BRAC STRATEGY FOR THE 1990s

A Policy Evaluation
with Recommendations

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1. INTRODUCTION.

The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee—(BRAC)—is, quite possibly, one of the largest Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the world. At any rate it is widely recognized as having a remarkable record of achievements as well as being something of a trend-setter in the field of development.

BRAC prides itself in being a "learning organization", having developed a remarkable capacity for self-transparency, learning from its considerable successes, as well as profiting from candid and fortright analysis of its errors. BRAC has thus faced several "pivotal" moments in its career. In responding to each of these, as the goals and obstacles to development revealed themselves more clearly, BRAC has gradually and successively evolved through the classical stages of the development process i.e. from a "relief-work" phase to the "developmental" and latterly, to the "mass-education" phase. In this last phase, that of mass-education, BRAC has come to accord absolute priority to social goals and educational inputs and not only to the creation of economic growth, however necessary that may be. BRAC has also, very single-mindedly, selected as its primary target-group, the landless labourer, who constitutes 51% of the population of Bangladesh.

I have been following the performance of BRAC over the past years with great interest, as well as something of curiosity. I approached this Evaluation, with some questions or "hunches" about the developmental process in general, the answers to which, I knew could only be found in the field. I was therefore pleasantly surprised to be invited by Mr. F. Abed, Director of BRAC, to do a Policy Evaluation of BRAC, as part of its programme of defining its perspectives and strategies for the 1990s. Two other teams participated in this process, besides myself – each independently of the other – that from NOVIB, the Dutch NGO, connected with BRAC and David Korten, of the Ford Foundation and the Asian Institute of Development.

I had, besides, a specific role, as an Indian - neighbour to
Bangladesh and share in an ancient tradition and character, common to this sub-continent, irrespective of later political and territorial changes - which role was to compare and exchange experiences in the remarkable developmental process in India, with its successes as well as its hazards. (It must be noted that statements, judgements and recommendations made in this report, refer specifically to this sub-continent i.e. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and should not be applied without the necessary cautions, to other regions of the Third World with different structural and cultural backgrounds eg. Africa and South America.)

BRAC's achievements have been extraordinary, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Its programmes count some 2500 groups in 2000 villages, involving a staff of 2500 workers. Credit Programmes within its Rural Development Programme, have a membership of 104,217 persons in 2033 villages. BRAC has motivated landless labourers to generate 12 million Taka* in savings from their own meagre earnings and resources. This has been ploughed back into development projects which the people plan for themselves, with the guidance of BRAC. In 1985, these locally generated finances have created 1 million man-days of employment. Beside, BRAC itself, has provided credit from the outside to groups and individuals, amounting cumulatively to 75.6 million Taka. The Recovery-rate for last year, 1987, has been 91%, an altogether enviable statistic! BRAC's Health Programmes have covered some 7 million households with its Oral Rehydration Therapy Programme (ORT), mobilizing 800 health-workers in a house-to-house campaign of health-education. Infant deaths, in particular, from the killer-disease, diarrhoea, have been reduced on a vast scale. BRAC has thus covered two-thirds of the country with the ORT Programme and is now involved in the last stage of this Programme, that will take in the remaining one-third of the country! Its Comprehensive Health Programme covers a population of 9,56,377 in some 1069 villages, while the Child Survival Programme (CSP) - consisting of ORT, Immunization and Vitamin A - covers nearly 20 millions.

* US $ 1 = 32 Taka approx.
The Manikganj Integrated Development Project and the Jamalpur Womens' Project have set equally excellent standards of achievement. Particularly good and encouraging successes have been reported in population control, where it has been inserted into the Integrated Rural Development Project. Success on this vital front evades governmental efforts, generally, as well as those of most private organizations. The Non-Formal Primary Education Programme (NFPE) had 600 centres functioning in 1987. A target of 730 centres has been projected for 1988, but the actual number expected to be functioning by that date is 900.

BRAC co-operates with the Government in several instances, such as in training personnel for the government for some development activities. A BRAC officer has also been appointed to a Governmental Committee for the re-distribution of "khar" lands to the landless.

BRAC therefore is an organization with a remarkable record of successes on an economic and material level. More strikingly, it is an organization that accords absolute priority to social and educational inputs for the development process, setting before itself, very unambiguously, the goal of social change and not only of economic growth.
2. THE QUESTION.

In the course of this scrutiny of BRAC's performance, it was evident that BRAC had once again arrived to another "pivotal moment" in its history, bringing with it a series of problems that it must face and several opportunities that it must seize. Having grown to such proportions, the question that bedevils BRAC today is: What now? Do we go on expanding or do we limit ourselves? Can we expand without losing the level of "quality" that has been achieved? Or the equally intriguing question: Can we dare or can we afford not to expand? Can this very level of "quality", hitherto achieved, be preserved and maintained without continuing to grow and expand?

These questions, I was to find out, are at the back of the minds of everyone of the Project Coordinators, Project Managers, the middle-ranging staff at head-quarters, as well as with a good number of their field-level staff. All without exception, expressed their fears about expansion, and all at the same time, felt sure that expand they must! What BRAC staff wanted to know, however, was how to do so without losing the qualitative levels of their work, taking into account as well the fact that finances are not infinite nor dedicated personnel for such a task, easy to come by. I was deeply gratified by the discussions that ensued with BRAC staff on this vital topic, for the air of field-tested experience and realism, as well as of honesty, with which such a critical issue in development practice was being handled.

The alternative, quite obviously, that presents itself as a response to the above-stated question, is to withdraw from some of BRAC's older projects and areas of action, thus transferring experienced and tested staff as well as finances to new areas of operation.

The unanimous opinion, however, at all levels of BRAC staff, forthrightly and courageously stated, is that there is no single position from which BRAC could withdraw, not even from the very oldest of BRAC's initiatives, at Sulla. (Results of trying to withdraw after twelve years from their oldest initiative at Sulla I was told by a senior member of BRAC staff, were, "disgusting".)
On the other hand, it must be stated very emphatically that things do work where BRAC is present, and very well, indeed! It is rather an indication of how difficult and alien a socio-cultural environment it is that BRAC operates in and with which it must, in reality, cope and contend with.

I tried to go beyond the quantitative statistics, behind the scenes, to sense some of the "intangibles" or more subtle, human and qualitative changes that might have resulted from the activities of BRAC. In the course of frequent and informal exchanges with BRAC staff, some of them surfaced: killings and murders, a not infrequent occurrence between and among the landless and the poor, I discovered, were greatly reduced; corruption at government Food-for-Work sites was reduced, even eliminated; normally intransigent and corrupt local officials were more serviceable ....... these were some of the beneficial results or spin-offs from BRAC's presence in its operational areas, and which indeed do not count for little! The problem however is that this lasts as long as BRAC is present and falls apart with BRAC's absence.
It, therefore, comes as something of a surprise, that the remarkable economic growth triggered by BRAC, has not, of itself, led to "social change" or more accurately, to "social transformation" at a more profound societal level i.e. to the creation and internalization of the basic "social-cultural values" or patterns of social behaviour required for self-sustained, autonomous economic growth. It must be remembered, however, that this self-sustained economic growth is only one of the many pre-requisites for the longer term goal, which is a relatively more equal and just society. (One local sage has called this incapacity for self-sustained economic growth - "non-weanability".)

** There is an increasing number of signals from the field, regarding this matter. Prof A.K. Gupta, of the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India, in his evaluation-study of a well known NGO in India, states, "it was hoped that economic change so taking place would bring about social change in the desired direction... During a year long participatory evaluation and introspection, (they) have realized that the task of social change has not followed automatically from the economic change. It has also been recognized that the economic changes in many cases have widened the disparities". (from "A Note for Training needs of Social Centre" by Prof. A. K. Gupta, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India.)

For more details on this subject, cfr. Appendix No. 1, 2.

More intriguingly, some of the finest educational inputs from BRAC - to which, no doubt, its economic successes on the material and economic level are due - have neither brought about this "social transformation" referred to above.

A very elementary truth seems to have been lost sight of: that there is not only an economic infra-structure to every society but also a cultural infra-structure of "socio-cultural values" or social disciplines that is as important, if not more so. Non-weanability of BRAC's projects is primarily due to the lack
of these "socio-cultural values", as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.
3. A RESPONSE.

To return to the original question: why cannot BRAC withdraw from any single project after nearly twelve years of some of the finest economic achievements and educational inputs? Why is no single project of BRAC able to assume the autonomy that BRAC tries to pass on to it? Why have the basic "building-blocks" or "socio-cultural values" required for this, not been created, assimilated, and internalized, as yet? Without this, self-sustained growth or "weanability" - which I have earlier pointed out, is only one of the many pre-requisites for the achievement of the longer-term goal i.e., a relatively more equal and just society - will remain unattainable. Economic growth not having brought this about, nor the educational inputs by BRAC - to which efforts, incidentally, BRAC accords top-priority - where, then, does one look for an answer or a solution?

Prior to my departure for Bangladesh, I had done extensive back-ground reading into the development problems there. In my reading, there surfaced several references to certain social and cultural cultural traits or "dysfunctions" mentioned by some authors and persons with extensive field-experience, as being the causes of this above-mentioned failure. I tested a list of these on a wide spectrum of BRAC staff, individually and in group discussions, as well as at a final general meeting at BRAC's headquarters, at the end of my visit. All agreed that, indeed, these cultural "dysfunctions" were very much in evidence at village level, and were, in fact, very important causes in preventing BRAC's projects from "taking-off" or achieving self-sustained growth.

These social and cultural dysfunctions are the following:
1. "Irreconcilable factionalism" as indicated by David Korten in "Community Organization and Rural Development - A Learning Process"
in "Public Administration Review", Sept.-Oct. 1980, p.489. This refers to the paralysing divisiveness among the poor, themselves, which is one of the greatest obstacles to the creation of solidarities amongst them. My experience in India would seem to confirm this opinion. These solidarities are vital to the process of the poor raising themselves, socially as well as economically, through co-operation, as well as in facing the inevitable "backlash" or retaliatory action from vested interests, which are often quite violent. Korten demonstrates the extent of this factionalism with the example of earlier efforts of BRAC to build "Gonokendra" (i.e. Peoples' Centres) in each village, which were rendered unsuccessful due to this paralysing divisiveness. In fact, scarcely any form of development based on co-operative effort or on a communitarian basis, is possible without outside intervention. In my opinion, this remains one of the greatest stumbling blocks to development by the poor, themselves. As stated earlier, it is the special merit of BRAC, on the other hand, that things work where and when it is present. The problem really is that after twelve years, BRAC is not able to withdraw without endangering the projects concerned.

(This factionalism is generally based on "personalisms" rather than "objective issues", and can reach such irrational proportions in that even the personal gain of the persons involved in a co-operative action or in a village-level community action, does not generally prevent them from destroying the same, because of "personal" differences.)

2. "Mistrust" among and between the poor, themselves, as well as at the total village-level, seems to be a way of life in Bangladesh. This has been referred to by Clarence Maloney in his book "Behaviour and Poverty in Bangladesh" (Univ. Press Ltd. 1986, pp. 55-56.) This is a very interesting book dealing with what might be called the "socio-cultural infra-structure", synonym for socio-cultural values- and its role in the development process in Bangladesh. Maloney states that a man who has worked for years to organize the credit-union movement in Bangladesh told him
that "the main problem is that we have not yet learnt to work
together". In one village, I was told by the villagers that
they felt that they could surmount their differences and fac-
tionalism while BRAC was present but that things would collapse
the moment BRAC would pull out.

3. "Intolerable and degrading corruption" exists at every step
of daily life. This emphatic statement was made to me by Mr Abed
himself, when we met in Geneva, to discuss the preliminaries of
this Evaluation. He told me that corruption had reached intoler-
able proportions. I asked him whether one could do without the
basic and elemental "principle of right and wrong" or the basic
honesties and social disciplines required for fruitful social
interaction, and could one have social justice and cooperation
without them? He told me that BRAC was beginning to realize that
this along with factionalism was indeed the great problem facing
BRAC as an obstacle to development, at field level, and that they
were not having much success in dealing with it.

(It must be understood that corruption is not merely the passing
of a few coins, below the table! It is, in fact, one of the most
efficient mechanisms of impoverishment and for increasing the gap
between the poor and the rich, since the "haves" can always pay
to distort the system in their favour while the "have-nots",
who are too poor to do so, are further pauperized eg. bribing of
local village officials and higher-ups by better-off farmers
often results in the tampering with of land-records and the con-
sequent loss of lands - and lives, sometimes - of the poor. In
Bangladesh, as in neighbouring India, there is ample evidence
of this, as well as of how corruption spreads from one level to
another, distorting even the systems of legal justice and demo-
cratic elections, finally.)

* One of the Project Coordinators of BRAC told me: we are living
not just in a corrupt society. It is also a "corrupting" society
which actively corrupts everything, and if compromised with,
even one's own family relationships!
What is strikingly evident is that 1. the basic "socio-cultural values" and "social disciplines" required for self-sustained growth or "weanability" as well as for the more distant goal of a relatively more just society, are simply not there! And the "cultural dysfunctions" at work are strong enough to impede their creation. 2. The various "dysfunctions" enumerated above that prevent "social transformation", it must be noted, are "non-economic factors" and are actually "socio-cultural" in character. It is not very fashionable to discuss the development process in terms of these socio-cultural factors being the important, even primary causes of its failure, in many cases. But, in fact, that is the case at field-level. (While it is true that "dysfunctions" exist in every society in some measure, in this context, they exist in a disproportionately higher and more destructive degree than normal. Unless these dysfunctions are reduced to tolerable and manageable levels, they will serve as strong obstacles to progress towards even economic growth that is self-sustained and weanable. Economic growth it will be seen has not curtailed these dysfunctions. It is now possible to understand why this is so, the factors that impede self-sustained economic growth as well as social transformation being socio-cultural and non-economic in nature.) 3. The problem of under-development has come to be construed as being solely a matter of an oppressor-oppressed polarity. Little attention is paid to the lack of values amongst the oppressed themselves, in many cases. This aspect needs to be attended to, firstly, for the oppressed to be able to stand together against the oppressor, and then to create a more just society amongst themselves. (This leaves us with an interesting conundrum: does poverty lead to a "breakdown" of values or does a lack of socio-cultural values lead to poverty? In cases where the latter is true, it could explain why economic growth does not of itself bring about social change. 4. Further, some of the finest educational efforts and inputs brought to bear by BRAC, on this situation, have resulted in remarkable successes on a more immediate, purely economic, material level. eg. there is no doubt that the remarkable recovery rates
on loans to the landless, standing at 91%, are the results of the educational inputs of BRAC:

These educational inputs however have not brought about a change or "social transformation" at a more profound level of socio-cultural values, necessary to make the projects of BRAC self-sustained (or "weanable") even on a purely economic and material level.

("Non-weanability" of BRAC's projects, it will now be realized, is only the direct result of the lack of socio-cultural values, whose role has been greatly under-estimated till now in the devolpment process.)

BRAC staff in conversations with me - they sometimes stopped me in the corridors, some even came to my residence - asked me to stress and re-affirm in my Report that the aim of BRAC was not only economic growth, which is no doubt necessary, but primarily the creation of socio-cultural values for a just society, within and alongside which, economic growth must necessarily take place. They felt that this was what BRAC was founded for, that in fact social change had not been achieved by them as yet, and that BRAC must re-focus itself on this dimension in the coming decade. They feared that economic growth without this accompanying change of social values might even be dangerous. These views are held actively and strongly by the average BRAC staffer. I could not help but be impressed by their level of commitment, which is not just a matter of wild idealism but is backed up by very real and impressive economic achievements. This makes their concern with the socio-cultural aspect and that of "social transformation" all the more remarkable.

4. The cause of the failure to create socio-cultural values needed for social transformation lies, I believe, in the need for a more realistic and radical understanding of the process of "education for social transformation".
4. AN ATTEMPTED "ANATOMY" OF THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION FOR VALUE - CREATION

1. This process of "value-creation" or "education for social change" is, in reality, not a merely notional or rational process, expressed in neat syllogisms, designed to convince disembodied "intellects". This is all the more so in "traditional" societies.

2. In real life, it is and must be vitally related to "power" (as understood in the Weberian sense, and which is not to be confused with "force"). Such education for social transformation, in reality, amounts to imparting values and ideas which challenge and threaten the existing and dominant power. Matthias Stiefel formerly of UNRISD and consultant to ILO, in a paper entitled "Social Participation in Development" for the International Round Table on Social Participation in Development at Laval University, Quebec, 25-28 May, 1987, (sponsored by IILS & ILO) writes:

"The question of the link between participation and power underlies many of the issues discussed so far. International organisations and governments often avoid this question in practice despite the fact that most definitions of participation presently in use in international organisations define participation, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of power. However, if participation is to be considered seriously, this issue must be addressed, as any attempt to promote or increase the active participation of the poorer social groups - i.e. to promote their greater influence on the decisions, institutions and processes that determine their lives - implies some transfer of power, however small, from one social group to another. This in turn may lead to social tension, a clash of interests and possibly conflict as some groups appear to gain what others lose. However, it must be stressed that the belief that all social groups, and society as a whole, will, in the long run, profit from a more equitable distribution of power and, concomitantly, of wealth is at the base of any quest for participation. Viewing participation in terms of a relative distribution of power in society will allow us to place local participatory experiences and struggles in their proper social context and to understand some of the fundamental reasons for their success or failure." (ibid. p. 19)
Education of this sort, therefore, is not neutral, since in reality, it grapples with the formidable, oppressive power of entrenched structures, which are not only economic but also cultural. These structures, both economic and cultural, militate actively and "diseducate" more powerfully and surely their individual members than any micro-attempts to "educate" (which may explain the generally unimpressive results of such attempts). The average individual with rare exceptions draws his "values" from these cultural and economic structures, his social behaviour being strongly influenced by them. Any attempt to create lasting change in social values must actually deal with the power of cultures to influence individuals. Finally and realistically speaking, it must be remembered that it is the "values" of groups in "power" or "dominant" groups that prevail. The necessary strategic conclusions should be drawn:

These are, therefore not static, indifferent situations. Rather, it should be clear that this is an unstable, highly volatile region down to village level. Only the naive, therefore, would underestimate the power of the inevitable "backlash" from its cultural and economic structures, when challenged. Korten, in his article earlier referred to, states that "where the poor have organized their own coops to challenge established community interests, they have commonly faced retaliatory actions they were ill-equipped to resist". The Round Table on Participation at Quebec (ILO/ILS) states that challenges to the interests of dominant socio-political groups often result in the co-option, containment or even "dismantling" of participation structures (ibid. p.4). It later refers to "intimidation" which "is less easily dealt with, but animators should be warned of possible negative consequences..." (p.6) BRAC is already facing some of this "backlash", I was told, and that it expects more in the future. BRAC must, therefore, be prepared to deal with the harsh realities of "power" and transform and knit together its projects and operations into "NETWORKS" or "CONTINUITIES" of "COUNTERVAILING POWER", firstly, to survive the reactions to its initial education challenges against vested interests and then to continue this same role for long enough to be effective. Much of BRAC's future will depend on how it responds to such realities in the 1990s.
3. This "power" also implies the power of "restraint" eg. even in relatively educated and disciplined countries of the First World, one would not imagine, for example, of organizing traffic on roads, based on "education" alone and dispense with all forms of "restraints" - which finally are functions of "power" - such as police, fines, controls, law-courts or even prison sentences. This is more and more being realized in the West regarding several critical issues facing them eg. drugs; crime, AIDS, and the environmental crisis. When all is said and done, this applies more surely to the more essential, sensitive sectors of public life. It is an over-done myth that education alone will change anything as vitally linked to deeply vested economic and cultural interests. (There is immediate uneasiness and discomfort at the mention of "power" or of "restraint". But as seen above, they are continuously used in public life in very liberal countries.)

They are also, in fact, continuously and very successfully, utilized by BRAC for initiating new social values for a more just society. For example, while discussing with members of BRAC Staff, the occurrence of killings and murders among and between the landless over personal differences - I was, in fact, trying to gauge the extent and degree of solidarity or the lack of it, among the landless, which is a vital factor in evaluating the future of a mass-movement - I stumbled upon the following interesting clue. In BRAC project-areas, the rate of killings has been greatly reduced, in fact, because of the great "respect" by the poor for BRAC's network of selfless activity (charism of "service": something greatly respected in this part of the world) as well as the "fear" of being expelled from BRAC's network of coops and other benefits (charism of "power").

(A well-known Bank for the poorer sections in Bangladesh uses a similar dynamic of social pressures with very good results. Similarly, the extraordinary recovery rates of BRAC on loans to landless poor, the reduction of corruption, even its total elimination at governmental Food-for-Work sites, because of BRAC's presence, are all "spin-offs" or resultants of the power and influences of BRAC's "network-presence".)

(Re. Control or restraint of "differential interests" cf r p.13 §2)
Simply and realistically put, it is obviously necessary to repeat, multiply, deepen, reinforce this beneficial "network - presence" of BRAC with its services and the power thereof which it exercises for good. Especially since nothing else seems to provide such results. This network should be supported and deepened with education and economic growth, crystallizing hopefully through a long, evolutionary process into the future just structures of Bangladesh. Education, linked to this type of network - presence, supporting it and deepening it over many years, should have better results than hitherto. Economic growth, created within such a framework of consciously planned "social transformation" will be necessarily of a different species.

If this role is missed by BRAC, the danger is that BRAC will dissipate itself into a series of well-meaning activities that "service" the existing structure rather than making demands on it or transforming it. BRAC is one of the very few NGOs that have the capacity for this "social transformation".

(In an endemically unstable, even violent society such as this, these are no mean achievements by BRAC. It is useless, at this point, to discuss "respect" or "fear" of being expelled from BRAC's network as an adequately dignified or noble motivational force, since anyway nothing else seems to deliver such results!)

After the final conference at BRAC head-quarters, with a large representation of BRAC staff present, a Project-coordinator of BRAC told me: we have always used this approach till now. In future, we will use it more consciously!)

New patterns of social and economic behaviour are thus emerging, hesitatingly and unsurely, upon the scene, challenging it by their very presence and attracting growing structural and cultural resistances, as could be expected. They need time, encouragement, and protection against an alien environment to become rooted and internalized. Power, therefore, it would seem is needed as much as education and economic growth, and alongside them.

This "network" must provide "continuities of geographic space" as well. Extension of projects, henceforth, must not be haphazard but must link together projects, one with the other, and into
geographically contiguous "wholes" that are large enough and organically coherent enough to eventually make demands on national structures rather than just "service" them or be conditioned by them. These network-areas must strategically cover most of the normal spatial and human "interlinkages" and "interdependencies" of the average landless labourer of a given area i.e. a large enough area, across and within which he inter-marries, and commercial and bazaar relationships occur. It must include administration centres on which they depend for certificates, permissions, grants, taxes etc. Voting regions must be focussed upon geographically. This approach of geographic extension is opposed to the "test-tube" approach which would treat the project as the final unit of reference and action rather than the region and its lines of force. In fact, geographic extension is one of the essential and strategic ingredients, paradoxically, for creating and preserving the very "level of quality" which some fear might be lost through extension. The answer to BRAC's enigma, earlier referred to i.e. Expand or not? ....lies in the fact that the very "level of quality" sought to be preserved is in actuality a momentum and force against an opposing and negative force, and without which, not only BRAC's level of quality but also, quite possibly, its survival will be endangered, with time. Hence, the "level of quality", in this case, can only be preserved by keeping up the momentum through planned, strategic expansion.

Micro-realizations or actions are easily neutralized by macro-environment. Hence the change created must be on a scale large enough to withstand it and make an impact on the system.

This "network" must also provide "continuities of time". The process of "value-creation" is necessarily a long, slow evolution, against great odds. Who can say whether the twelve years of BRAC's activities were sufficient for the task? It needs time, though, not only time but also some other very definite inputs referred to in this Report, as one telescopes centuries of social evolution elsewhere into the short span of a decade or two. The question, paradoxically, is: how will BRAC survive long enough the "backlash" to its initial educational efforts, which slowly begin
to be recognized as challenges to vested interests, in order to continue further, that very process of educational challenge, for long enough. This is one of the vicious circles of field-level experience of education for social transformation. There is no way of guaranteeing BRAC this vital "continuity of time" or "gestation period" in the face of growing opposition, but to create these "networks of countervailing power".

(Finally, this network must be able to restrain and control "differential interests" that rise to the surface within any larger mass movement. These short-term interests rise to the surface and can and do take on an immediate importance and often clash with the long-term objectives of the movement. Given the high level of divisiveness and factionalism among the poor at village-level in Bangladesh, these "differential interests" could constitute a very important problem and pose as serious a threat as oppression from above. There is need, therefore, for a leadership, especially in the earlier stages of the movement, that is representative of and sensitive to the needs of the masses, but also larger and stronger than its differences, able to lead, rise above local interests and provide larger horizons for the movement. Many a mass movement has been weakened and neutralized by such divisiveness and differentials of interest. Vested, threatened interests, needless to say, are ever prepared to exploit these differences and hurry the collapse of such movements. As BRAC grows and comes to closer grips with the problems of Bangladesh in the days ahead, the above problems will undoubtedly make themselves felt increasingly.)

It is into such an organically coherent "network" that continued ideological and educational inputs, at every "nodal" point in an action-education interaction, over a substantial period of time, will bring about the social transformation that has eluded BRAC till now.
5. TRANSLATION INTO REALITY AT BRAC.
PROJECT UMBRELLA

Given this new perspective, BRAC, in reality, must henceforth gradually endow and enhance the stage of poverty-alleviation and subsistence-strategies—a stage it has managed with excellence, indeed—with the further more profound role of "social transformation". As the facts demonstrate, this is not a luxury or an ultimate refinement, but is essential, firstly, even for the more immediate material goal of making its projects self-sustaining and "weanable" from the purely economic point of view, and further, to achieve the more distant goal of a relatively more just society (which comprises many more constitutive elements besides self-sustained economic growth.)

It must be strongly emphasized at this point that this is not a dramatic change to be brought about overnight. Rather, BRAC must move gradually, cautiously and prudently, yet very decisively, towards this role, from now. This must be kept in mind as a guiding perspective and definite goal already now because: a. it will influence many choices to be made in the near future regarding, for example, different organizational, administrative styles, modes of recruitment and training etc. b. experience elsewhere in the Third World, including India, (cfr. Appendices) seem to indicate that if the seeds for social transformation are not sown and do not germinate already and along with the process of economic growth, that growth either does not take off, or is distorted, unbalanced and can do damage to not only the social interests sought but even to the purely economic interests of the poor. This will influence as well the choice, for example, of the modes of production that will determine the type of growth: elitist or social, individual or communitarian, exploitative or distributive.

The projects of BRAC must, henceforth, not be viewed as disjuncted operations, offering valuable but material services and objectives i.e. Taka, calories, kgs. of grain produced but must become active, constitutive elements of a larger "network" of power, education and economic growth used for social transformation.
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PROJECT UMBRELLA

Given this new perspective, BRAC, in reality, must henceforth gradually endow and enhance the stage of poverty-alleviation and subsistence-strategies - a stage it has managed with excellence, indeed - with the further more profound role of "social transformation". As the facts demonstrate, this is not a luxury or an ultimate refinement, but is essential, firstly, even for the more immediate material goal of making its projects self-sustaining and "weanable" from the purely economic point of view, and further, to achieve the more distant goal of a relatively more just society (which comprises many more constitutive elements besides self-sustained economic growth.)

It must be strongly emphasized at this point that this is not a dramatic change to be brought about overnight. Rather, BRAC must move gradually, cautiously and prudently, yet very decisively, towards this role, from now. This must be kept in mind as a guiding perspective and definite goal already now because: a. it will influence many choices to be made in the near future regarding, for example, different organizational, administrative styles, modes of recruitment and training etc. b. experience elsewhere in the Third World, including India, (cfr. Appendices) seem to indicate that if the seeds for social transformation are not sown and do not germinate already and along with the process of economic growth, that growth either does not take off, or is distorted, unbalanced and can do damage to not only the social interests sought but even to the purely economic interests of the poor. This will influence as well the choice, for example, of the modes of production that will determine the type of growth: elitist or social, individual or communitarian, exploitative or distributive.

The projects of BRAC must, henceforth, not be viewed as disjointed operations, offering valuable but material services and objectives i.e. Taka, calories, kgs. of grain produced but must become active, constitutive elements of a larger "network" of power, education and economic growth used for social transformation.
Social transformation is inclusive of but larger than income-generation or poverty-alleviation.

**PROJECT UMBRELLA.**

This process, in actuality, requires no new elements; it rather requires that the core-projects of BRAC be re-aligned with the new perspective described above as well as the more conscious inter-linking and use of their spin-offs to form something of an umbrella of synergy of power, education and economic growth for social transformation. An umbrella, as is well known, is essential equipment in storm or in heat in Bangladesh!

The projects of BRAC must henceforth be viewed as:
- Platforms and networks to draw and hold together a highly divisive and factionalized people. Some element of structure is eventually necessary to provide a framework of stability apart from the need to serve as networks of countervailing power.
- Means to tightly interlink and weld together the spin-offs of power and respect from its net-work presence using them to make an impact upon an environment quite alien to, even militating strongly against, the values sought to be transmitted by BRAC.
- To use this organically coherent network for sustained action, education and ideological inputs.

1. No new non-essential programmes should be undertaken, rather all available resources, material and human, should be invested in strategic expansion, geographically speaking, as well as in deepening the content of these core-programmes, both in terms of services and of inputs for value-creation. The core-programmes, in my view, are Education for value-creation, Health and Rural Development (incl. Credit). All the other projects are of lesser importance at this juncture from the point of view of linking up for social transformation.

2. The thrust of these core-programmes must be uni-dimensional i.e. they must firstly cater to as large a group as possible to give the movement as wide a base as possible. Secondly, it must cater
to the common interests of the group thus emphasizing the solidarities of the group rather than introducing differential interests, that might eventually weaken their already fragile solidarity. (It is in this respect that I have earlier pointed out that BRAC will have to make clear choices and decisions about its goals as they will determine the means adopted. The individual's or sub-group's interests, even though making good economic logic or even being more efficient in creating wealth, will have to be rejected if it is solidarity of the masses and communitarian change that is being sought.) Hence, programmes that may take some members to more sophisticated levels of occupation or earnings must be looked upon with suspicion. From this point of view, the Rural Enterprises Programme troubles me. I would welcome in its place that BRAC would lend its not inconsiderable skills and resources at organizing on the widest scale as possible, the renting of lands for cultivation by the landless, as a group. This is a well-known phenomenon in Bangladesh and pushed as much as possible would help larger numbers of people.

(Some of the brick-yard coops inspired by BRAC, are doing well and are employing landless poor. In a way, they are good means of economic advancement, and in fact help groups of landless to share in the agricultural surplus wealth of better-off farmers, as it is noted that these agricultural rich spend some of their surplus wealth on building. However, the Rural Enterprise Programme does not hold possibilities, at this juncture, of helping large masses of people, and should therefore be treated with caution.)

Education and ideological inputs must be linked to and support this "umbrella" of inter-linkages and solidarities, using their synergy. These educational and ideological inputs must be inserted at every "nodal" point in the long process of development for many years ahead and must not be limited to an introductory course of a few months.

**Problems connected with "Extension"**

The major obstacle to the idea of expansion is firstly, the costs involved for additional staff and secondly, the difficulty that is being increasingly met with of finding reliable and dedicated per-
sons to work in such difficult condition. Finances not being infinite nor dedicated staff for such a task, the problem is bound to be increasingly felt in the coming years.

One solution to this problem would be to create "barefoot" managers for the phase of expansion that has been proposed. The present field staff have an excellent spirit and sense of loyalty to BRAC and much of BRAC's successes are due to them and the inspiration provided by BRAC. But this cadre is becoming top-heavy for BRAC's purposes. Many of the field-leaders and staff are college-educated MAs etc. which has been a valuable asset for BRAC and they very rightly have to be paid well. They are also not from the area of operations, either by chance or by design. This has served BRAC well till now as it has insulated it from local factionalism and bickering - a valuable point, which people not having field experience in such circumstances may not easily appreciate. BRAC staff also take a more prominent place in its demonstrations and representations, at field-level. This is understandable in the early stages of a movement such as this.

The new emerging cadres will have to be from the landless classes, henceforth, if not necessarily from the project areas themselves. Their main recompense will be the profits they make with their fellow-landless, in a BRAC programme. Perhaps, a small honorarium may be considered but I would have misgivings about this, all the same. However, with a view to avoiding obvious problems attached to this new approach, it will be necessarily earnestly to launch upon a finely graded programme of some 5 to 7 years, of carefully identifying possible and reliable cadres of this sort training and testing them and very gradually handing over the projects to them. This should be done through and around the present staff of BRAC at its centres. Any hastiness or false optimism in this process may be fatal. Over a period of years, half of BRAC staff at each centre could be transferred elsewhere to work for expansion. In this manner, it should be possible to double BRAC's coverage in contiguous areas in the coming years, and create a local well-tested leadership.
Federation or not?

Given such a strong ideological focus, it would be contradictory to talk of federating BRAC at least in terms of its core-programmes. The idea being to increase, multiply and interlink the power derived from the net-work of projects to back and give substance to an organic social ideology, it would, in actuality, require tightening unity between the core sectors of BRAC. This should, at no time, come to be confused with rigidity. At the same time, BRAC having attained a certain size and extension, it would require greater flexibility and room for creativity in certain areas eg. at field level, though within and related to a unified structural and ideological frame-work.

One of the outcomes of this re-organization scheme would be to take part of the load of day-to-day administrative trivia off the shoulders of the Director and his Project Coordinators, by leaving field-leaders greater flexibility within clearly defined guidelines, which no doubt have been arrived at already over these years, but may need to be formalized. In fact this flexibility or decentralization is already being practiced to a great extent but needs to be exploited further. The Director and PCs will thus have more time for contact at field-level to inspire and guide so that this flexibility at field-level becomes, in actuality, a dialogue between experienced management and field-level staff at action level.

In the course of my meetings with field-staff, all were highly appreciative of the leadership of the Director of BRAC, and felt that he was needed more and more at field level as a force of inspiration.

* It must be borne in mind that "federation" is not the same thing as "de-centralization".
The scheme for re-organization of BRAC will look as follows:

IDEOL. GROUP

Finance & dealings with donor agencies

Allocation of finances to Projects by BRAC according to social priorities.

Greater autonomy at field-level for implementation, subject to guidelines.

Education, Health, Rural Develop. & Credit

Monitoring at field-level and feedback to Ideolog. Group and Management.

An Ideological Group is proposed to be set up to steer BRAC in terms of policy. It could coincide with the present Board of Directors, or have additions to it for the set purpose, or it may consist of a new group or contain some members of the staff who
equipped for such a role. It should, however, consist of some experts of international standing. The function of this group is not to spy so much as to make sure that ideological unity is preserved and that the purely economic element, however necessary it is as a component of social change, does not blur the perspectives of BRAC. BRAC, willy-nilly, is going to come to deal with power in the not too distant future. It will be necessary to have such a group as an in-built and voluntary corrective for any possible aberrations in this matter. The relationship between the Director and the administrative wing vis-a-vis this group will have to be spelt out.

Other vital sectors, related more closely to unity and clarity of purpose eg. dealing with donor agencies for funds, financial allocation of those funds within BRAC to projects and the priorities on which this is done, management of suitable educational inputs, are, in this scheme, all linked together more tightly with the Ideological Group. Final monitoring at field level of projects as well as the use of the greater autonomy at field-level that is to be sought will provide a new and important role to the Research Group. The Research Group, or its equivalent, will have the vital task of providing feedback from the field to the Ideological Group as well as Management. This sort of an arrangement should leave greater flexibility at field-level without breaking down unity of purpose, leaving the Ideological Group and Management greater scope for inspiration and guidance at field-level. These more general observations will need to be worked out on the level of specifics by BRAC itself.

NB. A stray thought about "federation": Federation is not the same as de-centralization. Besides federation takes for granted a certain stability and generalized consensus of means and goals, which are not available in this context in Bangladesh. It is also, perhaps, more easily comprehended as a mechanism in economic or commercial management rather than in ideological movements, in such a context.
THE CORE-PROGRAMMES AND OBSERVATIONS.

While I consider the Health and Rural Development Programme along with Mass Education, to be the core of the BRAC Programme in the new phase of expansion that I propose, I believe that the Health Programme should have immediate priority in time over the other two programmes. Firstly, because this programme is neutral and does not threaten anyone and hence entry into newer areas is easier through it. Secondly it is a crying need in Bangladesh, thirdly, it earns the regard and loyalty of people as few other programmes do, and lastly, in comparison with Credit, it is relatively less intricate to organize. It is also a boon, economically speaking, if one considers the fact that an attack of diarrhoea costs, each time, some 500 takas, if treated by a doctor! The average occurrence is three times a year, I am told.

It is felt by those dealing with Health that the entire programme should be upgraded in content to the level of Preventive and Comprehensive Public Health. (The "Arole approach" considered by them to be too intensive and it may be necessary to work out some less intensive method.)

BRAC should be careful, however, not to take up activities that are capable of being organized by other groups. BRAC has done yeoman service with its ORT Programme and is well into the last phase which is meant to cover the remaining one-third of the country. However, I feel this and any such future actions should be shared with other agencies and groups, BRAC having shown the way.

It is quite evident, however, that population control and family-planning are of absolute importance in Bangladesh. (It is also true that the poor have their own unassailable logic in not taking to it since numbers are an insurance and protection in deprivation and insecurity). There is evidence, however, that Family Planning Programmes do work where BRAC has inserted them into the Integrated Development Programme and not otherwise. Most Governmental attempts as well as those of NGOs meeting with little success. I suggest that BRAC has a distinctive contribution to make in this critical area, based on its past successes, and should emphasize this function in the coming decade.
The question is whether this programme should be inserted into the Rural Development Programme (RDP). RDP feels that it should not be in its programme, since Health is addressed to all while RDP works with only the landless in a village. It may be possible to have population control included in the Health Programme but linked geographically with RDP areas.

The Rural Development Programme and Credit Programmes: BRAC has achieved some absolutely remarkable and outstanding results in its Credit Programme. In completely informal programmes addressed to landless groups, with little or no security, in terms of mortgages etc. it has achieved an extraordinary recovery rate, quite unmatched elsewhere, on this scale (eg. On last year's loans of nearly 2 crore taka, it has had a recovery rate of 91%. Cumulatively, BRAC has loaned 75 million taka to landless with a similar rate of recovery!)

This Programme must be expanded along with Health, though it will necessarily be at a slower pace, owing to the greater need for organization and motivation. In reality, it would find itself following the Health Programme into new areas.

However, as the Programme grows, it will be necessary to formalize it to some extent. There is need to explore the possibility of dealing with National Banks, taking care that BRAC would have the pre-rogative to name the beneficiaries. If this is possible, and other checks and balances built into agreements with the Banks, to avoid corruption and mis-utilization in such Banks, an agreement could be hammered out, at least for a pilot-area to start with. (From my own experience in India, I am dubious about the lasting possibility of such arrangements with Banks as the level of corruption are extremely high.)

It would seem that co-operation with Grameen Bank – inspite of its remarkable financial results – is not considered suitable, for several reasons. Grameen Bank works with groups and not with the entire village community of landless persons. Grameen Bank is also not amenable to co-operate with other organizations, for valid enough reasons from its point of view. Given this difference of nature of programmes and purposes, this possibility is ruled out.
Throughout my interviews with all sections of BRAC staff, including the PC dealing with Credit, it was affirmed time and again, that their opinion was and that the Report should point out, very unambiguously, that Credit should not be allowed to dominate or supercede the educational and social dimension of BRAC's activities and goals and that it should not be used as an ultimate or paramount indicator for judging a centre's performance, as it tends to, even if unwittingly, in many cases at present. I would therefore suggest that this matter be taken up seriously, even to the point, following a suggestion made by a BRAC staffer, that project leaders in the field should not have anything to do with credit or be only indirectly connected with it.

(One highly placed officer at BRAC, who had gone out of his way to remind me, quite rightly, that there was need always to have "material" programmes and not only "ideological" inputs, all the same reiterated that Credit should not be allowed to dominate the social aspects of the programmes.)

While talking of formalizing Credit, the question of creating a BRAC Bank is bound to arise. All sections of BRAC staffers interviewed had reservations about this idea, largely fears concerning the formalisms that would be involved, and at the same time, all felt that the concept should be seriously considered and discussed. Obviously the fear, always present, that Credit might come to dominate BRAC's stated priority for the social dimension, revealed itself here. I have suggested, however, that the very danger might be removed by a BRAC Bank, with a separate administrative identity, but very closely linked in goals and intentions.

I feel that there is a very good case for a Bank and that a deep and careful study of the means and possibilities for formalizing credit is called for. It could throw light on the subject of a BRAC Bank. It doesn't need to be called by that name, of course! This discussion must be wide-ranging and intense covering all the positive points and addressing itself to the fears and dangers involved.

(A small observation: Grameen Bank does not attract as much opposition as does BRAC, in some cases. This, of course, is largely due
to BRAC approaching more "critical" areas and issues, but a Bank may serve to diffuse opposition as well as the danger of Credit influencing BRAC's functioning.)

Mass Education: The Non-Formal Primary Education Programme (NFPE) is an intensive programme of surprising coverage. It involves 2 hours a day for 5 days a week for several months. The surprising thing is that it works out with a high degree of success, with a drop-out rate of just 1 to 2%, I am told, for which this department must indeed be congratulated. There are many, however, who wonder whether such an intensive programme is required. It may be possible to reduce this amount of time involved, considering that literacy and numeracy have a validity of their own, and these along with some basic social messages, might be able to reduce the intensive time-factor in this course.

It may also help to realize that if the strategy previously outlined in this Report is accepted, education will no longer be an initial course of a few months, however valuable that is, but will have to be an on-going process of several years, parallel to the entire, evolving process of development. This is a task for the Functional Education Programme, to evolve such a comprehensive programme. It will be necessary to explore the use of diverse means of education eg. plays, songs, posters etc. A critical area to be explored, in this connection, is the scientific approach to "conflict-resolution" which will greatly aid the development of coops and the fashioning of solidarities of interests among them.

An interesting suggestion was made by Mr.-Abed at the final public session of this Evaluation: that perhaps the main thrust of BRAC, as well as its hope, given the present obstacles and difficulties, should be towards youth and teen-agers i.e. the future generation who have fresher outlooks. This is a very important avenue to be explored but I believe that it also delays the problem i.e. youth grows into the man of tomorrow within an environment existing in his society today. There are many imponderables and incalculables between the teen-ager of today and the mature man of tomorrow. However, the essence of the strategy I have prop-
osed being to push on every critical front, this should include as much the present-day landless labourer as also youth groups. I cannot end this section on mass-education without emphasizing enough that it is of utmost importance, as indicated by Paolo Frere, to move first on "neutral points" in the educational programme, and this with great prudence and care, as one should approach more "critical points" in the social system, that may and will provoke strong reactions and backlash, only after the movement is wide enough and has acquired enough depth

The Research Section: The Research Section of BRAC is coming very much into its own and holds interesting possibilities. It has before it an interesting role in the re-organization scheme I have proposed, that of providing data from the field to both the Ideological Group as well as to Management to help both perform their tasks more objectively. Interesting studies on, for example, the factors involved in the failure of Sulla to assume autonomy, as well as on Social Indicators for development in the RDP projects, were underway while I visited BRAC.

Some Allied Points:
- An important area for recruiting and building support is quite strangely, the elite class in urban areas. This is a well-known phenomenon in India. While the elite are to a great extent apathetic, there are persons among them as well as groups, economically well off enough to be idealistic and critical of the system and its inequalities and deprivations. Valuable recruits will be found among them for BRAC and its future activities.
- BRAC tends to look upon the rural areas as the main outlet for the poor. The slums in urban areas are bound to play this role sooner or later, even though they are not as pronounced a phenomenon as in neighbouring India. Their importance will grow soon with growth of industrialization with its capacity to mop up labour surplus and the rootless rural poor.

I end this Report with the remark that BRAC is one of the few NGOs that has achieved both the level of "quality" and the size of "extension" which place it in the privileged position of being able to launch upon the process of social transformation.
Certain terms have been used in this Report which may need further explanation:

SOCIAL or SOCIETAL...........CHANGE/WORK: The labels "Societal" and "Social" refer to "Society" - I will not try to define it, at this stage - which is understood as the final unit within which development takes place. "Society" therefore has certain very specific roles: a. the role of creator, preserver, and propagator of "social values" and social patterns of behaviour and interaction, evolved within a given society, which influence and are influenced by economic change. Society recruits, forms, and "socializes", to a remarkable extent, its individual members and their social behaviour, the more so in "traditional societies". Society, therefore, provides and is the cultural infra-structure and matrix of social behaviour and hence must be dealt with in any attempt to create deeper, more lasting forms of social change. This cultural infra-structure is as real as the economic-structure of a society, and as important, if not more so, for social development. b. the role of prime-mover of social change and development, which are primarily the responsibility of Society. Other groups eg. aid-agencies, internal pressure groups etc. only help or prod Society to perform its duty and can never usurp this role. The words "social" and "societal" have, however, become "tired" having acquired several connotations that are harmless and often misleading eg. "Social work" can come to mean a noble gesture or a well-intentioned hand-out by groups, associations, either internal or external, intended to relieve a situation of deprivation or hardship. In doing so, they do not take into account the role of Society itself in creating that situation by its failure and abdication of this primary role. Every development initiative or "project" must, therefore, in some way refer itself to this prime-mover, Society, by not only alleviating symptomatic poverty but contributing to creating the "societal" values required for social transformation. This view will need to be applied differently in various parts of the world. In Bangladesh, it would seem to call for more intensive transformation. Social action without this outlook runs the risk of becoming a phenomenon that is parallel, well-meaning but superficial.
This concept, rightly understood, would imply that for "social change" to occur - I prefer to call this "societal change" for reasons that will now be apparent - a scale of change, in terms of size and intensity, is required in order to influence and "transform" Society to play its role of development. Projects must be judged, in the last analysis, by this norm. Micro-projects, besides offering symptomatic relief of poverty, have deeper meaning only if they build up cumulatively to relate to and impact upon Society.

CULTURE: a pattern of generalized social values or perspectives that is internalized by and influences the individual member's behaviour within a social unit. Society and Culture, therefore, have an actual, formative and conditioning effect upon the individual's behaviour, to a great extent. While this is more evident in "traditional societies", it is more subtly present in modern, liberal societies eg. the power of the advertising media over the individual. In both the above cases - that of "society" and of "culture" - I am greatly influenced by Durkheim's "holistic" approach to society and culture, which states that "the whole is more than the sum of its individual parts". This "holistic" level is larger than the arithmetic sum of the behaviour of individual members (= "synergy") and influences their social values and perspectives to a remarkable extent. Individuals, therefore, draw their social values from a society and its culture. Rare are the cases where the individual breaks out of the patterns of generalized behaviour in a given society or culture. It is this "holistic" level of society and culture that must be addressed to and dealt with to create the new social values required for self-sustained and lasting social change. (The fact that most NGOs are unaware of this, is partly the reason, along with their lack of size, for their inability to create deeper social change.)

POWER and CONSTRAINT are, therefore, related to the concepts of Culture and Society, in this Durkheimian sense i.e. a Society or Culture, being larger than the arithmetic sum of its individual members, exerts a certain collective pressure and influence on the
individual eg. one might get into trouble if one would spit in public in some societies, while one may get into worse trouble in others, if one tries to prevent it. Similar transpositions can be made for corruption, equality, cooperation, truth, justice etc.

It must also be borne in mind that, when all is said and done, it is the values of the groups in "power" or the "dominant" groups that prevail. The necessary strategic conclusions need to be drawn.

CULTURAL FIT: Cultures provide a "fit" or lack of it, in so far as they provide a cultural and behavioural infra-structure or background that can be either positive or negative to the process and content of social change. This cultural infra-structure is as real as the economic infra-structure and is increasingly being recognized as having great importance for the social and human aspect of the process of change and for determining the social aspect of economic growth. If the cultural infra-structure is positive to social change, as it is in some areas and societies, then economic growth has positive results; if it is negative, the results can be negative or even anti-social. Therefore, economic growth can either increase the gap between rich and poor or can create equality. Economic growth is, therefore, neutral and its social effects are interpreted and translated, positively or negatively, by this cultural infra-structure.

In this light, it will be useful to analyse the goals and strategies of BRAC in terms of "cultural fit":

eg.: Your strategies viewed in terms of creating......
Your difficulties and obstacles in terms of......
Your goals, choice of projects, size, strategies, inputs etc. in terms of achieving......

"Cultural fit"

It should, therefore, come as no surprise, that Gunnar Myrdal, who stresses the role of "non-economic" factors and that of "cultural
values" for development in Asia (cfr. "Asian Drama") reminds us that all cultural revolutions of Europe took place before the Industrial Revolution.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND THEIR PRIORITY IN DEVELOPMENT

Celebrating the 40th. anniversary of India's Independence, on 15th August, 1988, YOJANA, the official journal of the Planning Commission of the Government of India, on that same date, has published a souvenir-issue, reviewing the development process, as it has unfolded itself over the last four decades of freedom in India. Noted economist, Dr. Babatosh Dutta, Prof. Emmeritus, Calcutta, makes a distinction between "growth" which means "economic transformation" and "progress" which implies "social transformation". He states that this "social transformation" has not been achieved in India, inspite of a measure of economic growth, for which reason Prof. Dutta says India "is and will for a long time remain a less developed country."

Dr. B.B. Bhattacharya of the Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi, points out that inspite of the Green Revolution in the country, and a surplus of 25 million tons of grain, "availability per capita per day of food-grains has declined from 480 gms. in 1964-65 to between 450 and 470 gms. in subsequent years". It is noteworthy that some of the finest economists in the country, while reflecting on the process of development in India, with its considerable material gains, need to have recourse, finally, to the term "social transformation". It is in this sense, conveying a decisively different orientation to development, that the term has been used in this Report.

The staff of BRAC, interviewed in the course of this Evaluation, strongly asserted their feeling that economic growth of itself, does not seem to have brought about social change or social transformation. They were even troubled by the fact that economic growth, however much it is one of the elements required in the process of development, without this change on the social level, might even pose serious problems. They felt strongly that the early determination of BRAC that social goals had first priority and that this matter as well as the search for means for adequately introducing social inputs must be preserved as a very definite specific in its planning, execution and monitoring.
15 Aug. 1987

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SCHEDULE FOR THE PERIOD: 16 AUGUST 1987 TO 31 AUGUST 1987

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