdoing is also ensured through accountability. A whole new range of mechanisms has come into force to review and correct the decisions of public administrators, thereby ending the defense of compliance with instructions or merely following orders (UN, 2001: 37). Indeed, this newly emerging doctrine of administrative responsibility goes well beyond the bounds of public administration to the broad field of governance.

5.4 New Public Management and Governance Reforms:

The reforms initiated in the mid 1980s with the support and leadership of the Bretton Woods institutions introduced a new public administration paradigm and macro-economic policy framework. The outcome and legacy of New Public Management (NPM) or 'reinventing government' is an example of globalization at work. The term refers to a focus on management, on performance appraisal, on efficiency on disaggregating public bureaucracy into agencies which deal with each other on a user-pay basis, the use of quasi-markets and of contracting out to foster competition, cost-cutting and a style of management that emphasizes output targets, limited term contracts, monetary incentives

and freedom to manage (Devii, Rhodes & Weller, 2000: 1-2). It has redefined the identity of public administration as a profession and scholarly discipline. It has helped to alter the balance of power within administration, as well as between officials, media and civil society. It provides an object lesson about the nature and effects of globalization on governance in the opening decade of the twenty-first century. They proposed reform initiatives to reduce the scope of the State, downsize the public service, and promote deregulation and decentralization. Public sector efficiency and reduction in the public costs was accompanied by measures such as privatization, de-bureaucratization and the introduction of market-like mechanisms (UN, 2001: 33-5). It has been manifested in the uneven but observable decline of traditional authority structures, the flattening of hierarchies and the pressure from the people to have a voice and for that voice to count.

Public administration is the key institution for policy implementation. The state has to make sure that its administrative apparatus is functioning well, so that it can innovate and implement solutions and that it can ensure that the poor will not be excluded from the process and benefits of development. From the beginning of the 1990s, the role of government has changed from an intervener to a referee; instead of playing the game, its main duty is to make sure that a fair game is being played. This reinvented role of the government necessitates redefining the role of the bureaucracy (Jahan, 2006:2). 'Let the managers manage' has been the movement's slogan. In Osborne and Gaebler's bestseller on Reinventing Government (1992) and other writings, the 'entrepreneurial manager' is lionized, in contrast to the stereotyped and maligned conventional 'bureaucrat' (UN, 2001: 36). The profile is consistent with the promotion of a new prototype: hard-nosed and business-like, but also proactive, creative, focused on tasks, results-oriented, but friendly to the public.

Bureaucracy can be considered as an 'open' system that interacts with or is affected by the environment in which it operates. Traditionally, this

environment consisted of only the domestic economic, political and social context within which the organization is located.' Now, however, 'public organizations are more often faced with global threats and opportunities that affect their operations and perspectives' (Jahan, 2006:2). The performance of a public organization depends largely on how the domestic political institution handles global pressures as well as how it interacts with the bureaucracy.

Despite the reform efforts the citizen's perception of the public servants and the quality of the service they provide is negative. Various surveys indicate that citizens consider the public service as 'over centralized, unaccountable, inefficient, overpaid, coercive, unethical, and rent seeking' (Zafarullah, 1997). Individual encounters with officials brought 'unnecessary harassment, procrastination in deciding simple problems, discourteous and arrogant behavior, keeping customers waiting for hours before attending to their needs, frequent absence from office, not maintaining appointments, ignoring pleas for reconsideration of a problem, unwilling to correct mistakes, and making unabashed approaches for pecuniary benefits'.

An annual study that gives an insight into how well the bureaucracy of a country is functioning is the Doing Business Report, a widely acknowledged report prepared by the World Bank. 'Doing Business Report' shows that it takes a whopping 102 days to register a property in Nigeria, whereas it takes just 28 days to do the same in any of the developed Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The indicators also show that the administrative burden that is associated with the payment of taxes is outrageously high. Whereas only 183 hours are spent preparing, filing and paying taxes by an entrepreneur in an OECD country, the Nigerian entrepreneur spends a mind-boggling 1,120 hours (Kolapo, 2007:3).

A. New Zealand, UK, U.S.A and the EU countries:

The highly developed, democratic, stable and prosperous countries have been hosts to major reform movements, which may be considered as the principal exponents of the New Public Management (NPM) movement. In these countries transparency, accountability and public service integrity made a powerful comeback partly due to pressures from the public to put an end to a tradition of secretiveness and lack of transparency. 'Putting the people first' became the theme of New Public Management systems; bringing the government closer to the public, treating people as valued customers, and also making government officials less remote and more responsive, but also less bureaucratic and more entrepreneurial and results-oriented was widely practiced. To achieve these goals different countries have taken certain steps like the following:

Country	Initiatives
United States of America	The adoption of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) by the United States Congress was a leading step in this direction. In it, Congress prescribed consultation and planning to identify agency and program goals and annual reporting on performance.
New Zealand	Privatization of delivery of public welfare services was initiated by New Zealand
United Kingdom	The UK identified five commitments like policymaking, responsive and quality public service, information age government and public service ethics.
European Commission	The European Union (EU) countries have emphasized on 'output over process', 'lean government', 'value for money',

Country	Initiatives
	but equally on 'professionalism and customer orientation'. With increasing stress on openness has also come reliance on networks, national and international, and partnerships with non-state actors, with private enterprises and other civil society organizations

B. The Eastern and Central Europe:

In barely a decade, the Eastern and Central European countries have attempted a transition in four major phases that are transformation, consolidation, modernization and adaptation. In the initial period, the overall conditions were marked by volatility and rapid change, the end of the decade brought with it indications of growing consolidation in most of the countries concerned. This highlights the emergence of a new triangular relationship between State, the private and business sector and the individual, together with the rise of an active civil society and the expansion of the private sector. The sum of transformations is redefining the nature, the structures and the tasks of public administration in Eastern and Central Europe. The retreat of the State from the economy i.e. from direct production of goods and services and the demise of the one party rule and democratic centralism are drastically altering the structures, methods, processes and operations of the public administration, making new demands on public servants. To meet these needs, public servants, at all levels, are challenged to develop a new configuration of competencies, skills, of attitudes and values (Bertucci & Jemai: 9, 11).

C. African Experiences:

The reforms initiated in the African countries in the mid 80's stressed on maintaining macroeconomic stability, avoiding deficit spending, and

drastically reducing the size and scope of government. But soon it became apparent that the macro-economic adjustment and stabilization policies were not sufficient to address the fundamental problems of governance and public management, which were political and institutional in nature. In recent years, the evolution has been reversed. The focus has now shifted from retrenchment and downsizing to capacity building for effective resource management and quality service delivery, financial accountability and smart government. Few countries, so far such as Botswana and the Gambia, have taken initial steps and moved towards the concept of "smart government" by beginning the consultative process, articulating the national long-term vision and strategic framework for development. Yet, in most Sub-Saharan Africa, the promise of public sector reform remains largely unfulfilled. Retrenchment and downsizing the government was not an easy task in Africa where government is the single largest employer for most of the countries. Capacity reinforcement is the common thread that runs through current programs of public service reforms in countries like Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda and Mozambique. Democratization, decentralization, devolution of responsibility, service delivery improvement and local government reform are the major components of the reform drive. Available evidence indicates that the results are yet mixed (Bertucci & Jemai: 11-2).

D. Latin American Experiences:

In Latin America, the 1990's have been marked by extensive reforms through democratization, de-bureaucratization and reduction of the scope of State intervention, privatization and opening to the global market. Deregulation and de-bureaucratization went hand in hand with a process of decentralization, delegation of authority and devolution of power to lower levels of government and actors in civil society. This paradigmatic shift is gradually transforming a closed, inward-looking, rule-bound and formalistic administration into a more open system. The new system is more responsive to citizen's demands, accepts

looks for partnerships to accomplish objectives in close collaboration with private sector groups and aims at value for money. A major declared objective of reform in most of Latin America was the redefinition of the functions of the state and therefore, its relation with civil society. What has been sought was to circumscribe the functions of the state in the economic sector, to reinforce the technical administrative and organizational capacities of the public sector and to enhance the effectiveness of the institutional framework of government for the establishment of norms and their enforcement in partnership with civil society (Bertucci & Jemai:12).

E. The Asian Experiences

Asia combines a group of nations with enormous racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, economic, political and religious diversity. One commonality that singles them out is a long and strong tradition of State Administration. In Asia, corruption is viewed as a way of life, political factor in the management of public sector, growing influence of religion and traditional values in politics and administration, human deprivation in South Asia, and the global impact of the public management movement. The bureaucracy has in general responded well in time of crisis. All this gives hope for further improvements in the style of governance, administration and management.

Country	Initiatives
Singapore	Singapore has gained a reputation for experimenting with new initiatives in public sector management involving selecting, borrowing and modification of foreign models while simultaneously pursuing domestic innovations. The purpose of these reforms was to establish a government that is stable, effective, efficient, incorruptible and business-oriented. Singapore began experimenting with NPM initiatives as early as

	<p>the 1980s. The launch of the 'Public Service for the 21st Century Initiative' (PS 21) in 1995 was a major initiative intended to create a new culture of excellence and continuous improvement. A special government scholarship scheme has been introduced at the university level to recruit the best available people in the public sector. Higher rank officials are paid the highest remuneration in the world as a long-term investment for a corruption free environment. Privatization has not been a priority rather it has introduced corporatization under public ownership (Samaratunge, Alam & Teicher, 2008:29).</p>
China	<p>China is the country with the oldest administrative heritage in the world. The traditional Chinese bureaucracy consisted of educated and highly motivated elite of scholar-administrators. China launched its government downsizing campaign in 1998. The goal is to streamline government staff nationwide by 50 percent over three years. Reform in localities is more than streamlining; it also aims at changing the functions of the government in the context of the market-oriented economy. In terms of perfecting the civil service system, new approaches like, transparency, publicity of promotion prior to appointment, admonishment, commitment, responsibility of first consultation, responsibility of recruiting incompetent persons, maximum tenure at one post, post adjustment due to poor performance, are explored in provincial governments. The state council attaches great importance to the training of civil servants, which includes: new employee training, qualification training, knowledge refreshment training and specialized training. The accountability mechanism for civil servants was set up in 1998</p>

Country	Initiatives
	<p>through the "Rules on Implementing Accountability on Ethics and Conduct". As part of the institutional reform, local governments are encouraged to use administrative cost control approach. Intermediary organizations or the NGOs are playing an important role in promoting the market economy in China. NGOs and private sectors are getting increasingly involved in some traditional public services like education and other community services. Though significant progress has been made in public administrative reform in China, bureaucracy and overlapping government functions still exist (Bertucci & Jemiai: 15).</p>
Cambodia	<p>After three decades of conflict, the Royal Government of Cambodia considers the need for reshaping the public administration, downsizing and restructuring the civil service as an integral part of state's reform priorities. To this end, a National Program of Administrative Reform (NPAR) has been officially endorsed for the period 1999- 2003. To achieve the NPAR objectives initiatives were taken to improve public services, increase credibility and accessibility of civil servants, modernize civil service management and create highly skilled and motivated civil servants to lead central administration (Bertucci & Jemiai, 19).</p>
Bangladesh	<p>In a country like Bangladesh, where global pressure is eminent and the domestic political institutions are ill structured, the colonial legacy places the bureaucracy in a difficult position. As globalization or market liberalization changes both the domestic</p>

	<p>context and the functioning of the bureaucracy, it is possible—but not necessarily desirable—that the two primary state institutions, politics and bureaucracy, forge an alliance (Jahan, 2006:2). To meet the demands of a changing society, government tried to reform the administrative system. Successive governments appointed as many as fifteen administrative reform commissions and committees. Each tried to change the administrative system to make it more dynamic, efficient and representative. Two of them, Administrative and Services and Reorganization Commission (ASRC) and Committee for Administrative Reform and Reorganization (CARR) went beyond ‘the domain of the traditional administrative system and pleaded for democratization of administration and devolution of power to elected local governments’ (Ahmed, 2002: 336-37). However, most of the recommendations of the reform committees were never implemented; in a few cases, the recommendations were implemented in a modified form.</p>
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Conclusion:

Redefining the role of the State in light of globalization is in fact a tough task to do. Sovereignty of the State should also be protected along with global pressure to adjust with change. It should be kept in mind that good government and governance must be a firm belief and needs to be continuously practiced. Public Sector Reform is not a new phenomenon brought about by the process of globalization rather a change for sustainability. The objective is to create an atmosphere that motivates officials to respond to the challenges of government by adhering to the notion of duty and service to the community, as well as taking responsibility for the welfare of others. The United Nations former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the UN

21st Century Action Plan, a detailed report that sets the agenda for the Nations Millennium Summit, addresses globalization and governance as the first key area. He states that 'the challenge is clear: if we are to capture the promises of globalization while managing its adverse effects, we must learn to govern better, and we must learn how to govern better together'. Thus it is the prime duty of the bureaucrats to be well equipped to enable them to be competent to establish better governance in the country and embrace change and globalization.

Social Accountability of Bangladesh Bureaucracy

6.1 Prologue:

Responsible and democratic government can play a vital role to ensure accountability of civil servants. In general, civil servants are accountable to their superiors or the controlling authorities. But globalization has identified another perspective of accountability, which has been named as social accountability. It is the outcome of pro-accountability reform activities, which propose to involve societal actors to ensure accountability of bureaucracy. In fact, social accountability is interconnected with the issues of responsible governance, citizen empowerment, social development and effectiveness as well as with service delivery to citizens. Globalization has necessitated the changing in every formats of people's life and expected to see a quality civil service in operation. Rearranging, redesigning and redefining the duties and activities of bureaucracy are being hammered by globalization. Citizens have become the prime spokesman of all services; their satisfaction is the ultimate goal of service providers. To ensure citizen satisfaction Civil Service has to change its characteristics to be well acquainted with the changing needs of upcoming days.

6.2 Road to Social Accountability:

Bureaucracy is an instrument of development and social change. Apart from regular activities it works for policy implementation to ensure economic and social progress, which is possible through increased people's participation and ultimately leading to ensure social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh. To attain this objective bureaucracy must be equipped with the appropriate dexterity, temperament and attitude. Currently Bangladesh

Bureaucracy is taking sincere initiatives to change their attitude and identity with pro- people activities and responsive attitudes. Still they need to work more to achieve citizen satisfaction. The Government of Bangladesh has taken some initiatives, which may be identified as positive attempts to travel on the highway of Social accountability. These attempts are as the following ones:

6.2.1. Pre Budget Talk:

Bangladesh is emphasizing on citizens view in the governance issues. Budget is one of the prime instruments of public expenditure. It is notable that the government is arranging pre-budget talks with different sections of the society to consider their inputs in the final budget. In recent years the Finance Minister/Adviser of the Caretaker government hold discussions with stakeholders before framing the national budget. Civil society actors, business community, educationists, scholarly personnel and economists are invited in the talks to consult with them and share upcoming budget issues. It ensures social accountability of public expenditure. Citizen scorecard, practicing participatory budgeting and social auditing are useful instruments for social accountability in practice. Bangladesh is a new participant in this wave.

6.2.2. Civil Society Advocacy:

The government is coming up with its policies based on the citizen's expectations and desire. For example, Citizens Advocacy played a vital role to formulate 'National Women Development Policy' in February 2008. The women activists working in the country advocated this policy. Women are almost 50% of the total population but they are neglected in some vital areas. In order to bring about a change in the scenario Bangladesh signed the *Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)* in 1984. Though the government was pressured by some religious extremist groups not to pass such policy, but the government took into account the international obligation

as well as women. Candidates are encouraged to apply for any of the positions in the civil service and at least ten percent positions are preserved for female candidates. Parents are being encouraged to educate their daughters and in the village areas female students are awarded scholarships and free schooling, and college level education to enhance their voice. Women are given opportunity by the governance system in a scattered way; however, it shows that government is becoming socially accountable to women rights day by day.

6.2.3. Tax Ombudsman:

Citizens are the taxpayers of the country and they have every right to know how their taxes are calculated. They are also entitled to sue if they feel aggrieved at the amount fixed for payment. So the government has appointed Tax Ombudsman to hear their grievance and provide remedy. If implemented citizens' access to Tax Ombudsman will ensure credibility of the tax collected from the citizens. This has created some kind of social accountability of the civil servants involved in this job.

6.2.4. National Integrity Strategy Paper:

Asian Development Bank, in 2007-'08, funded for formulation of National Integrity Strategy Paper in Bangladesh. Institute of Governance Studies (IGS), a research group under BRAC University, provided technical assistance for preparing the paper. The Cabinet Division played lead role in accomplishing the project. This is a positive sign of changed role of the government and partnering to ensure social accountability of bureaucracy. While working the IGS research group received support from the focused groups and from different ministries. The draft paper has been accepted by the Cabinet Division in October 2008 and now awaiting for the approval of upcoming parliament.

6.2.5. Election Commission:

experienced a well accepted, free and fair 9th National Parliamentary Election held on 29th December 2008. According to *The Daily Star* a widely circulated newspaper published on the election day the Election Commission (EC) has allowed 3,55,000 local and 673 foreign observers to observe the election. Both domestic and foreign observers commented that the said election took place in a credible, free and fair manner. Nevertheless, BNP led four party alliance rejected the results questioning the integrity of the Election Commission. Election Commissions role in preserving people's right is an important issue to ensures government's sincerity in keeping the commitment towards social accountability of the civil servants.

6.2.6. Separation of Judiciary:

Neutral and timely justice is the right of a citizen. The government has been sincere enough in separating the judiciary from the administration. As it was mandatory in Bangladesh Constitution to separate judiciary from administration so the government was keen to preserve citizens right and worked actively. Empowerment of the courts ensures peoples' right and ensures social accountability.

6.2.7. National Identification Card:

Citizens are the ultimate owner of a country. They preserve the power and they elect whoever fits their desire. They have voting right but they did not have any well-accepted document to prove their nationality. The government has recently distributed National ID Card declaring the identity, which will mitigate many of their difficulties in getting government services.

6.2.8. Life-Style Checks by Government Officials:

The government has introduced mandatory submission of life style check by the government officials to control corruption in bureaucracy. They are bound

to submit their list of properties. The government holds the right to investigate at any time to ensure accountability of government servants.

6.2.9. Mandatory Submission of Tax Returns:

Government has declared mandatory submission of tax returns by government officials to ensure accountability of their properties. These Tax Returns will reflect the wealth information of a civil servant. If anybody submits wrong declaration of properties he/she will be held accountable for such declaration. This will contribute to impede them from corrupt earnings.

6.2.10. Government Websites:

Government has introduced websites of each ministry/division/department to create access for all citizens to get information whenever they desire. Each website will provide information about ongoing projects, application forms for service delivery systems, update of the government action in the related sectors and receive citizen's comments on any of the actions being taken by the government.

6.2.11. Press Release:

Government always keeps the citizens in touch. Information is disseminated according to their requirement. Sometimes situations arise to inform the nation about some burning issue. In such situations the government gives 'press release' to inform the citizens and removes anomalies of information. This is a widely used instrument of social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh.

6.2.12. Private Radio & Television Channels:

Democracy ensures right to voice. Government Radio and Television centers sometimes do not telecast right or actual information. Sometimes they are

Bangladesh Government has permitted more than ten private Television station and Radio to operate and telecast and transmit information to citizens as early as any incidence takes place. Their right to telecast information is preserved by themselves; government does not impose any embargo on them. Coverage of the 9th National parliamentary Election by private television channels ensured governments' accountability in a wide extent.

6.2.13. Citizen Charter:

Citizen charter is an instrument for disclosure of what the civil servants are doing. It is a list of services, which are provided by a certain office. Earlier people did not clearly know where they should go to get a service. As a result a third party came into being in a role of helping them and got illegally benefited and sometimes people had to be harassed or pay more fees than was actually needed. They used to buy defame for government officials in lieu of their benefits. Government of Bangladesh has ordered mandatory publication of Citizen Charter by each authority. It has ensured information of where citizens should go to get a certain category of information. It also provides the time span of a specific category of service. As a result, citizens need not to move blindly to get a certain type of service. This has opened scope for access of citizens to the governance system.

6.2.14. Anti-Corruption Drive:

The government has established an active Anti-Corruption Commission. The Commission went on drastic action against corrupt politicians as well as Government Officers. As a result a positive reaction is being seen among the civil servants as well as among the citizens. They are behaving consciously not to bribe anybody. Oversight of corruption is being active and both the parties of corrupt actions are in a weak position in the country. This will ensure development ethics among the civil servants.

6.2.16. Regulations: Bangladesh has been a colony of the British rulers. The existing rules and regulations were formed during those periods. As a result almost all the existing laws, rules and regulations can be used to rule citizens rather than serving them. Present pro-people attitude of the government has compelled them to form a Regulatory Reforms Commission to update the age-old laws, rules and regulations and propose amendments to use them to provide better services for the citizens.

6.2.16. National Human Rights Commission:

A person possesses certain rights at birth; human right is one of them. It is very unfortunate that human right is being violated in the World even in the developed countries. Human rights activists are working to stand by those victims. But they are not that much powerful, well organized, financially solvent to support the victims. They do not also get all the information of violation of human rights in time. So they fail to serve up to expected level, as it is needed. Bangladesh Government has taken positive step to preserve human rights and support victims of human rights violation. The Human Rights Commission came into operation on 2nd December 2008 to ensure human rights, which will ultimately contribute to rights of the citizens.

6.2.17. SLGD Project:

Local government is a highly viable mechanism through which democratic processes and practices can be established and participatory development can be ensured. Sirajgonj Local Governance Development (SLGD) Project was a program of local government reform in 1997. SLGDP aimed at increasing responsive and accountable service delivery capacity of Union Parishad (UP). The project has been successful in providing power to local people and initiated development from below. The project was implemented and monitored by certain committees like Union Development Coordination Committee

(WDC), Union Development Committee (UDC), Union Facilitation Team (UFT) and Women Development Forum (WDF). Prime emphasis of the project was to allocate performance based funds and promotion of participatory planning and budgeting. It ultimately made Union Parishads to depart from their role of bureaucratic authority and ensured accountability of UPs. The outcome of the project encouraged initiation of ongoing 'Local Governance Support Project' (LGSP) under Local Government Division of Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development & Cooperatives and ultimately contributing to reduce bureaucratic authority in UPs and enhance peoples' participation in UP operation.

6.2.18. Training the Civil Servants:

Bangladesh government is keenly interested in training the civil servants to improve their quality and nurture them to become competent enough to meet the expectation of citizens of the 21st century. As part of such initiative the government in 2005 allowed Institute of governance Studies (IGS) under BRAC University to arrange competitive admission tests for mid-level civil servants and offer scholarship for them to study in governance discipline and develop their competence. In 2007, a similar program has been developed by the North South University to train the Civil Servants. These are notable instances of public-private partnership in training the Civil Servants.

6.2.19. Right to Information Ordinance 2008:

To ensure transparency in civil service the Government has issued 'Right to Information Ordinance' 2008 on 20th October 2008, which has ensured citizens right, guided by law and possess the authority to know whatever they desire. Section 10 of the ordinance has ensured compulsory nomination of a specific officer who will be responsible for providing information to the citizens

forward for enhanced social accountability of Bureaucracy in Bangladesh.

6.3 More Areas of Intervention:

Institutionalization of civil society engagement is necessary to ensure social accountability of Bangladesh Bureaucracy. As apprentice of the British rulers civil servants of Bangladesh has been experienced in dominating the people rather than serving them. This is the legacy of training and orientation of those rulers. According to Allen Schick (1998) developing countries should take into account three factors to improve government operations: parallel advancement of public sector and informal market development, reliable external control on public sector and concentration of both politicians and government officials on the basic process of public management (Schick, 1998: 129,130). In fact, conceptual development of citizens' rights has changed the expectation of citizens to the government as well as to the civil servants. They demand for social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh for better governance and institutionalized democracy. To acquire such quality government needs to intervene in the following areas:

a. Political Commitment:

In Bangladesh people are politics conscious, although most of them have their political biasness. It has become a strong barrier against neutral attitude of both civil servants as well as politicians. Impersonal attitude is the prime condition to be a civil servant. It is also expected that politicians in power will behave neutrally as they take oath at the time of ascending to power. But unfortunately they fail to behave the way they should do. It is very important that political people are committed to citizens to serve for them and civil servants are bound to act in a way that their activities do not reflect any kind of biasness. So, both the politicians and the bureaucrats must act remaining within the lawful boundaries. Politicians should not compel bureaucrats to be

also act according to service conditions, to act neutrally and refrain from being personally benefited from the power they hold. This will enable them to enhance their quality, encourage them to be committed to their duties and develop as socially accountable members of Bangladesh bureaucracy.

b. Redesigning bureaucracy:

Bangladesh civil service is the sibling of an eight-century-old ancestor. From the late 18th century bureaucracy was designed according to the needs of the British rulers to rule the colony and it is still carrying the burden of those days. But present generation are the children of the 21st century. Their expectations are far different from the service quality of previous bureaucracy. Time has come to redesign Bangladesh bureaucracy to match with changing needs of the day. A big-headed bureaucracy is no more required by the citizens of current days. Technology has reduced the necessity of over burdened bureaucracy and expects slim bureaucracy of quality. Redesigning would involve right sizing of central government and enlarging scope for local government, private sector and Non government Organizations (NGOs). Quality bureaucracy can understand demands of the citizens and serve according to their expectation. Whenever bureaucracy will be able to meet citizens' expectation, their accountability to the society will be ensured.

c. Simplification of Government:

Bangladesh Bureaucracy is tied by too many age-old rules and regulations. Though most of the civil servants are patriotic, responsive and willing to serve the citizens according to their demands but they are tied by those rules and regulations. But globalization prioritizes service and citizen satisfaction. So, existing government rules and regulations needs to be simplified to ensure faster service delivery and decentralized administration. The Public Administration Efficiency Study (PAES) thoroughly examined the organization

present administration is inconsistent with dynamism due to existing rules and regulations, which need to be, simplified (Zafarullah, 1998:101). It needs to be mentioned that the immediate past Caretaker government was keen about administrative decentralization and delegation of power. For example, they decided to hold Upazila election to ensure peoples' representation in the tier of Upazila administration. In a recent circular dated 17 November 2008 Ministry of Establishment has delegated some issues of administrative decisions to the divisional headquarter and district administration like approval authority of earned leave and maternity leave, disposal of pension related issues which will ensure speeded up service delivery to the citizens. These are some of the positive trends that one might foresee towards attaining social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh.

d. Curbing Corruption:

Corruption is a curse for Bangladesh Bureaucracy and curbing corruption is one of the instruments of good governance. Corruption generates greed among the civil servants. It creates unequal standards of life among them. As a result, honest civil servants become psychologically demoralized to serve up to the highest level of their ability. It is said that politicians use civil servants as instrument of corruption. It is also true that some of the civil servants act corruptly under the veil of political corruption. Enhancement of ethics can reduce corrupt mentality. Present government has activated the Anti Corruption Commission, which is taking drastic actions against corrupt politicians and civil servants.

e. Responsive to the civil society:

Bangladesh civil service is the descendent of British civil service. After so many reform initiatives they are still motivated by the deep-rooted colonial attitudes. They are not always responsive to the citizen up to the expected

level. They often in certain situations. They must change their attitude and be responsive to the citizens to become socially accountable.

f. Representative Bureaucracy:

The theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that organizations perform better if their workforces reflect the characteristics of their constituent population. They argue that organizations will be more responsive to the public if they reflect the demographic characteristics of those they serve. In fact internal organizational management is important to tap into underused talent in the workforce in order to enhance and improve the quality and effectiveness of civil services (Andrews, Boyne, Meier, O'Toole & walker, 2005:490,491). Bangladesh as a poor country is unable to pay necessary amount of remuneration and expected facilities to the civil servants. So, certain civil service cadres, which are service providers can be recruited motivated by the notion of 'representative bureaucracy'. Benefit of such recruitment would be in two ways. These people can reflect the needs of their locality; contribute in policy formulation and live a solvent life by the remuneration they are getting.

g. Open Budget Session:

Open budget system is one of the vital instruments of ensuring social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh. Union Parishad (UP) is one of the root level administrative units of Bangladesh. Basically UP is headed by an elected body consisting nine general members, three reserved seat female members, which is headed by a chairman. This people's represented organization is run under government rules and regulation, supervised by Deputy Commissioner (DC) of the concerned district. It means that UP is run under supervision and through involvement of bureaucracy. Earlier a 'one-way budgeting system' was practiced by the UPs, which was prepared by the UP

Secretary (a regular official) the DC for approval. The bureaucracy alone practiced the authority to approve the proposed budget or redesign the allocations. People had no access into the budgeting process. The UP was not accountable to citizens for expenditure of their taxes. As a result, people were reluctant to pay due taxes. Open budget system will create opportunity for tax payer citizens to be directly involved in the decision making process of expending their own money, which will increase social accountability of civil servants in the other way around.

h. Recruitment Standard:

Bureaucracy works as the skeleton of a government and it must be strong enough to be able to carry the weight of the government. This strength depends on quality of their recruits. Qualified people have the knowledge of judging any event and they possess the ability to respond according to their stakeholders. To ensure recruitment standards the immediate past Caretaker government has formed competent Public Service Commission (PSC), which was able to successfully hold the Preliminary Test of the 27th B.C.S. recruitment examination without any defame. This will also contribute in reducing corruption in bureaucracy. As a constitutional body PSC is accountable to the citizens and their recruitment standard would ensure social accountability of bureaucracy in the upcoming days in Bangladesh.

i. Transparency in Practice:

Only a mirror can reflect the real picture of an object because it is made of glass. There is nothing as transparent as glass. Civil service needs to work as transparently as glass to enhance the level of social accountability. Transparent activities will enhance acceptance of the civil servants to the citizens. It is impossible to satisfy all the citizens but transparent action ensures level of satisfaction in a citizen, as a result people do not feel aggrieved. For uniform transparent action by all sectors of civil service the

transparency in bureaucracy.

j. Open Structured Civil Service:

Civil servants are accountable to the citizens as they are the servants of the government. The government is also accountable to the citizens. This is a cyclic procedure. But in practice, they forget their liability because once they are recruited they feel sure that it is very difficult to remove them from service. So they remain careless about citizen satisfaction. An open structured civil service is necessary to reduce reluctant attitude of existing civil servants and ensure standards of quality service. Open structured civil service will create scope for quality recruitment at any level as necessary to provide better services and satisfactory outcome of an ongoing project or implementation of a government policy.

k. Gender Balance:

Patriarchal society is prevalent in Bangladesh. Though almost fifty percent of the citizens are female, still they are left behind due to the existing social structure. Women participation in civil service is very low if we count its percentage. As a result, their voice is hardly heard in policy formulation level. It indicates that almost half of the citizens are ignored from social accountability perspective. To enhance the rate of social accountability of bureaucrats', increase of gender balance needs to be taken care of. So, a balanced voice of citizens can be heard in the policy formulation procedure and reform in the bureaucracy can be balanced.

l. Improve Customer relations:

Meeting the needs of the citizens is the prime concern of globalization. Under the changed reality the needs of the customers are given top most priority. Enhanced satisfaction of the customer is the indicator of measuring good

Customer satisfaction upgrades the acceptance of an institution. So civil servants must treat the citizens as customers and improve customer relationship. This practice should be in their motivation in order to upgrade their quality and social acceptance.

m. Cooperation with Private Sector:

Globalization has created scope for non-government sector to involve in the development activities. The government is not expected to do the entire job as earlier. Because globalization has brought the countries closer and multinational companies are expanding from one country to another. So, the government must shift from the role of actor to the role of facilitator. It must facilitate to create room for private sector to expand and let them create job market for this weak economy. Social accountability will then leave a leaner central government to shoulder those tasks which only government can do. Reduction of liability of government will ensure better service delivery and quality output.

n. E-governance in Practice:

Social accountability is about involving citizens in the service delivery procedure. Citizens in Bangladesh are always kept in darkness from being informed. Web-based information dissemination process is one of the best-practiced procedures in involving citizens in any kind of activities. So, introduction of e-based activities is necessary in involving the citizens in Bangladesh. The practice of e-government is thus necessary for ensuring social accountability.

o. Introduction of Citizen Scorecard:

Citizen scorecard is an instrument of gathering comments from the citizens. Citizens can put their comments based on the services they are being provided

higher officials for performance analysis. This is a useful instrument to enhance rate of service delivery, accountability and quality of civil servants. In the study of social accountability in different countries this instrument is being widely used by the researchers.

Conclusion:

Social accountability spokesmen advocate for citizen's involvement in policy formulation and governance issues. As a colony of the British rulers and weaker part of the then Pakistan, citizens were always under estimated and undermined. They were always used as instrument of ascending to power but none judged them as the owner of ultimate power. Citizen's welfare was neglected and civil servants felt that they are recruited to serve the rulers not the people. Time has come to change this type of attitude and evaluate the citizens properly. For such attitudinal development established instruments of social accountability needs to be practiced in Bangladesh bureaucracy.

Citizen scorecard, community scorecard, practicing participatory budgeting, participatory planning process and social auditing are useful instruments for social accountability in practice. Bangladesh is a new participant in this wave. Democratic trend in Bangladesh is on the way of its replacement. It is expected that citizen voice will be the one and only power of democracy, which will rule, in the coming days. Established democratic rule will ultimately depend on implementation of citizen voice for better governance. Though social accountability has not yet been incorporated as a tool of good governance still both these issues are interrelated. As long as good governance is ensured social accountability of bureaucracy will be established in Bangladesh.

Thoughts of Conclusion

Social accountability is about constructive partnership between the state and the citizens within lawful options. It leads to empowerment of the citizens specially the weaker section of the population. Citizens are mobilizing around the world demanding better services by counting, not by shouting. Better governance can offer better services to the citizens. As we know that governance is as old as government. As a central element of democracy it maintains public sector resources under some degree of political control and develops strategies to sustain the government's capacity to act. Governance of a government is well accepted when it creates environment for involving the citizens in a transparent manner. Thus better governance ensures better services by the government, which ultimately ensures better feedback for the civil servants.

Social accountability is still a new concept in Bangladesh. Some of the social researchers, academicians, civil society activists and students of social studies and governance studies have heard it till date. Though it emphasizes on empowering citizen voice in policy formulation and policy implementation the concept is still unknown to the stakeholders. Citizens are not empowered enough to feel the power they hold. In fact, traveling from Mughal rule through the British regime, Pakistan period and even in independent Bangladesh governments did not sincerely work to empower the citizens.

The overwhelming majority civil servants suffer from an unpredictable mixture of what Jyanto Kumar Roy in "A Plea for an Alternative Bureaucracy" calls as Vowel vices: apathy (A), evasiveness (E), Incompetence (I), obstructionism (O), and urge for unwarranted power (U) (Pant & Gupta, 1990:172). An ordinary

to confront 'vowel vices' unless he deals by chance with an exceptional agency or with one of the few extraordinary conscientious persons in a normal agency. A common citizen may not experience the impact of these vices if he has access to Minister or friendship with civil servants and he is not averse to using these contacts (Pant & Gupta, 1990:173). The scenario is nothing different in Bangladesh. It is of negative culture being practiced in countries including Bangladesh.

To some extent it is also true that the ethos of the civil service after independence, changed from welfare-orientation in the late 1940s to development-orientation between the 1960s and 1980s, and finally to the facilitator's role in the 1990s. The independence of the country posed new challenges to the civil servants. They were no more expected to perform the role of a police state. The welfare of the citizens was viewed as the central task to be performed by the state, and hence they were to be an instrument of carrying out welfare functions which, among other things, included the settlement of refugees and providing minimum conditions for their day-to-day living, safeguarding the national borders from external aggression, and promoting conditions responsible for internal peace. But the public opinion about civil servants is that they are status quoists and are no-change agents. They lack innovativeness, initiative, empathy, and drive for change. The civil servants hold exactly a different view of themselves. The sense of mission held by civil servants is a mixed bag of compliance, cooperation, policy responsiveness, constitutional responsiveness, and guidance. Guided by such forces and some of them as citizens of current days feel to change the existing role and want to be responsive and practice pro-people attitude.

Poverty eradication is the prime duty of the Government in Bangladesh. Citizens would be satisfied if they experience to see the organs of the

Table' for attacking poverty involving both government officials and the civil society representatives would bear better feedback. The objective is to institutionalize the participation of civil society in the design, decision-making and the control of poverty related programs.

Policy formulation is a national task. Government organs operate it. 'Top down' policy formulation process is practiced in Bangladesh. Most of the policies are formulated based on theoretical knowledge. In many cases these policies does not fit our socio-economic condition. Ultimate result is misuse of public money, which we cannot afford at all. For feasible policy formulation and involvement of indigenous knowledge input practical bottom up initiatives needs to be included along with equally important top down initiatives.

Government Offices in Bangladesh have already prepared Citizen Charters, which is a positive sign towards social accountability. But publication of such Citizen Charters is not enough, it should be made public and people should be given the chance, authority and scope to comment on existing Citizen Charters. The ultimate target would be to create opportunity for them to allow them to reset the exiting one for better services.

Some Government projects like Sirajgonj Local Governance Development (SLGD) Project have been successful using social accountability instruments. They have practiced open budget sessions, participatory planning and participatory budgeting processes. The ultimate outcome is positive. It indicates they are not foreign to our society and cultural system. These instruments are applicable in our country. Experience of SLGD Project is being used in the ongoing Local Governance Support Project (LGSP) of Local Government Division under Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development

community in the governance process.

Establishment of active Anti-Corruption Commission, National Human Rights Commission, formulation of National Women Development Policy, issuance of Right to Information Ordinance 2008 reflects the positive will of Bangladesh Government to establish transparent administration through which social accountability of bureaucracy in Bangladesh will proceed. Moreover, accountability of the civil servants will be ensured through submission of life-style checks, declaration of properties through mandatory submission of Tax Returns, Independent judiciary, Tax Ombudsman in action and information dissemination through Government websites.

Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) seductive slogan that governments should focus more on steering and less on rowing (Peters & Pierre, 1998: 231), must be internalized by Bangladesh Government. As a poor country citizen's expectation is high on part of the Government. But they are less capable due to scarcity of resources. It is better to change the existing role of the government and be motivated by the slogan. Outsourcing and public-private partnership is a better way out. This will lessen the burden of the Government and create scope to perform up to mark and meet citizens expectations.

Social accountability speaks on behalf of the citizens, which is allowed only in democratic countries. To ensure bureaucratic accountability through bureaucratic reorientation, government shall have to practice democratic norms and values sincerely and honestly. Otherwise citizen's participation may be affected by biased attitude. Biased action always affects any of the parties and it is universal that this comes back as reactive as a 'bumerang', which brings negative effect on the society. This will bring positive result neither for the Government nor for the society.

practiced in practical, side by side it is not that much tough to be said as impossible. It depends in fact, on the good will of the state, the government, the bureaucracy and oversight of civil society existing here. Consciousness of the citizens and their credible demands to the state will create room for fulfillment of citizen's expectation and participation.

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